Signifying the body: nation, sport and the cultural analysis of Pierre Bourdieu by Fjeld, Torgeir
 
DOCTORAL THESIS







Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 04. Feb. 2021
1
Signifying the body: 
nation, sport and the cultural analysis of Pierre Bourdieu
by 
Torgeir Fjeld, MA, Cand.Mag.




The present study is an interrogation of theories of culture and nation in the context of 
spectacular sports. It proposes a view of nationalism as discourses that articulate and produce 
nations through narrative acts. A wide array of concepts and tools are drawn from the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu and contrasted with methods and notions from discursive and semiotic 
analysis to interrogate a national-sports nexus in which sports are vehicles to embody nations, 
their matrices of thought and perception, and their dominant order of masculinity and 
heteronormativity in the national subject, so that this order appears natural and 
commonsensical. Particular attention is given to the case of South Africa’s participation in the 
1998 World Cup, and the way the epic genre was employed to frame the event and produce a 
particular kind of national body.
Spectacular sports events provide nations with opportunities to disseminate narratives that 
regulate desire and conjure a particular kind of national fantasy – what Bourdieu referred to as 
illusio – in subjects. This work makes a distinction between an epic body of nationalism, a 
body enmeshed in "the natural and authentic," and an excessive body. However, mediations of 
sports are never merely reflections of social events but themselves participate in producing 
these events as meaningful and anchor them as national. Furthermore, an actively interpreting 
subject is required for the production of meaning, and in this regard the thesis offers a critique 
of Bourdieu’s limited view on what it entails for a recipient of nationalist discourse to be 
active. The questions addressed by this study is twofold: how and what kind of national order 
of the body and desire is manufactured through spectacular sports events, and how are 
mediations of such events made meaningful in subjects?
The open-ended character of signification means that beneath the level of nationalist 
anchorage of spectacular sports events other articulations are possible. Drawing on Bourdieu’s 
view of sports as forms of silent dressage, the thesis suggests that there is a potential excess of 
meaning that enables such events to become potential sites of subjective truth: as viewers 
realise the fantasmatic character of such mediations they may come to question the notion that 
spectacular sports are something more than just a game.
© Torgeir Fjeld 2011
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1. Introduction: Making meaning of sports
Sports may be inserted into a number of knowledge contexts. When someone says, “I know 
football” we generally take that to mean that we are speaking to a person who knows not only 
the rules of football, but also has some experience of playing the game. Knowing football may 
also include familiarity with an esoteric set of records associated with the game – well-known 
players and managers, winners of important games, knowledge of significant events, and so 
on – and with an increasingly specialised set of expert knowledges; psychological 
applications to football, biological applications, sociological and philosophical knowledges, 
and so forth (Bourdieu, “Sports fan” 342-345; Foucault, “Discourse on language” 224; 
Shumway and Messer-Davidow 203-208). Not all of these knowledges are subject to the 
strictures of academic knowledge regimes, but at least one of them has an element that 
remains beyond words. As a form of practical competence, football constitutes a way of 
knowing with the body that can only be verbalised with some effort, since it is to a large 
extent taught silently, transferred from the teacher’s body to the body of the student, without 
ever reaching the level of verbal utterances (Bourdieu, “Program” 160).
This is a study of sport, and particularly football, as a cultural phenomenon. While the 
term discipline may usefully be applied to football in a number of ways – indicating how the 
body is ordered or trained to master the sport, how the game can be approached or mastered 
from the perspective of a number of academic fields, or how the attainment of a specialist 
knowledge entails the attainment of discipline (Shumway and Messer-Davidow 203) – 
cultural studies is the academic field in which this study is situated.1 Specifically, our concern 
is with how we know with our bodies and how they are made knowable to us through a 
1 For a thorough discussion of the use of the term discourse in the work of Ernesto Laclau in relation to a 
broader Cultural Studies – most often to be understood as that of John Mowitt (see Bowman). Against the 
fetishisation of “alterity” criticised by Stuart Hall and others, Bowman (p. 203) proposes to distinguish between 
work “that is unproblematically disciplinary versus work that is interruptive” 
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particular kind of matrix, namely that which has been formed to cultivate a deeply embedded 
sense of national belonging in us. When inculcated through sports this matrix may be referred 
to as the national-sports nexus, the term adopted in this study.
Nationalism, writes Benedict Anderson, is impressive not so much in that it affords 
people something to live for, as that it is a concept for which millions are willing to die 
(Imagined Communities 6). Nationalist narratives tell stories of deep horizontal comradeships 
among their members. Taking the place of the great religious systems, nations endow our lives 
with a meaning that stretches beyond our individual life spans. Nations conjure images of 
themselves as harking back to immemorial times and stretching into a limitless future while in 
actuality they are temporal, limited entities. Such national narratives and national ways of 
perceiving, thinking and acting have become naturalised and are often taken for granted or 
accepted as an essential part of our being.
This study is situated at the intersection of sport and national narratives. It is 
concerned with the ways in which nations make use of sports to constitute themselves as 
essential human attributes rather than contingent social formations. Sports are vehicles to 
entrench the nation as a matrix in our habitual engagement with the world. Through sports the 
nation becomes a way of perceiving, thinking and acting in the world. We are trained, taught, 
and – finally – disciplined to regard the nation as an attribute of what it means to be a human 
being as natural as “having a nose and two ears” (Gellner 6).
We are centrally concerned with questions of meaning and significance. Nations make 
use of sports to manufacture distinctions between desirable and unwanted bodies, gender 
performances and sexualities. However, such mediations of desire are made meaningful only 
at the moment of reception, and this study argues for an actively interpreting subject of 
national discourses. Our central research questions are: (1) How and what kind of national 
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order of desire is manufactured through spectacular sports events? and (2) How are 
mediations of such events produced as meaningful to subjects?
National sport and the gaze
In order to advance in answering these questions, we need to make some important 
distinctions. Sports have become part of our lives in two different but closely related ways. 
Most of us have at least some experience of practising a sport and the training that is entailed 
in mastering it. Napoleon dreamt of solidifying his empire with the use of a national discipline 
(Foucault, Discipline and Punish 169), and physical education as a nation-wide subject is part 
of nation states’ efforts in promoting bodies that have a shared frame of reference in their 
physical training, in other words, to mould national subjects.
We experience sports in a different way as well: as mass mediated spectacles 
performed by elite athletes. Even if the sport may be familiar to us through our own practice 
of it, the way it is performed, the level of achievement and excellence, and the stakes of the 
contest make the game so alien to us that we are reduced to passive comprehension 
(Bourdieu, “Program” 160). The further the distance between our own experience of 
practising the game and the sport as it is presented to us through the mass media, the greater 
the chance that audiences will be content with cheering for “their” team, taking delight in its 
successes, and what Bourdieu calls extrinsic aspects of the game, such as the gains of winning 
or losing.
Mass mediated sports are therefore centrally about training the body in a different 
sense: it is about training the eye, instructing us how to observe sports, and to coordinate our 
gaze with the pleasures we derive from watching. While the kind of disinterested observer we 
find in Kant’s writing on aesthetics is incompatible with the rousing of emotions favoured by 
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modern sport spectacles, there is an analogous incongruity in the application of the gaze in the 
two modes of observation. While the former favours a pure gaze acquired through a kind of 
implicit learning, enabling the viewer to sift out all things that may serve to rouse the kinds of 
passions and emotions “ordinary” people experience in their “ordinary” existence (Bourdieu, 
Distinksjonen 48-49), the latter takes pleasure in a drowning of consciousness and allowing 
their emotions to be agitated, and may therefore make use of the gaze to seek out precisely 
those things that stir up emotions. The way the gaze is exercised in spectacular sports 
reinforces social orchestration: by structuring how audiences observe, these events strengthen 
and reproduce bodily and collective mimesis (Bourdieu, “Logic” 167). We are directed to 
observe particular events and trained to imitate them – if not expressly with our bodies, then 
as recollections of past practice – and in so doing our habits are formed outside conscious 
awareness.
There is a third way to train the gaze. Bourdieu notes that the posture or gaze inhabited 
by the scholastic observer must be fundamentally different from that of those who are 
involved in social processes. It involves a distance from the immediate intelligibility of the 
world, and the posture of the scholastic observer is a “disposition to regard his or her 
experience and practice as an object about which one talks and thinks” (Mesny 60;). There is 
an analogous relationship between the kind of rigorous knowledge production that takes place 
in academic disciplines and that which is transferred and circulated in sports. This will be 
discussed further in chapters 3 and in part II, which has production of knowledge in the body 
as its main concern.2
2 Chapter 3 and 6 investigate the production of discipline both in the sense of training individual bodies, 
and as rigorous accumulation of academic knowledges.
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Culture and national narratives
As a study of culture, this investigation relies on a double usage of the word. As Stanley 
Aronowitz reminds us: “culture may be taken both as the civilizing process – where the 
assimilation of art and its traditions is understood as one of the crucial elements of self-
creation – and, in the anthropological sense, as the practices (and, Bakhtin argues, utterances) 
that constitute everyday life” (Aronowitz 119-120). To cultivate means to engage in a practice 
to bring someone, perhaps even oneself, into culture. It includes an element of training, and a 
sense of transferral of knowledge from master to student. Bourdieu writes thoroughly on this 
relation, both as a matter of exercising the gaze and more generally as a body praxis. It is 
relevant to those who teach or learn the craft of cultural analysis or sociology, but also in the 
analysis of cultural practices, such as football, since they may provide a metaphorical 
apparatus to illustrate the educational process. In its second sense, the word culture brings 
together the writing of Bourdieu with our study of national narratives. While they approach 
cultural contingency differently, both Bourdieu’s cultural analysis and a study of national 
narratives rely on the word culture to signify a range of everyday practices configured 
differently in various spatial and socio-economic locations.
Bourdieu’s tools for cultural analysis provide a conceptual apparatus to understand the 
national-sports nexus as it is deployed in individual bodies. Foucault noted that the concept of 
the individual is itself a relatively recent invention, and probably manufactured in the late 
eighteenth century as a product of three instruments of dominance; hierarchical observation, 
normalising judgement and the examination (Discipline and Punish 170-189). Sports are 
vehicles to produce individuals through this threefold machinery: both as popular practices 
and in their mass mediated forms, sports allow their participants to be ranked in hierarchies, 
judged according to norms, and to be examined by a gaze that is exterior to the actions on the 
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field. The structure which defines the individual exists prior to any particular player and 
coordinates the struggle between participants. To put it differently, we are moulded to act in 
the world as individuals – we did not become individuals by our own choice – and while our 
notions of individual agency tend to posit a single person as an autonomous moral agent, our 
autonomy is circumscribed and structured by institutions and narratives such as those of the 
nation.
Sports may aid in understanding how our agency is circumscribed by structures 
beyond our control – and may itself be a structured device. Consider a player on the football 
field: her actions on the field are determined by the rules of the game, her team’s tactical and 
strategic game plan, her skills – which is the product of historically sedimented training and 
ability – the quality of the pitch, movements of team mates and opponents, the location and 
movement of the ball and so forth. Analogously, a player in a social field has a space to 
manoeuvre that is structured and circumscribed by rules, other players, historically 
determined skills and abilities, and the ever-changing state of the field. Our individual 
freedom to act in ways that intervene in the state of the field is highly limited. In Bourdieu’s 
field theory, the national field as an element in the field of power always contains the space 
for manoeuvre in the various sub-fields, such as the field of cultural production, and for 
individual agency.
Bourdieu tends to regard nationalism as a property of the field of power that exerts its 
influence on the way we perceive, think and act, establishing limits to our individual agency 
Nations tell stories of belonging and solidarity. The deep horizontal comradeship offered by 
these social formations requires that members renounce their individual difference and pursue 
a sense of solidarity in the face of outsiders. There is an element of subtle persuasion 
involved. Nations are relatively recent social formations, but tend to portray themselves as 
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looming out of an immemorial past – as if they were transcendent. We may be convinced to 
take part in an exchange: In return for membership in a community that promises a limitless 
future and meaning to our lives despite our mortality, we must give up our individuality and 
some of our autonomy.
Nations use storytelling as a way to persuade their members to make these sacrifices. 
To Benedict Anderson nations came into existence by acts of the imagination (Imagined 
Communities 6). The new communities that demanded their independence from the imperial 
centres at the end of the eighteenth century were imagined as national, and it was previously 
imperial subjects in the American colonies who conjured these new communities. The 
particular form of the new national imaginary is not without consequence.3
While nations narrate themselves as unparalleled and particularly compelling 
specimens, the very structure of these stories reveal the common foundations to nations. 
Perhaps it is a national drive for singularity that compels nations to narrate themselves in the 
epic form. This genre portrays a national heroic past, a world of “beginnings” and “peak 
times” in the national history. Mikhail Bakhtin (p. 15) noted that the national past of the epic 
is clearly demarcated in time and space from our own present. This absolute separation 
between the world of the epic and our own makes it suitable for arguments that nations are 
beyond human creation and democratic constitution.
Stories of sports are closely related to epic narratives. At the very core of the national-
sports nexus we find the epic as bridge and reminder of the location of sport as a subfield to 
the national field of power. Despite their apparent differences, nations appear to share 
narrative ground.
3 Chapter 4 proposes a discursive approach to nationalism modelled after Benedict Anderson’s view of 
nations as contingent and imagined communities. It discusses how articulation and narrative are essential to the 
construction of nations, and provides specific examples for the South African social formation. Chapter 5.1 
offers a detailed discussion of how the South African nation was produced through narratives of football in the 
transmission of the 1998 Football World Cup on South African television.
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Bourdieu and sport
Although this is centrally a study about Bourdieu’s type of cultural analysis, it is not a 
monograph. Bourdieu wrote two pieces that had sport as their explicit theme. “Program for a 
sociology of sport” was first published in 1988 and deals with sport as system of preferences 
structured on the basis of the degree of engagement with the body (see above and chapter 3). 
It also proposes a two-stage model of sports – a stage of appropriation and a stage of 
dissemination, or “popularisation“ – as well as the idea that sports are useful in governance in 
that they manufacture a necessary consent from participants’ bodies – a consent that might 
have been refused if the body was not in a state of “somatisation” engendered through sport. 
In this paper, Bourdieu also develops the idea of sports as raising the question of what it 
entails to understand “with the body”, and what it means that practitioners of sports are taught 
to communicate in a silent, practical way. These issues are discussed further particularly in 
chapter 3, but also form the basis of the arguments in parts II and III of this study, which deal 
with embodied knowledges and mass mediated sports respectively.
The second piece, “How can one be a sports fan?”, has appeared in print in various 
places. The version published in 1993 in Simon During’s often used reader of cultural studies 
will form the basis of the discussion here. In “Sports fan”, Bourdieu develops the idea of sport 
as a kind of physical art-for-art’s sake developed in private schools in the nineteenth century 
that had the purpose of instilling a disinterested relation to one’s body in those who 
participated. In this essay Bourdieu also gives some detail with regard to how the 
appropriation of sport took place and what kinds of uses sport and physical education served 
to the dominant fraction of the dominant class: by adopting vulgar games and filtering them 
through a sieve of the values characteristic of this fraction – "fair play," rôle distance, etc. – 
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sport became a vehicle both to train the future leaders of industry and government, as well as 
to disseminate the values of this fraction to the larger public in the popularisation phase, 
presenting such values as "natural" and "intrinsic" to sport. As such, sports are appropriate 
examples of the larger structure Bourdieu investigates: how precisely the values and interests 
of a fraction of the dominant class became a normative world view. 
It is also in this essay that Bourdieu specifies the various relations to the body that 
emerge from different class “habituses”, and how what he calls the “macrobiotic cult of 
health” emerged. Again, these ideas will be the topic of chapter 3, and will also be central to 
the argument developed around the use of what Bourdieu elsewhere calls illusio in order to 
produce a containable, governable body in chapter 7. In chapter 8, I challenge the idea 
Bourdieu proposes in “Sports fan” that mass mediated sports tend to render those who watch 
passive. Against this view I enlist the work of Stuart Hall and others who show that any 
decoding activity, necessary to make meaning of televised sport, involves an active 
engagement on the part of the viewers. This echoes the debate in chapter 2, regarding the 
status of mediated texts and the role a process of signification plays in the production of 
meaning. Bourdieu theorises what he refers to as symbolisation, but does not break with what 
Tony Bennett refers to as the “mirror theory” of language. As a consequence, Bourdieu’s view 
on the process of mediation is limited by the under-theorised role of the recipient in making 
sense of the message.
In “Program” Bourdieu offers what he calls some “general, programmatic” guidelines 
for analysts of sport as cultural phenomena. These guidelines are supplemented with advice 
and instructions regarding methodology and the practical activity of research from his Paris 
and Chicago workshops, reprinted in Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive  
Sociology (1992), as well as other key texts.  
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Monographs that focus exclusively on Bourdieu’s work and have been consulted here 
include David Swartz, Culture and Power (1997), and Annick Prieur and Carsten Sestoft, 
Pierre Bourdieu (2006). Additionally there are book-length studies that focus on aspects of 
Bourdieu’s approach, such as Richard Schusterman, Bourdieu. A Critical Reader (1999), and 
Michael Grenfell and David James, Acts of Practical Theory – Bourdieu and Education  
(1998). These works are consulted here and quoted where applicable. In addition, secondary 
literature is consulted in the form of journal articles, web resources, and so on, and referred to 
in the chapters that engage the particular aspects of Bourdieu’s approach to cultural analysis.
Much of the work in this study concerns finding the appropriate tools to investigate the 
various elements of the national-sports nexus. In order to understand mass mediations and 
signification, Bourdieu’s work is supplemented with insights from cultural and media studies 
(e.g. Bennett; Hall “Encoding/decoding”,  “Encoding and decoding in the television 
discourse”) to bring out the work of the viewer in making meaning of mediated events. The 
discursive approach to nationalism that is the topic of chapter 4 is prepared with a set of 
concepts from discourse theory in chapter 3, such as articulation and subject position. By 
comparing discursive approaches to Bourdieu’s type of cultural analysis I show the 
similarities and ruptures between the two modes of thought.
Sport and cultural capital
One way in which Bourdieu’s cultural analysis overcomes the impasse between subjectivist – 
those who overemphasise the role of the individual – and objectivist – or determinist – 
approaches is through the term habitus. The habitus invests individuals’ actions with social 
force: our perceptions, thoughts and acts are structured by our historically sedimented 
elements in social fields. The habitus is an organising concept. It gives expression to the 
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totality of an agent’s dispositions.
The term field makes it possible to describe how agents and groups struggle for 
dominance and cultural capital in socially distinct arenas. In Bourdieu’s view of the social 
world, sports are sub-fields to the larger field of cultural production. Like other such fields, 
sports offer specific forms of cultural capital – or recognition – to those who engage in them. 
In the system of preferences with regard to sport, the determining element is “the degree of 
engagement of the body” (Bourdieu, “Program” 157). The most distinctive value – or cultural 
capital – is bestowed on those who associate with sports that euphemise violence to the 
highest degree, so that, in golf, distance is created “by the very logic of a confrontation which 
excludes all direct contact, even through a ball” (ibid. 158).
Sports tend to have a common trajectory: out of vulgar games by and for the common 
folk, these activities were disconnected from their religious and bodily purposes, and used as 
a kind of physical art-for-art’s sake in British private schools to instil a relation of 
disinterestedness to their bodies in the “sons of the heads of private industry” (Bourdieu, 
“Sports fan” 344). Sports claimed their cultural autonomy by refashioning these games in 
accordance with the mechanisms of high modernity: rationalisation, calculability, 
predictability and a corpus of rules which turned common games into activities with a distinct 
distance from material interest. When sports return to the masses, differences in their 
popularity indicate their distinctive values.4
Bourdieu distinguishes between cultural practices in large and small-scale production 
(“Field” 38; The Rules of Art 124). While less popular sports, such as aikido and golf, may on 
occasion be made available to wider audiences, none of them have an audience on the same 
scale as football. Consequently, having an association with practices in the field of small-scale 
cultural production offers a higher distinctive value – or cultural capital – than an association 
4 Chapter 3 discusses Bourdieu’s cultural analysis of sport in greater detail.
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with a mass-produced spectacle such as football.
Football may reward elite practitioners with considerable economic gain, embedded as 
the sport is within the field of economic production, but in return it offers little cultural 
capital. It is regarded as the world’s most popular sport. The fewer who appreciate and 
practise a cultural form, the more cultural capital it commands. Bourdieu expressed this logic 
in his dictum that the logic of the cultural field is that of the economic field inverted (“Field” 
29-73): the higher degree of autonomy from the economic field, the more cultural capital we 
associate with the practice, and the more distinctive is the kind of recognition offered to those 
who associate with it. The distinction between a sport in small-scale production, such as golf, 
in relation to a large-scale sport, like football, is a product of a threefold difference: there is a 
significant difference with regard to the characteristics of those who practice them; they can 
be distinguished by taking account of their location within the field of cultural production; 
and they can be delineated from each other by accounting for inherent characteristics, 
specifically their euphemisation of violence.5
Outline of study
This study is divided into three main sections. The first considers general approaches to 
representation and signification, Bourdieu’s cultural analysis contrasted with discourse theory, 
and theories of nationalism. The second section argues that there is a changing body of sport. 
Both in the micro technologies of governance we find in school sports and in the mass 
disseminations of spectacular sports events nations have hitherto sought to establish an epic 
body. However, a new, globalised body is emerging. This body is primarily signified as 
“natural” and “authentic” (as opposed to “corrupted” or “disingenuous”), and relatively 
autonomous of the division along national boundaries established in and through the “epic 
5 See chapter 8 for a further discussion of these distinctions.
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body”. The third section is more specifically concerned with spectacular sports, and how they 
provide illusions that may dupe, but also offer the possibility of awakening, the spectator.
Together, the study attempts to interrogate the relations between sport, media, and 
nations, how sports are used to inscribe nations onto the body, how nations are naturalised, 
turned into an automatisation of habit, and made part of our dispositions to perceive, think and 
act. Before we begin our venture into the national-sports nexus proper, it may be useful to 
consider some general theories on how meaning is made.
Chapter 2 interrogates two models of representation and their specific implications for 
the relationship between sport and society. The first model, often referred to as the mirror-
theory of representation, posits that the site of representation – in our case sports – is best 
described as a mirror of that which is represented, i.e. society. For instance, in terms of the 
mass media, those who hold this view on the actual or ideal relationship between media and 
society, claim that the media is, or should be, as accurate a reflection as possible of society. In 
Plato’s ideal republic, poets would be banned, since all events would be immediately 
meaningful to the ruling philosophers, and such events would therefore not need 
representation by skilled mediators. In the mirror theory of representation, there is finally no 
medium: the world represents itself. The perspective is challenged by the process-oriented 
approach to meaning proposed by Stuart Hall. In his view, meaning is not given in the 
message, but is produced through interpretation, which opens the way for a range of 
subjective meanings – which may be structured by context and the recipient’s location in 
social space – produced by the same representation of a sports event.
Chapter 3 provides a toolbox to interrogate the national-sports nexus. We start from a 
critique of the knowing subject established through practices of self-reflexivity and 
objectification, and ask which tools are necessary to produce a disciplinary and disciplined 
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knower of cultural analysis. Discipline is a term used here to describe a form of mastery, a 
kind of dressage of the body, and knowledges that are circulated in academic fields. In all 
these senses, the term discipline may usefully be considered as discourse. In this chapter we 
investigate key terms for analysing discourses; articulation, antagonism, elements, and 
discursive moments. We then consider some key terms from Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory of 
culture, such as dispositions and the habitus, symbolic capital, and illusio. Chapter 3.1 
discusses the subject in Bourdieu in more detail and relates it to the subject of discourse 
theory. In chapter 3.2 the referee is considered as a case to understand how the concepts of 
subjectivity, performativity and role-awareness may play out in a practical setting.  
Chapter 4 takes a view of nationalisms as discourses that articulate and narrate 
nations. It considers Benedict Anderson’s approach to nationalism as founded on social 
antagonism, dissemination of vernacular languages, and conception of time as homogenous 
and empty. Anderson’s model is contrasted with those of Eugene Kamenka and Peter Alter – 
with nationalism based on social contracts and on organic, ahistorical communities. We ask if 
particular sports events may complicate the smooth, homogeneous time of nationalism, and 
whether they may be enlisted in a production of an epic, messianic moment so as to establish 
a break with the past. In order to situate our study of the 1998 Football World Cup in section 
4.1 and the chapters on the changing body of sport in part II, we then ask from what kind of 
political organisation and social imaginary the current South African regime emerged. Where 
does nationalist thinking come from and what are the elements specific to these kinds of 
social formations? Chapter 4.1 considers the development of South African nationalism as a 
discourse articulating antagonisms based on language and colour. These divisions were later 
resignified as national. It is with the arrival of the post-apartheid political formation that the 
need to establish a break with the past makes itself felt. Chapter 5.1 suggests that such a break 
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is attempted by establishing the 1998 Football World Cup as a messianic moment, 
symbolising the new regime and its novelty.
Part II of the study makes use of the concepts and methods arrived at in the first part 
and applies them to shifting perceptions of the sporting body. First, chapter 5 considers the 
ways in which social codes and values are inscribed into the bodies of those who participate 
in sports, and we are particularly concerned with the establishment of an epic, national body 
through the automatisation of military dispositions, the dominance of values associated with 
the emerging bourgeoisie, and the mass production of individuals codified as dimorphic and 
autonomous in sports. We ask how the order of sports produces sexual difference and 
dominant forms of masculinities, and how they may be subverted within the scope of 
spectacular sports events. Chapter 5.1 considers the signification of the 1998 Football World 
Cup by South African broadcaster SABC and shows the epic framing of the national body. 
Here we discuss the ramifications of such a framing and how it contributed to establishing a 
new national story, with an epic, messianic, moment. The chapter also shows how a struggle 
over the autonomy and meaning of football between economic and national interests, and 
sports organisations is inscribed into the mediation, so that the meaning is not singular or 
given by the event itself.
Chapter 6, the second part of the section dealing with the body of sport, shows how 
there is a new kind of sporting body produced both through school sports and spectacular 
sports event. This body is globalised rather than national, and takes the “authentic” or 
“natural” body as its sign. Here we discuss further how the notion of illusio is necessary both 
as a kind of seduction of participants, but also as a state from which subjects may become 
conscious and, in turn, emancipate themselves.
In part III the focus of analysis shifts from power lodged in the body to the production 
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of desire – what Bourdieu might have referred to as social orchestration – through spectacular 
sports. Chapter 7 makes use of the terms dressage and illusio to discuss how such sports 
events are framed in a national, epic world of fathers, firsts and bests, and put to use in 
regulating desire by narrating the fundamental fantasies – illusions – that hold the subject 
together. Spectacular sports provide allegories of the excessive body meticulously produced 
through an individualising training machine. Sports produce phantasms of peak moments and 
phallic dominance, and symbolise a conquest of youth, women and the working population. 
We nevertheless ask if the subject may experience a kind of subjective destitution by the loss 
of a fundamental fantasy from watching sports and what the effects of such an experience 
may be. Can viewers come to a recognition of what Bourdieu called the illusio of social 
orchestration?6
Chapter 8 provides a critique of Bourdieu’s  theory of mass mediated sports as 
producing a passive subject. Spectacular sports participate in a struggle over the legitimate 
definition and use of the body. In Bourdieu’s view, mass mediated sports are transmitted to 
audiences that are alienated from the games they are watching, and reduced to passive 
comprehension as a consequence. However, Bourdieu’s view of spectacular sports events as 
passifying is limited and disregards the active component of meaning making as an ongoing 
process. The national body that is produced through spectacular sports events is both 
embodied in the gaze and our dispositions to perceive, think and act, and also made 
meaningful through interpretation on the spectator’s part. This chapter suggests that Bourdieu 
overlooks the way sport’s silent, wordless language may be mobilised to produce meanings 
that are unofficial and disruptive to the dominant stream of preferred interpretations.
The conclusion interrogates the multiple meanings of football. The game may be 
6 See chapter 3 for a fuller discussion of the term illusio. The term is also central to the remarks in the 
conclusion.
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dominated by the national signifier, and – as the stadium provides a key site for the 
establishment of the ego – central in the production of the national subject. Nevertheless, the 
game can be characterised as a drama, as a form of rule-bound game, or as playful activity. 
The ritual character of the game includes an element of illusio: those who participate tend to 
believe that it is something else and more than a game. This libidinal investment is a vehicle 
to transform the game from something private into a collective enterprise. The silent dressage 
of sport entails the possibility of a different site for truth.
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I Cultural Theory as Martial Arts: A Toolbox for Cultural 
Analysis
In the 2001 documentary film Sociology is a Martial Art Bourdieu describes cultural analysis 
as “a martial art, a means of self-defense. Basically, you use it to defend yourself,
without having the right to use it for unfair attacks” (McQuade). This section outlines the 
various techniques of cultural analysis as practice, with an emphasis on tools that will aid in 
understanding mediations of the national-sports nexus – theories of signification, discourse 
and nationalism –, in addition to laying out the basic concepts of Bourdieu that will be of use 
here. The main elements are listed in the title of the study; signification, sport and 
nationalism. They establish the theoretical and historical framework necessary to answer the 
question of what kind of body is manufactured through sports and how mediations of sports 
events are made meaningful to subjects.
Bourdieu himself recommended to students that they approach his style of cultural 
analysis as a toolbox. Teaching a métier, a craft, requires a different approach from “the 
teaching of knowledges (savoirs)” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 222), since the “scientific  
habitus … reacts in the face of ‘practical choices’”. Therefore, one must apply practical logic 
to research as actors would in other social fields: it is a matter of making use of the 
appropriate tool when one encounters a specific event in a particular social context. School 
sports produce different events from mediated sports events, and analysis of school curricula 
would need different kinds of methodological considerations from those used when we 
approach mediated elite sports. The analytical habitus is a “modus operandi that functions in a 
practical state” (ibid., 223) and the analyst will find tools such as field theory and dispositions 
useful to understand the refereeing subject (chapter 3.2), while terms such as illusio and social 
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orchestration are more appropriate in the context of mediated sports events (parts II and III).
While this gives an outline of the general approach to cultural analysis recommended 
by Bourdieu, and followed in principle here, the specific tools we shall need are not exhausted 
by those we find in the writings of Bourdieu. This study is not intended as a monograph of 
Bourdieu: rather, in order to understand the complex character of signification and mediation, 
we will draw on findings in media studies to show how the significations of mediated events 
are more complex in meaning than the events themselves. The added layer of signification 
means that the event is framed in ways that are contestable, so that work done by the spectator 
is a necessary part of meaning production.
Knowledge is automated through sport and lodged in the body. Therefore, sports also 
are ways of knowing with the body, and this is a kind of knowledge that often remains outside 
spoken discourse. This form of practical knowledge and mastery is contrasted with academic 
and disciplinary forms of knowledge in chapter 3. Discourse theory and its understanding of 
subject positions is contrasted and supplemented with key elements in Bourdieu’s approach, 
such as field theory, dispositions and the habitus. Chapter 3.1 discusses the subject in 
discourse theory and Bourdieu in detail. The case study in chapter 3.2 is an investigation into 
the official meanings and reformulations of the refereeing subject in football. It lodges 
Bourdieu’s field theory as an approach to situate the referee literally in a space of positions on 
a field, and contrasts this with the view taken by analytical philosopher Bernard Suits. The 
point here is that while the objective distribution of positions may be similar, only Bourdieu 
takes account of the practical logic of practitioners, and it is through this kind of analytical 
apparatus that we come to understand the meaning of referees’ self-perceptions as “teachers” 
and “judges”.
The third element in this study, nationalism, is the topic of chapter 4. To Bourdieu 
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nationalism is primarily a justificatory, or legitimating, discourse in the hands of the dominant 
fractions of the dominant class. In other words, nationalist discourse serves to defend the 
privileges extended and reproduced through the state and “national” – nation-wide – 
institutions. Part of our purpose here is to understand this kind of discourse more fully. 
Chapter 4 compares the discursive theory proposed by Benedict Anderson with two other 
approaches: it shows in what ways Anderson’s view perceives nations as discourses and how 
we may usefully identify the tools from chapter 3 – such as articulation and antagonism – in 
Anderson’s analysis. Nations, in his view, are constructed – imagined – in response to 
particular social circumstances: they articulate a novel social body in contrast to an 
antagonist, which in the inauguration phase of nationalism was the dynastic empires, such as 
Lisboa and Madrid. Print-capitalism made it possible to disseminate this new subject position 
in books and newspapers, and it generated a novel sense of time. Rather than an order marked 
by prefiguration and fulfilment – what Walter Benjamin (“Theses on the philosophy of 
history” 246) refers to as Messianic time – the former colonies now experience time as 
“homogeneous and empty” or “cross-transverse”: while something happened in Madrid, 
something else might take place in, say, Buenos Aires. However, the case study of South 
Africa shows that the 1998 Football World Cup was mediated on national television as an 
attempt to make a new – albeit contested – national body (chapter 5.1) with a messianic break 
with the kind of linguistic, organic nationalism that preceded it (chapter 4.1).
The kinds of knowledge addressed in this section are thus twofold: I will present a set 
of concepts and theories of signification, cultural analysis and nationalism, while also giving 
specific examples of how these terms may come into play in specific cases – the refereeing 
subject and the South African national formation. What should emerge is a sense of practical 
logic: a modus operandi of cultural analysis. Parts II and III will engage in more detail 
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specific elements in the national-sports nexus: How and what kind of national body is 
produced through sports (part II) and how are spectacular sports enlisted as tools of national, 
social orchestration (part III)?
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2. Signification: Mediation and sites of meaning
This chapter is centrally concerned with two things: how messages are made and how they are 
interpreted by readers or viewers. With regard to the former, Bourdieu tends to hold the view 
that sports symbolise violence, through its various degrees of euphemisation, in the sense that 
the events we observe and participate in are representations of previously violent events 
(Bourdieu, “Program”). In this sense events in sports are signifiers of a violent signified. This 
structuralist model has several limits that shall be dealt with here. A discursive approach to 
signification may be said to rest on a post-structuralist foundation. Briefly put, the violence 
that sport refers to can only be grasped as a sign – the signifier points to another signifier – 
which again can be made meaningful with reference to other signifiers, and so on, so that 
there is no final referent or certain organising element outside discourse itself (Derrida, 
“Structure, sign and play”).
With regard to how messages are made to mean, studies of communication have 
offered a wide range of positions on the relation between social events, the mass media, and 
audiences. A study of how the body is made meaningful may usefully engage these debates, 
both in order to investigate how the mass media produces coded messages about bodies – 
national bodes, gendered and sexed bodies, bodies of colour, and so forth – but also to address 
how the body itself is used as a medium of communication. Bourdieu, while concerned with 
the effects of the mass media, did not engage the debate over audience interpretations directly. 
For instance, in his book On Television, he elaborated “all of the various ways in which 
journalism imposes limits on the public’s vision of what constitutes reality,” but offered little 
discussion of how audiences interact with messages to produce meaning (Bourdieu, On 
Television; Szeman). When writing on sport, Bourdieu tended to view audiences as an 
undifferentiated mass that are rendered increasingly passive by spectacular sport shows (1988: 
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159). In this respect, theories of mass communication that take a more differentiated view of 
audience interpretation may add complexity to Bourdieu’s insights on elite sports as 
spectacular events.
The body plays an important role as a site for inscription in Bourdieu’s theory, both as 
a mediator in his notion of habitus – which we may briefly define as sedimented dispositions 
to perceive, think and act, and particularly structured by class position – and as a vehicle to 
instil obedience and belief in subjects. The body, says Bourdieu, obeys: it gives a consent that 
the mind might have otherwise refused.7 The body plays a double role: it betrays our location 
in the economic field and it serves as a target for economic and political power to inscribe and 
further their dominance.
Here we shall investigate two models of communication – the mirror theory and the 
encoding/decoding model – and then ask how the body should be situated in these models, 
and what role the body plays in producing meaning from sport. These three questions are 
central: First, do the media simply serve as neutral mirrors for social events, such as 
spectacular sports events, or are they playing a part in producing a world for audiences? 
Second, as sports themselves often are considered models for society, how can we conceive of 
this relationship as a form of representation? Third, is the difficulty with the mirror-theory in 
fact related to a larger issue: a dualism of ‘reality’ and its representations that assigns primacy 
and priority to the former, while ignoring that there can be no clear distinction between them 
since we can have no communicative knowledge of ‘reality’ except through some form of 
representation?
The debates around the mirror theory have been concerned with how messages are 
shaped with or without the active participation of the mass media. In order to understand how 
7 The concepts of habitus, dispositions, and the production of consent with its attendant notion of a 
necessary illusio will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
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meaning is made out of these messages we will turn to Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding model 
with a particular emphasis on how the same media text can produce different interpretations, 
although – as Hall concedes – such interpretations are structured by the audience’s social 
position.
The mirror theory
There has been a long debate over the relationship between mass media and society. Should 
the media be regarded a fourth estate that governs society alongside parliaments, courts and 
governments (Carlyle)? And is it therefore the media’s responsibility that the stories they 
relate are told in a truthful and objective fashion? Do mass media influence the messages they 
convey, and are different kinds of media affecting messages differently (McLuhan)? Are the 
media crucial in manufacturing from the masses the consent that governments and powerful 
economic elites need to maintain their positions (Herman and Chomsky)?
Suffice it to say here that we may discern two main positions on the topic: either the 
media gives or should give a truthful and objective representation of society in order to justify 
and maintain its role as watchdog in the balanced governance of the modern nation state, or 
the media carries a weight of its own, shaping the message, for better or worse, and being 
influenced by governments and economic interests. This latter position holds that the media 
has a degree of autonomy in selecting, producing and distributing messages, and that this 
autonomy influences the way we make meaning of the world we live in.
These debates are relevant in at least two ways for our topic. First, sports events are 
regularly covered by the mass media, and whether we see the media as providing a detached 
and objective perspective, or as influencing messages and trying to produce specific effects in 
audiences, has a bearing on the way we approach media representations of sports. If the mass 
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media are a mirror of society – a mise en abyme of the larger social world – meaning would 
be a direct product of the sport event itself. If, on the other hand, media organisations, 
advertisers and governments influence the way sports are selected for representation, covered 
and distributed, we may find it useful to study the specific effects of mass mediation if we 
want to know how meaning is made out of spectacular sports.8
Second, sports were conceived in the nineteenth century as models of society. Their 
purpose was to serve as a training ground for the sons of the wealthy in how to behave in 
specific situations that they may encounter in their adult life, and to teach them the 
appropriate rôle distance in social interactions (Bourdieu, “Program” 154).9 Today, the 
relation is reversed. Sports now are held up as models for society: they should provide better 
arenas than larger society, participants that are more honest and truthful, and practices that are 
more just (Møller 201-202; Tamburrini 205-206,). In both of these scenarios – whether we see 
society as a model for sport, or sport as a model for society – there is an act of representation 
involved, and it is relevant to ask how meaning is produced in this representational game. If 
sports are mirrors of society, we would find the meaning of a sport in the social activity it 
models. To Bourdieu, sports symbolised social violence to different degrees, with activities 
like tai-chi and golf at one end of the spectrum and boxing at the other (1988: 155). The 
mirror theory would suggest that the meaning of sport is simply as a euphemised violent 
combat between individuals or groups, and it would exclude the possibility of sport as 
providing a modelling activity. As Bourdieu would remind us, each sport has a relatively 
autonomous history, code, esoteric record, administrative bodies, and so on. As a result, sports 
constitute cultural fields with the ability to produce messages that are specific to their field. If 
8 The second section of this study deals with specific elite sport mediations and considers how 
institutional aspects of the mass media influence sport representations.
9 See also the discussion of the space of sports and euphemisation of violence in chapter 7. As Bourdieu 
shows, the emergent industrial bourgeoisie developed their sense of sports in distinction to the values of the 
working classes. This is how the notion of a physical art-for-art’s sake and a disinterested relation to the body 
emerged.
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sports, their performers, administrators, sponsors, organisations and television broadcasters 
influence the meaning of sport events, it is relevant to ask how the mediation process affects 
meaning.
Our questions – do the mass media provide mirrors of sports events? and are sports 
mirrors of society? – are joined together in their common concern for the relation between the 
model, or site of representation, and that which is modelled or represented. If the media 
provided mirrors of sport events, we would not need to study media representations of sports 
to understand the meaning of a sporting event. Similarly, if sports were mirrors of the larger 
social world it would be redundant to study sport performances, since these would be merely 
mirror images of social events. Rather, we could go and study the event directly. Tony Bennett 
comments that the mirror theory “implies that the media are secondary and derivative, 
somehow less real than the ‘real’ they reflect, existing above society and passively mirroring 
it rather than forming an active and integral part of it” (p. 287). The analogy seems to favour a 
view of the media as custodians of a balanced government, or as a fourth estate, justified by 
its objective and impartial representation of social events. Mirrors do not intervene in what is 
placed before them: they are content with accurately rendering the object of representation. It 
is not the media that provide meanings to messages but the events themselves. In this view, 
the media are not really a part of the same reality they report on: they must retain a distinct 
detachment from the reality they represent in order to maintain their objective impartiality and 
mirror-like functionality.
Dualisms in representation
The difficulty with the mirror theory is not limited to media representations. Ferdinand de 
Saussure posited a duality between the signifier and the signified, the representation and that 
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which is represented. The task of the signifier is to point to the appropriate signified (de 
Saussure 66-67). Bennett finds an implication that signifiers are subordinate or governed by 
the world of signifieds: “The world of signs can only reflect what is already there. 
Subalterned to the reality it mirrors, the world of signs is granted only a shadowy, twilight 
existence” (p. 287). The world of signifieds appears to be more original and prior to the 
signifiers. Bennett notes that we should rather investigate the materiality of the sign and the 
activity of signification as a process which constructs worlds, and not simply passively 
reflecting a pre-existing reality. Signs are themselves part of reality as much as the media are 
part of the reality they report on.
There is an assumption in de Saussure’s approach to representations that each actual 
articulation points to a deeper and more profound structure of signs. He distinguished 
language from speech in order to separate “the social from what is individual” (p. 13), and his 
interest lay in establishing the systematic properties of this deep structure. As we move from 
the surface structure of any actual utterance to a deeper level of language or ideas, we venture 
into more profound structures of thought and reality. In this sense, media representations 
constitute singular utterances of a deeper level of meaning, which would be the event itself.
There seems to be a precise reference to Platonic thought at work here. In Plato’s 
allegory of the cave, some prisoners have been chained inside a cave since birth. Behind them 
puppets are moved along, and the prisoners believe that the shadows cast on the cave wall by 
these puppets are reality itself (Plato VII 516a-c). It would be the scholar’s task to deduce 
from the shadows cast on the wall to a deeper level of meaning. Language in de Saussure’s 
model, or social events in the mirror theory, find their analogy in the puppets themselves. In 
Plato’s allegory, we should strive to free ourselves from the chains that tie us down, and seek 
beyond the cave to find absolute truth – the deepest and most profound structural level of 
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language or ideas.
Indeed, as noted above, in Plato’s ideal republic, truth should be sought without 
mediation. This kind of truth could only be given by the ruler-philosophers who would have 
privileged insight directly into divine truth: “all poetical imitations are ruinous to the 
understanding of the hearers, and … knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to 
them” (Plato X). In this dualistic structure, signifiers are secondary to ideas, utterances to 
languages, and media representations to social events. A study of signifiers, utterances or 
representations should strive to find the deeper structure of ideas, languages or social events.
There are further implications for the world of sport. As sports represent society they 
perform the role of the secondary and the derived in this dualistic structure. If sports 
essentially symbolise social violence, the truth of these performances would be found in such 
violent acts themselves. To Plato, sports may be counted among those imitations that ruin the 
understanding of spectators, and would face an uncertain future in his ideal state. There is an 
ideal of transparency in Plato’s theory: The shadows cast by the puppets should be replaced 
by the puppets themselves, as our knowledge of singular utterances and representations 
should make way for insight into languages and the deep structure of social events. The 
preference for transparency becomes acute when Plato seeks to banish poets and those who 
produce imitations from his ideal state. The whole world of representations – signifiers, 
utterances, and mass mediated sports – stands in the way of the kind of direct insight preferred 
by Plato.
Play of signification
The difficulty with Plato’s concept of absolute truth, or knowledge at the very deepest level of 
ideas or language, is that it remains as slippery as it is opaque. As we approach this centre of 
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knowledge, are we not searching for some point of origin that itself lies outside all structures 
of meaning – some point of articulation from which all other utterances would be immediately 
meaningful? Jacques Derrida found such a search futile or metaphysical, since such a point of 
origin could not itself be signified. Let us posit sport as the central signifier in a structure of 
meaning. To find its referent, we would look in a dictionary, and find that the noun “sport” 
signifies active diversion requiring physical exertion and competition, the occupation of 
professional athletes, someone who engages in sports, an organism that has characteristics 
resulting from chromosomal alteration, or verbal wit. Each of these references would point to 
further signifiers in the dictionary, and so forth, and we would never finally arrive at the point 
of origin that would illuminate the whole chain of signifiers that departed from our initial 
word “sport”. If we cannot find this point of origin – the locus from which all signification 
would be meaningful – from within signification itself, would we not be left with relying on 
some transcendental signified? In Derrida’s language, “everything becomes a system where 
the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present 
outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the 
domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum.” (Derrida, “Structure, sign and play” 
280). As we rely on language to communicate all sorts of truths, we would also have to rely 
on the language made by the shadows of puppets on the wall to communicate some absolute, 
divine truth that we might have found somewhere outside the cave, and in this language we 
cannot end all debate by referring to some absolute point outside language itself.
Derrida’s argument serves three purposes here: First, it illustrates the impossibility of 
arriving at some direct, transparent insight into truth. We are left with the use of language and 
representations, and in the world of mediations we can never finally arrive at some undisputed 
origin of truth. This is an argument along the lines of Bourdieu’s advice against objectivism in 
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research: “action understood as a mechanical reaction ‘without an agent’” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 121), since meaning and action is now not determined by some point outside a 
structure, but mediated by agents located in cultural fields that are relatively autonomous of – 
though still structured by – the economic field. Second, it demonstrates how the meaning of 
sport cannot be exhausted by referring to the social activity that it symbolises. Sport in 
general and each specific discipline activates a wide range of meanings in relation to wider 
society – such as the symbolisation of violence, warfare or courtship – in relation to each 
other – the kinds of technical skill or training involved – and with relation to a history of 
practice (Bourdieu, “Sports fan” 340-341). For instance, the meaning of a widely broadcast 
boxing game is not exhausted by referring to it as a symbolisation of social violence. Its 
relation to the economic field and to other memorable boxing matches will be cruical to 
structure our understanding of the event. The meaning of sport cannot be arrived at by simply 
pointing to some event outside its own structure, since sport constitutes a language of its own, 
with a capacity to produce messages that are relatively autonomous of the larger social world. 
In order to make meaning of sport, we need to approach its totality of practices through which 
each specific sport receives its value in relation to other sports, such as the degree of 
engagement of the body.10 Boxing and tai-chi are valued differently and confer different 
meaning on their practitioners partly because of the different degrees of engagement with 
other participants’ bodies (Bourdieu, “Program” 154).11
Third, Derrida’s argument reminds us that media representations of sport will always 
do more than merely mirror events. Acts of mediation are themselves signifying practices that 
extend the domain of meaning: A football game that is televised offers a further domain of 
meaning compared with one that is only available to those present in the stadium. By inserting 
10 In chapter 7 the relation between social class and the distinctive values of sport is discussed in greater 
detail.
11 Chapter 3 will discuss Bourdieu’s approach to sport as a cultural field of practice in more detail.
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the game into new contexts, media representations produce a whole new level of meaning and 
a new way of relating to the game. Observing a game on television with family members 
constitutes a different experience from attending a game at a stadium with friends, and the 
meaning that is conferred on the event is different. Watching sports is an important 
intergenerational experience where fathers teach sons about values such as courage, loyalty 
and team-spirit (Sabo and Jansen 202-204).12 It is for these reasons that Tony Bennett 
observes a shift in studies of communication towards a focus on “the independent materiality 
of the signifier – the ‘fleshiness’ of the sign – but also [on] the activity and effectivity of 
signification as a process which actively constructs cognitive worlds rather than simply 
passively reflecting a pre-existing reality” (p. 287).  Media institutions are part of the world 
they report on. They shape the messages that they deliver to audiences, and they are 
participating in constructing a reality for their public.
The encoding/decoding-model
So far our main concern has been to determine how media messages are put together. Are they 
reflections of events that take place in the ‘real’ world or are the media instrumental in 
shaping messages and manufacturing worlds for us?
While Bourdieu only gave fragmented analyses of large-scale media production 
(Hesmondhalgh), his notion of cultural autonomy grants media producers a degree of 
independence in relation to economic and political interests. This entails that media work is 
not pre-determined by the outside world, but that the media participate in shaping messages. 
In his writing on sport, Bourdieu tended to take the view that audiences constitute a large, 
undifferentiated mass that are increasingly passified by the sports entertainment industry 
12 Chapter 5.1 and 8 analyse two specific instances of mass mediated sport – the 1998 Football World Cup 
and the 2008 Uefa Champions League – with particular attention to the kinds of messages attached to the game 
in these instances of mass mediation.
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(1988: 162).13 Thus, even though he would grant the media industry a degree of autonomy in 
shaping messages, there is still an open question to what extent meanings can be coded into 
messages and whether audiences automatically accept them or if there is space to negotiate 
meanings. Since Bourdieu did not directly comment on this issue, we will make use of Stuart 
Hall’s model for mass communication to see how it may enrich Bourdieu’s understanding of 
mass mediated sport.
In his encoding/decoding-model, Stuart Hall established a two-sided exchange in mass 
communication (“Encoding and decoding in the television discourse” 130). This model 
illustrates how media institutions and audiences may construct different meanings from 
messages. At the moment of encoding, media institutions embed a preferred meaning into the 
message by drawing on social codes that are shared by the producer and audiences. When 
viewers or readers receive these messages, they decode them by applying codes they deem fit. 
Hall uses the genre of the TV Western as an example. Since producers and audiences have 
shared expectations of this genre, such programmes are easily recognisable. However, such 
shared models are not always the case in mass communication. “The codes of encoding and 
decoding may not be perfectly symmetrical”, and “what is called ‘distortion’ or 
‘misunderstandings’ arise precisely from the lack of equivalence between the two sides in the 
communicative exchange” (“Encoding and decoding in the television discourse” 129-130). 
Hall’s model grants the reader or viewer a significant role. A particular decoded meaning is 
not an inevitable consequence of an intended meaning, and decodings do not follow 
inevitably from encodings. For instance, images from the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin may 
have been intended to demonstrate to the world the superiority of the system of government 
and racial ideology of Germany at that time. However, with black sprinter Jesse Owens 
winning four gold medals, the meaning of these images became quite different: It put the 
13 Chapter 8 gives a more critical analysis of Bourdieu’s approach to mass mediated events.
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racial ideas of the governing Nazi party to shame and constituted a moment of a marginalised 
minority defeating a supposedly superior adversary – a David conquering a Goliath. In this 
case, the codes at the point of programming and at the moment of reception may have been 
distinctly different, producing opposing interpretations of the same images.
In Hall’s model, meaning remains open in the sense that it is not determined either by 
the sender of the message or by some other instance or structure, and this is the reason why it 
is possible to produce different meanings for the same message. Hall stresses that “there 
remains a dominant cultural order, though it is neither univocal nor uncontested”, and 
“different areas of social life [are] mapped into […] domains of dominant or preferred 
meanings” (“Encoding and decoding in the television discourse” 138). Some areas require 
less work to “command as legitimate a de-coding of the event within the dominant definition” 
(ibid.). For example, cases where there has been a clear-cut foul committed against the rules 
of a sport are easier to promote as candidates for enforcing the law of the game than are more 
diffuse cases, where team-loyalties, national sentiments, and personal preferences can be 
rallied to the support of either position. In cases of clear-cut fouls, it takes less work to 
promote the idea that the game itself is at stake, and this challenge to the very definition of the 
game becomes the dominant meaning of the event. Thus, if the game itself is perceived as 
being threatened – such as when spectators storm the pitch – it is easier to enforce a dominant 
cultural order and to reach agreement on the appropriate response to the event. However, 
when Maradona used his hand to score in the quarter-finals in the 1986 World Cup against 
England – a game that Argentina went on to win 2-1 four years after the two countries had 
fought the Falkland/Malvinas war – and the referee awarded the goal, it was easier for 
Argentinians and others to overlook the foul and celebrate the victory. In this case, national 
sentiments and an international admiration for the outstanding football skills of Maradona 
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made it possible to decode televised images of the event as an act of artistry rather than as a 
threat to the code of the game.
Our three cases – Jesse Owens winning four gold medals in 1936, Maradona scoring 
with his hand in 1986, and spectators storming the pitch – show that there is room for 
different interpretations of the same images depending on the code used by producers and 
audiences. In Hall’s words, “things and events in the real world do not contain or propose 
their own, integral, single and intrinsic meaning, which is then merely transferred through 
language. Meaning is a social production, a practice. The world has to be made to mean” 
(Hall, “The rediscovery of ‘ideology’” 67). It is not always the case that televised images 
produce the expected meaning to audiences. When Jesse Owens won his four gold medals, 
interpretations were most likely quite the opposite of what the German television producers 
had expected, and in the case of Maradona scoring with his hand, audience interpretations 
would differ depending national and personal affiliations. Only in the second of our three 
examples would the dominant meaning be regularly produced in audiences. “In order for one 
meaning to be regularly produced, it had to win a kind of credibility, legitimacy, or taken-for-
grantedness for itself” (ibid.). This kind of naturalisation of meaning is only the case in the 
second of our three examples.
The decoder plays an important role in producing meaning from images and texts in 
this model. Yet there are limits to the variety of interpretations any given message can 
Image Encoding Decoding
Jesse Owens winning four 
gold medals in 1936
Demonstrate superiority of 
then-German system and 
ideology
Conquest of racist ideology
Spectators storming the pitch Threat to dominant order, law 
should be enforced
Threat to dominant order, law 
should be enforced
Maradona scoring with his 
hand in 1986
Unclear, dependent on 
broadcaster
Dependent on audiences’ 
sentiments
Fig. 1: Applications of the encoding-decoding model
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produce. Hall suggests three main positions which readers take to mass mediated messages: 
the dominant code is produced by viewers who “takes the connoted meaning from, say, a 
television newscast or current affairs programme, full and straight, and decodes the message 
in terms of the reference-code” (“Encoding and decoding in the television discourse” 140). In 
this case, the code appears natural and transparent, and there is no miscommunication or noise 
on the line between the media institution and the audience. In contradistinction to the 
dominant position we find viewers who make use of an oppositional code. In these cases, the 
viewer perfectly understands the inflection given to an event, but “determine[s] to decode the 
message in a globally contrary way” (ibid. 142), such as when we watch a political 
commercial for a party we vote against. In between these positions, we find viewers who 
employ a negotiated decoding of a message. They accept “hegemonic definitions to make the 
grand significations, while, at a more restricted, situational level, makes its own … 
‘exceptions’ to the rule” (ibid. 141). Hall’s scheme is useful to illustrate the possibility of a 
variety of interpretations to any given message, while acknowledging that there is a structural 
predisposition for interpretations that agree with the dominant code.
The body as a site of communication
Finally, the body is itself a medium of communication. Bourdieu notes that sports and 
physical education shape the body in ways that go beyond our awareness when we train or 
practise sports. They produce relationships between performer and tutor that are based on 
obedience, and they manufacture a necessary consent from our body that we might have 
refused had we not been so engaged in practising the sport (Bourdieu, “Program” 161). Sports 
and physical education shape our dispositions to perceive, think and act, and they do so 
outside our conscious awareness. It is in this sense that the body provides a site for inscription 
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by sports. Again, if the body is merely a mirror of a larger society that writes on them, 
meaning would be directly inscribed, and would not need interpretation. If, on the other hand, 
bodies mediate a range of interests, such as national texts, economic interest, and conceptions 
of gendered behaviour, each body may negotiate these interests differently, and each 
perspective on the body may interpret the result of these negotiations in a different way.
When Bourdieu introduces the model, he contextualises it as a matter of negotiating 
between objectivist and subjectivist positions in cultural analysis. An analogy will be useful: 
at its most immediate level, the mirror theory of communication poses a direct transfer of 
messages and attendant meaning from a social event to an audience. The medium of 
communication is transparent – practically non-existent – in the production of knowledge. 
This theory proposes a determinate relation between the event and meaning: each event offers 
a meaning that the media simply mirrors so that audiences can receive them. Such a theory 
would be objectivist in Bourdieu’s view.14 On the other hand, a decoding-model that would 
allow for individual interpretations that were unstructured by the event, the medium and the 
interpreters’ larger social context would constitute a case of subjectivism to Bourdieu. To 
mediate between these positions, Bourdieu suggests that we incorporate “the truth of practical 
experience” (Outline of a Theory of Practice 4). These questions will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapter.
14 See also the discussion of objectivism in chapter 3.1.
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3. Bourdieu, discourse, sport: Concepts and methods
Bourdieu deems existentialism and phenomenology as subjectivist, while structuralism and 
economic determinism are considered objectivist (Swartz 54-55). These two camps do not 
occupy an equal plane in his type of cultural analysis. As I will show in chapter 3.1, the 
subject in Bourdieu is first construed in opposition to subjectivism, which is to say that 
Bourdieu sets out with a subject that is rigorously structured by the cultural field within which 
it operates, the field of power, and, ultimately, the field of class relations. What distinguishes 
Bourdieu from structuralists, however, is his insistence on the relative autonomy of cultural 
practices. Therefore, the objective understanding of an actor should be supplemented with an 
understanding of the actor’s practical sense of operating in the field. Chapter 3.2 develops an 
argument for accounting for referees’ self-perception when approaching football as a 
relatively autonomous field of practice.
To return to the remarks concerning cultural analysis as a form of martial arts in the 
opening of this section, Bruce Lee – actor, accomplished sports performer, and founder of the 
sport Jeet-Kune-Do – echoes Bourdieu’s sentiments regarding reflexivity. To Lee mastery of 
an art requires practice, and cultural analysis is a form of practice (see below). This double 
meaning of practice – as an exercise we engage in with the purpose of improving our skills, or 
as an ongoing activity – also signifies the two forms of knowledge that are produced through 
sports: knowledge located in the body after a period of exercise, and knowledge of the body. 
While the former is a product of automatisation and to a large extent entails an embodiment of 
belief exercised silently, the latter refers primarily to the kinds of academic knowledges 
manufactured through scholarly practice. What Bourdieu proposes is a practical approach to 
cultural analysis: the scholar can be compared to the brick-layer who makes use of the tool 
that is most useful, according to experience and context.
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I will then interrogate three senses of the term discipline in order to locate it as a 
component in production of discourse, such as sports or nationalist discourses. Nations, then, 
articulate subject positions that emerged as a response to feudal imperialism in the colonies, 
according to Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities; “Western nationalism and Eastern 
nationalism”). Chapter 4 will discuss nationalism in detail.
The tools from Bourdieu’s work that will be discussed here are fields, dispositions, 
habitus, symbolic capital, naturalisation, dressage and illusio.15 I will then compare the 
subject in discourse theory with Bourdieu’s subject in greater detail. Chapter 3.2 investigates 
the referee from the perspective of analytical philosophy in contrast with an approach based 
on the practical sense Bourdieu recommends.
*
From the outset, this study seeks to investigate the entirety of a social space, or what we may 
conceive of as football as a “total social fact” (Wacquant 27). Central to this kind of pursuit is 
the status of the researcher, and the relation between the knowing subject and the material or 
objects of research. Conducting such an investigation of a reflexive nature entails a study of 
the researcher’s own status, or what we may call self-reflexivity. To Bourdieu, “reflexive 
practice entails questioning the privileged status of a knowing ‘subject’ who is excluded from 
the work of objectification” (Meditasjoner 124).
What is at stake, then, is to involve the knowing subject in the investigation, so that we 
may objectify our own positions as “knowers”. In his Méditations Pascaliennes, Bourdieu 
explains that his advocacy of critical reflexivity was based on his experience that the most 
severe mistakes and illusions among ethnographers, historians and cultural analysts was a 
product of the social conditions, or the structure and operative mode, of these fields 
15 This adds to the comments on the relative autonomy of culture and the brief history of sports drawn 
from Bourdieu in the introduction.
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themselves, and particularly the promotion of a fully “conscious, rational and absolute 
individual (or ‘subject’)” produced by the discourse on the “human being” (Bourdieu, 
Meditasjoner 123).16 The kind of historical or cultural research under critique posits a moral, 
or knowing, agent “as an autonomous sovereign subject” (Schildrick 152), detached from, and 
prior to, the social fields and conditions in which she or he is conducting research. The agency 
of the modernist knowing subject, then, “precedes and acts on particular contexts, rather than 
emerging from and being immersed in them” (ibid. 150). In order to resist this kind of 
atomistic perception of the scholarly producer, Bourdieu suggests closely observing the 
conditions of possibility of a knowing subject, and the social relations in which the cultural 
analyst is immersed. The points of view of cultural producers, including those of cultural 
analysts, historians and ethnographers, “always owe something to their situation in a field 
where all define themselves in part in relational terms” (Wacquant 39).
The practice of knowing
To practice self-reflexivity entails both considering the status of the self, or the subject, as 
well as reflecting on the relations between the subject as cultural analyst, historian, or 
ethnographer, the objects, concepts and strategies under consideration, and the academic field 
in which the researcher is engaged. As Bourdieu explains, “The matrimonial practices that I 
had studied in a much more distant social environment, namely Kabyle society, was a way of 
giving me the opportunity to objectify the act of objectification and the objectifying subject” 
(Bourdieu, “Logic” 59). Objectification may subsequently be considered as a method of 
depersonalising17 the objects that are manipulated in a study of culture as well as the 
researchers’ subjectivity and position in a social field. Provisionally assessing the sport 
16 My translation.
17 Analogously, Victor Shklovsky (p. 16) uses the term “defamiliarisation” (ostranenije, from stranno, 
Russ. “strange”) to describe the narratological tool of making things strange.
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analyst within the field of academic knowledge, Bourdieu notes that, while social scientists 
may be regarded as positioned near the dominated pole of the field of power, cultural analysts 
of sports are “doubly dominated”, since they are located near the dominated pole “both in the 
universe of sociologists and in the universe of sports” (Bourdieu, “Program” 153). While 
those who practise this kind of research are influenced by forces of attraction and repulsion 
that bear on all symbolic producers, the sociology of sports tends to be “scorned by 
sociologists, [and] despised by sportspersons” (ibid.).
While it may be possible to distinguish an ontology in Bourdieu’s “total” and 
“unified” social science, the implicit approach to the object of study requires a far more 
practical and strategic mindset in order to conduct scientific research than is often assumed. 
For instance, while still-dominant notions of divisions of labour between academic 
practitioners prescribe that a select few of those within the academic field should primarily 
supply ontological and epistemological frames – what is often referred to as “theory” – while 
the majority of regular academic workers rather should concern themselves with the 
application of these theories – engaging in “practice” – and, hence, re-enacting the dominant 
mode of consecration of academic labour, Bourdieu recommends an approach to social 
science where practitioners may apply a number of tools, concepts and strategies. This logic 
of the social division of labour is doubly reproduced in the cultural analysis of sport, since 
there are “those who know sport very well on a practical level but do not know how to talk 
about it and, on the other hand, those who know sport very poorly on a practical level and 
who could talk about it, but disdain doing so” (“Program” 153). Rather than postulating any 
particular theoretical mode or axiomatic sets of knowledge, Bourdieu proposes to perceive the 
production of social science as a way of manufacturing and disseminating knowledge, 
embedded in sometimes competing, sometimes relatively peacefully coexisting, modes of 
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economic and symbolic production. In place of theoreticism, which may be considered as a 
self-enclosed, self-referential realm of discourse, cultural analysts should be guided by a 
practical disposition and practitioners should approach theories and methodologies as “tool 
kits” designed to “help [the analyst] solve problems”. In short, such a framework to establish 
“total social facts” remains “for the most part empty” and consists above all of “warnings and 
programmatic guidelines” (ibid. 160).
Practical logic is productive of actual research, and since “habitus is in cahoots with 
the fuzzy and the vague […], the logic of practice is logical up to the point where the logical 
would cease to be practical” (Wacquant 22-23). Rather than positing a set of normative rules, 
or first principles, for research, Bourdieu suggests considering methods of research more as a 
set of tools which may be employed. The practice of reflexive analysis, then, stands in an 
analogous relation to that of the bricoleur, or brick-layer, who builds brick by brick, using the 
means at hand, as opposed to the engineer, who “constructs the totality of his own syntax” 
(Derrida, “Structure, sign and play”). Bricolage is also a mythopoetic, or discursive, activity, 
indicating that cultural analysis must remain uncentred, or without first principles. In other 
words, meaning is not to be located in the centre, i.e., the subject or author. Instead, the 
listeners or readers participate in the production of meaning in this kind of approach. 
Furthermore, since there is no final identity to be located in the subject, the researcher subject 
can never be fully present in the research situation. The relations of discourse are not those we 
traditionally have expected to find between subjects and objects, but relations of “mutual 
complicity […] or possession” (Wacquant 20).
Questions such as “how do we know what we know?” and “what do we, in fact, 
know?” are component parts of what we refer to as epistemology. It is both a matter of 
ascertaining knowledges (objects, knowers, methods of validation, and so forth), and of 
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organising knowledges, in terms of time, space, causality, or some other structure, as it may 
be.18 Reflexive analysis interrogates some key assumptions of the dominant approach to social 
inquiry, or what Bourdieu refers to as “objectivism” (Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of  
Practice), or empiricism, such as how we measure objective truth, and whether such a concept 
is valid. Empiricism posits a clear distinction between theory – or epistemological and 
ontological frames – and data, which should be derived from experiment and observation, 
rather than theory. As Bourdieu has shown, a clear distinction between researcher subject, 
method, and objects of observation, cannot be upheld. In Michel Foucault’s terminology, the 
term episteme (Gr. “knowledge”) may be used to “designate the set of conceptual procedures 
which govern the production of knowledge” (Clark), and considered as part of a discursive 
ensemble, along with the notion of discipline.
Discipline
We may discern three senses of the term discipline.19 First, in his Jeet Kune Do, Bruce Lee 
makes use of the term to signify a pathway to self-mastery:
True mastery transcends any particular art. It stems from mastery of oneself – 
the ability, developed through self-discipline, to be calm, fully aware, and 
completely in tune with oneself and the surroundings. Then, and only then, 
can a person know himself. (p. 4)
Mastery of oneself – or the ability to be calm, agile, and in tune with the social setting of 
one’s actions – is a precondition to self-knowledge. Discipline is acquired through practice, 
and empowers the practitioner to consider her or his impulse, so that she or he will avoid 
18 Epistemology may be defined as referring to theories of knowledge, particularly with regards to 
methods and validation.
19 The question of training the disciplinary gaze is discusses in the introduction. Chapter 8 considers the 
production of a Kantian distance to the object through sports.
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acting on fear or unreasonable motivations. One does not gain discipline, or self-mastery, 
through “prolonged imitative drilling,” even if such an approach would promote mechanical 
precision to the performer, since “the margin of freedom of expression grows narrower and 
narrower,” and, in the long run, the practitioner would be “moulded according to someone 
else’s fancy” (ibid. 7-8). To Lee, episteme, or knowledge, “simply means self-knowledge”, or 
to be aware of oneself (ibid. 8). Lee does not acknowledge any particular method or style to 
martial arts. Lee’s approach to mastery is based on practical adaptation to “ever-changing 
situations” (ibid. 4), or the “constant movement, un-rhythmic movement, as well as constant 
change” of life (ibid. 11). Finding the right approach or technique, then, is a matter of 
exercise, and the correct response, or methodology, is not given before the situation occurs, 
but should rather be conceived of in relational terms. Lee advises us to consider the 
relationship between the master and the student. While the teacher should occupy the rôle of 
the guide, or “pointer of truth, but not a giver of truth”, learners must be sincere, serious, and 
be concerned with “independent inquiry”. The “depending mind ... has not come to 
understand himself. In other words, he has gained control of the manipulative skill he has[,] 
but not what he is in himself” (ibid. 10), which can only be acquired through discipline and 
self-mastery.
Second, discipline may be understood as a controlled submission of the body, forcing 
upon it docility and utility. In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault stipulates that it is 
discipline that “‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards 
individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (p. 170). Discipline, then, is 
something that must be maintained or kept, as when there is an expression of a desire to 
maintain discipline in the classroom, or to keep bodies in check. This “policy of coercions that 
act upon the body” (ibid. 138) was constituted during the late eighteenth century through a 
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number of “simple instruments; hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement and their 
combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination” (ibid. 170), and, in turn, was 
productive of what we today refer to as “individuals”. Discipline consisted of a “meticulous 
control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and 
imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called ‘disciplines’” (ibid. 137). 
This notion of discipline entails that submission is forced upon the body from the outside, as a 
kind of dressage of the human body.
Finally, we may define discipline as a “system of control in the production of 
discourse” (Foucault, “Discourse on language” 224). As such, we may also perceive discipline 
as one of a set of tools to operate, or manage, institutionalised knowledge, and, on a larger 
scale, as filters to that which may be uttered or enunciated within a theoretical or academic 
field. In a discussion of the discipline of economics, Amariglio, Resnick and Wolff point out 
that “a discipline arises in the course of struggles to limit discourses involved in the 
production of formal knowledge” (p. 150). Disciplines consist of practitioners, objects of 
knowledge, methods, a set of propositions considered to be true, resources, and institutions 
located in social contexts.
Attention to discipline is not merely a concern about institutions and 
professionalization; it is above all about bodies – human bodies. Disciplines 
are institutionalized formations for organizing schemes of perception, 
appreciation, and action, and for inculcating them as tools of cognition and 
communication. At the same time, as embodied practical operators, 
disciplines are political structures that mediate crucially between the political 
economy and the production of knowledge. (Lenoir 72)
A discipline in this perspective is not the sum total of truths that is contained, utterable, or 
acceptable within a certain academic field, since disciplines consist of errors as well as truths. 
What counts as true statements are not given beforehand, but are products of the 
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institutionalised context of formal knowledge, or, in other words, procedures for perceptions, 
cognitions, validations, and so forth. In Lenoir’s view, these schemes of appreciation and tools 
of cognition are embodied, or become part of disciplinary practitioners’ dispositions, as 
habituated or corporeal knowledge.
Discourse and articulation
To Laclau and Mouffe, discourses are structured totalities resulting from articulatory practice. 
For instance, when two bricklayers cooperate in building a wall, both the verbal 
communication that take place between the bricklayers and the manual movements, such as 
the handing over of bricks, putting bricks on top of and next to each other, and so on, form 
part of the totality of the discourse of “building a wall”. Hence, discourses consist of both 
linguistic and extralinguistic practices in regularised and rule-bound, or structured, systems of 
dispersion.20 Linguistic and extralinguistic moments “constitute a differential and structured 
system of positions – that is, a discourse. The differential positions include, therefore a 
dispersion of very diverse material elements.” (Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 108). These 
discursive formations are produced by and productive of subjects, objects, concepts, and 
strategies. Discursive formations can be seen as ensembles of differential positions, or 
moments, within a structured totality. Differences, which are not discursively articulated, are 
signified as elements, and when they are articulated in a certain discourse, their meaning is 
considered as moments within that discourse. Consequently, a rock may become a statue, 
book rest, missile, or talisman, depending on the discourse in which it is embedded. In Laclau 
20 Laclau and Mouffe comment: “A dispersion governed by rules may be seen from two symmetrical 
opposed perpectives. In the first place, as dispersion: this requires determination of the point of reference to 
which the elements can be thought of as dispersed. (In Foucault's case, one can evidently speak of dispersion 
only by reference to the type of absent unity constituted around the common object, the style, the concepts and 
the theme.) But the discursive formation can also be seen from the perspective of the regularity in dispersion, 
and be thought, in that sense as an ensemble of differential positions.” (Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 106)
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and Mouffe’s approach to discourse, “[e]very object is constituted as an object of discourse, 
insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence” (Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy 107), which entails that they also reject the distinction between 
discursive and non-discursive practices.
Articulation may also refer to the practice of joining things together so as to facilitate 
motion, or producing connections, that is to say, a practical activity. Laclau and Mouffe define 
articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is 
modified as a result of articulatory practice” (Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 105).21
If I kick a spherical object in the street or if I kick a ball in a football match, 
the physical fact is the same, but its meaning is different. The object is a 
football only to the extent that it establishes a system of relations with other 
objects, and these relations are not given by the mere referential materiality 
of the objects, but are, rather, socially constructed. This systematic set of 
relations is what we call discourse. (Laclau and Mouffe, “Post-marxism” 82)
The spherical object, then, remains an element until it is articulated, producing it as a football 
only to the extent that it is joined with other significations of a sport event, such as the context 
of a stadium. Analogously, a rock “exists independently of any system of social relations, but 
it is, for instance, either a projectile or an object of aesthetic contemplation only within a 
specific discursive configuration” (ibid.), in other words, the “meaning of a word is entirely 
context-dependent” (ibid. 83). In Laclau and Mouffe, it is the transformation of elements into 
discursive moments that are referred to as a process of articulation, and such transformations 
take the form of attempts to fix signification.22
In Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to articulation, it is the realm of elements, or the 
domain of non-articulated differences, which establishes the perimeter of that which is 
21 My emphasis.
22 Simon Critchley explains that Laclau and Mouffe (following Gramsci) approach politics as a realm of 
decision, or hegemonisation – “actions that attempt to fix the meaning of social relations”.
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knowable, and against which meaning is possible. It is out of this domain that meaning is 
constituted through the practice of articulation, and, since we do not have access to the realm 
of elements themselves, the substantive reality of this domain cannot be known, even though 
it is experienced. Since discourses are constituted without a centre or origin,23 the category of 
the subject is deferred and relegated to a moment in a system of dispersed subject positions. 
However, it is possible to perceive the kind of endless deference of signification, and of the 
limit of the social, through the experience of antagonism. This kind of experience, such as 
when “a peasant cannot be a peasant” – productive of an antagonism with the landowner 
expelling him from his land – demonstrates the impossibility of a full presence, or closure, of 
society. “Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal but external to society; or rather, they 
constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully constituting itself” (Laclou 
and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 125), and as a kind of subversion of the social 
from within.
If full presence of society entails that each position is fixed as an “irreplaceable 
moment”, a subversion of the social space entails that “the specificity of each position should 
be dissolved” (ibid. 127), or, in other words, a fixed signifier is returned to the domain of 
elements. When a whole set of signifiers all come to express something identical, through a 
chain of equivalence, each of these signifiers loses its status as a differential moment and 
“acquires the floating character of an element” (ibid.). For instance, in a situation where a 
number of different signifiers, such as dress, language, skin colour or customs, all express the 
notion of “coloniser”, each differential moment cancels the other out, and they all come to 
indicate the presence of a dominant power, or “the oppressor” in relation to “the colonised”. 
23 In “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”, Jacques Derrida defines 
discourse as “a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely 
present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the 
play of signification infinitely” (p. 280).
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In the extreme, the logic of equivalence refers to situations where society divides into two 
diametrically opposite camps, e.g. when millenarian movements constitute “peasant culture 
[as] representing the identity of the movement, and urban culture [as] incarnating evil” (ibid. 
129). An alternative to a logic of equivalence is offered by a logic of difference, characterised 
by situations in which articulatory practices are dispersed and frontiers transformed “into 
something essentially ambiguous and unstable, subject to constant displacements” (ibid. 134).
Any attempt to fix signification must always be hegemonic and non-sutured in 
character, since there will always remain further possibilities of articulation. The domain of 
elements has analogies with Anaximander’s concept of apeiron (Gr. “that which has no 
boundaries”), similarly “immortal and indestructible”, constituting some kind of mass that 
“surrounds and directs all” (Fairbanks). As Aristotle comments, there “is no beginning of the 
infinite, for in that case it would have an end. But it is without beginning and indestructible, 
as being a sort of first principle.”24 It may be that it is a concept similar to the apeiron, or a 
kind of grey, infinite fog, that Lee refers to when he refrains from defining Jeet Kune Do as a 
style:
Maybe it is being neutral or maybe it is indifference [to style]. However, this 
is not the case either, for JKD is both at once “this” and “not this,” and JKD 
is neither opposed to styles nor not opposed to them. To understand fully, one 
must transcend the duality of “for” and “against” into one organic whole. 
Within the Absolute there is simply no distinction; everything IS. (p. 9)
In Lee’s approach, martial arts comes across as a practice of articulating the absolute, or as 
attempts to fix elements, i.e., floating signifiers, into moments of a martial arts discourse. 
Implicated by these notions of articulations as practice is the sense that there can be no 
finality, or suture, to discourse, since articulation is hegemonic and conjectural, and, hence, 
24 The passage is from Aristotle’s Physics iii.4; 203 b7, quoted in Fairbanks.
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ideological, since any element could always be articulated otherwise.25
The denomination of a prediscursive or non-discursive reality becomes acute when we 
consider the possibility of ideological critique. If it is the case that the world is constituted as 
sets of symbolic or ideological fictions with no fixed or non-ideological point outside these 
discourses, then there can be no neutral or non-discursive position from which ideology itself 
may be critiqued. If Anaximander’s apeiron, Laclau and Mouffe’s domain of elements, or 
Lee’s Absolute, are themselves not ideologically constituted, these entities would enable the 
kind of position that may be necessary for such a critique, even if a border, or limit, to 
ideology cannot be finally determined, or fixed, since such a fixity would itself constitute an 
ideological moment.26 Perhaps we may construct Walter Benjamin’s thought-image of the 
angel facing the past, propelled backwards by a storm blowing from Paradise, as a theoretical 
or hypothetical possibility of such a position outside or beyond ideology, even though he 
acknowledges mankind’s redemption as a necessary condition for the past to be “citable in all 
its moments” (“Theses on the philosophy of history” 246).27 Paradise, in this allegory, may 
serve to illustrate the impossible, and yet perhaps necessary, location from which a critique of 
the concept of ideology may be lodged.
Subject positions
It may be that it is nationalism’s concept of distinct and non-overlapping domains that renders 
it useless to a martial artist (Lee 5). The meaning of sport as practice is a matter of discursive 
articulation, and not an a priori given. As a case in point, we may consider the practice of an 
aspiring football player participating in the South African national team in an international 
25 Analogously, V.S. Volosinov notes that all signs have a political character: “The reality of the sign is 
wholly a matter determined by [conditions and forms of social] communication. After all, the existence of the 
sign is nothing but materialization of that communication” (p. 13).
26 This problematic is brought up in Slavoj Žižek's “The Spectre of Ideology” (p. 70).
27 For a further discussion of Benjamin's “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, see chapter 4.
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tournament for the first time. The totality in which he participates may be construed as that of 
attempting to win the game in cooperation with his teammates, or to win on behalf of some 
larger community (including the coach, support apparatus, administrators, or even a national 
community). However, it may also be the case that the totality in which his participation in the 
game should properly be understood is that of furthering his career. For many players outside 
the metropoles of football, participation in international tournaments may be one of few 
opportunities to demonstrate their skills and aspirations to agents from more affluent 
employers. In some instances, players have at a later point chosen not to participate in the 
national squad, since they perceive their obligations to their club team as more important in 
the long term than playing international games for their home country.28 The specific meaning 
of the player’s participation is contestable, and the discourse within which we articulate the 
player’s practice as a moment is a hegemonic decision.29
As a discursive approach to practice dissembles the subject as a nomothetic entity, it 
introduces the possibility of a dispersal of shifting subject positions. A football player may 
occupy a number of positions in different discourses, which does not exclude the possibility 
of articulating the practitioner as a moment in nationalist discourse. However, instances where 
a practitioner is barred from practising her or his trade , such as is the case when nationalist 
discourses forbid the inclusion of certain signifiers – e.g. the barring of non-white players 
from the national squad during apartheid South Africa – may be productive of an experience 
of the ‘real’, or the limit of the social. The impossibility of a subject position constituted by 
combining the signifiers “black” and “South African” was productive of antagonisms which 
culminated in the democratic elections of 1994,30 and later manufactured a national squad 
28 Examples abound, but see, e.g., Benedict McCarthy in the case of South Africa, and John Carew in the 
case of Norway.
29 Timothy Brennan perceives the nation as a discursive formation, since it is “not simply an allegory or 
imaginative vision, but a gestative political structure” (pp. 46-47).
30 Other signifiers, articulated in terms of, e.g., sex or class, were, of course, also included in the chain of 
equivalence. The socio-political situation in South Africa in the late 1980s is discussed in further detail in chapter 
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consisting of “South African” players regardless of skin colour.
Discourses, or in the terminology of Bourdieu, fields of practice, such as football and 
nationalism, may articulate events in conflicting ways. These articulations are relatively 
autonomous, in the sense that each discourse, or field, has its own logic of signification. In 
Lee’s perspective on martial arts, it is the practitioners who should occupy the primary 
position in a logic of practice, whereas nationalist discourse may attempt to hegemonise, or 
fix, the meaning or signification of events in order to subordinate the performer to the nation.
Fields, dispositions and the habitus
Bourdieu uses the term champ, or field, in two distinct senses.31 It may refer to a “global 
social space”, determined by actors’ position in the statistical distribution according to the two 
principles of differentiation; economic capital and cultural capital. This global social space is 
constituted as a set of addresses, physical or virtual, in the case of the “jet-set” or cyber-
communities. In addition, Bourdieu makes use of champ to refer to “relatively autonomous 
and [...] highly differentiated social worlds within global social space” (Earle 178). 
Bourdieu’s field theory makes the assumption that
any social formation is structured by way of a hierarchically organized series 
of fields (the economic field, the educational field, the political field, the 
cultural field, etc.), each defined as a structured space with its own laws of 
functioning and its own relations of force. [...] Each field is relatively 
autonomous but structurally homologous with the others. (Johnson 6)
Fields are relatively determined by other fields, and the larger fields of power and class 
relations, or “the economy”, and are productive of dispositions, and constitutive of available 
positions. A new entrant to a field must take up one of the positions that are already available, 
4.1.
31 See also remarks on Bourdieu's notion of social fields and forms of capital in the introduction.
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and her or his dispositions must fit with those of the field, in order for the actor to be 
recognised by other participants.
Fig. 2: Bourdieu’s structural model of social fields 
(adapted from Bourdieu, “Field” 38).
Each of these fields have a degree of autonomy, particularly with regard to sub-fields, such as 
the field of literary production and the field of sport as a case of large-scale cultural 
production. However, fields are also relatively determined by other fields, and particularly by 
the larger fields of power and class relations. Available supply of practices in a field shapes 
actors’ dispositions to the extent that
the logic whereby agents incline towards this or that sporting practice cannot 
be understood unless their dispositions towards sport, which are themselves 
one dimension of a particular relation to the body, are reinserted into the 
unity of the system of dispositions, the habitus, which is the basis from which 
life-styles are generated. (Bourdieu, “Sports fan”: 350)
Disposition designates actors’ tendencies of action and thought within a certain stratum or 
sub-stratum of a social group. The word disposition expresses “the result of an organizing 
action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a way of 
being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, 
propensity or inclination” (Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 214 n.1). Dispositions 
are acquired through practice, and inscribed into actors’ body-relations, and, when they 
interact with the larger economy, the actual practices must negotiate between the larger field 
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and actors’ interests and values.
Confronted with a social event, or with hitherto unfamiliar field of practice, we will 
have a tendency to respond in a certain manner, and it is these deep-seated patterns of 
perception and action that Bourdieu refers to as the habitus; a  “structuring mechanism that 
operates from within agents, though it is neither strictly individual nor in itself fully 
determinative of conduct” (Wacquant 18). If the habitus does not occupy the position of the 
deep structure in a structuralist system, it serves as an expression of a range of dispositions 
and values. The habitus is a relatively stable concept, although it is possible for an alteration 
in habitus as a result of an actor acquiring dispositions necessary for admission into a field of 
practice. Bourdieu defines the habitus as “the unity of the system of dispositions” (Bourdieu, 
“Sports fan” 350). The habitus includes mechanisms for transferring schemes from one area 
to another and methods of absorbing new experiences. Bourdieu explains that habitus should 
best be understood as
a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past 
experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, 
appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely 
diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the 
solution of similarly shaped problems, and thanks to the unceasing 
corrections of the results obtained, dialectically produced by those results. 
(Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 82-83)
The habitus is an expression of a totality of sensory and evaluatory systems, as well as 
practices. It follows that the habitus is not a concept that can easily be put into use or 
operationalised in practical research, since its expression would have to account for the 
totality of actors’ “perceptions, appreciations, and action.” However, we may approach the 
habitus from the perspective of changes in the totality, or through accounts of dispositions 
which are productive of the habitus. The habitus may be regarded as the total cluster of 
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embodied dispositions operative in an actor.
Sport, and, in our case, football, may be approached as a specific, and relatively 
autonomous, field of production and circulation, generative of its own dispositions. The 
supply of football, as may be the case with any field of sport practice, consists of public and 
private institutions and agents, sport associations, producers, vendors of goods and services, 
entertainments, sociologists, etc. (Bourdieu, “Sports fan” 340-341). The inception of sport as 
a relatively autonomous field, with a distinct economic and social history, took place around 
the time when English public schools appropriated “a number of popular – i.e. vulgar – 
games” (ibid. 342), disconnecting them from religious and social functions.32 The élite 
appropriated these games by a principle of conversion into “bodily exercises, activities which 
are an end in themselves, a sort of physical art for art’s sake” (ibid.). From the context of the 
public school, where sport served the purpose of inculcating manly virtues in future leaders, 
football was autonomised, along with other fields of sport, through processes of 
rationalisation, calculability, predictability, and a corpus of rules. However, the political 
philosophy of sport remained intimately linked to the moral ideas of the dominant fractions of 
the dominant class, and a theory of amateurism (ibid. 343).
Sport may also be seen as a subfield to the field of cultural production, forming a 
totality of practices in which each sport receives its value in relation to other sports. Such a 
space may be structured by articulating “the determining elements of the system of 
preferences,” such as “the degree of engagement of the body” (Bourdieu, “Program” 154), 
indicating that the reason for the preferred status of sports such as aikido to wrestling among 
the petty bourgeoisie may be articulated as an opposition between, on the one hand, “airy”, 
“light”, “distanced” and “gracious” and, on the other, “earthy”, “virile”, “body-to-body” and 
32 The word sport is derived from the Middle English “divert”, or “disport”, short for disporten, hence “to 
amuse oneself”.
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“direct”.33 The most distinctive value is bestowed on the practice that euphemises violence to 
the highest degree, so that, in golf, distance is created “by the very logic of a confrontation 
which excludes all direct contact, even through a ball” (ibid.). In this context, football may be 
perceived as a predominantly working-class sport, even though it emerged from the English 
public school system in the late nineteenth century. As Bourdieu points out, such a perspective 
could easily lead to a substantialist perception of sport. The analyst should therefore attempt 
to establish homologies, or correspondences, between the space of sport and the space social 
positions. Changes in practices “can only be understood in this logic, insofar as one of the 
factors that determine them is the desire to preserve, at the level of these practices, the 
distances that exist between positions” (ibid.). In other words, the distinction in class relations 
and the field of power is dominantly reproduced in the subfield of sport, as well as within 
each sport.
Symbolic capital
Sports operate by their own principles of consecration, a system which is relatively 
autonomous to the economic field.34 Each specific sport also distinguishes between differently 
valued practices, and these evaluative operations are not identical to those of the economic 
field. Within the field of football, the symbolically consecrated subfield of coaches’ memoirs, 
academic analyses and historical commentaries constitutes the avant-gardist element by 
asserting a degree of autonomy to the field. If the logic of the subfield of restricted 
production, or “production for producers”, in the literary field is that of “the economic world 
inverted”, then, in relational terms, the logic of the restricted field of football production is 
more homologous to that of the economic world.35
33 The example is from Bourdieu, “Program” 154.
34 See also the discussion of cultural capital in the introduction.
35 Bourdieu’s model of social fields, and a situation and elaboration of football within the field of cultural 
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A sociology of sport may be approached from the perspective of the production of 
supply – including intrinsic properties, such as the rules of the game, and relational properties, 
such as each sport’s distinctive value within the totality of sporting practices – or from the 
perspective of demand, by investigating “dispositions associated with the different positions 
in social space” (Bourdieu, “Program” 159). The logic of demand should be understood in 
relation to practitioners’ particular relation to the body, reinscribed into the habitus, which is 
generative of life-styles. With the dissemination of mass-produced and mass-consumed sports 
events, such as the 1998 Football World Cup, spectators are increasingly reduced to passive 
comprehension, which, in turn, diminishes their ability to practise the sport itself. In 
Bourdieu’s view, this situation leads to an increased attention to extrinsic aspects of the sport, 
such as the result, or which team won the game, and a diminished ability in spectators for the 
“kind of appreciation that practice gives” (ibid. 160).
Naturalisation, dressage and illusio
Evaluative articulations of the game may refer to defensive and aggressive modes of playing, 
conceptualisations of individual skills, analogies to models and systems of play which have 
achieved recognition among prominent actors, etc. Sports discourses are “ways of seeing the 
world”. For instance, commentators of the Super Bowl, the yearly premier American football 
event, make use of a highly militarised language. “Phrases such as ‘the bomb,’ ‘the aerial 
attack,’ ‘advancing into enemy territory,’ ‘the bullet pass,’ and ‘the offensive arsenal’ are 
common ways of describing and interpreting the ostensibly sporting action” (Jhally 84). These 
internal evaluative discourses of football are not wholly independent of those of the larger 
production, is also discussed in chapter 3.2. The field of restricted artistic production as a kind of inversion of the 
economic world is a notion Bourdieu elaborates in The Rules of Art. The symbolic logic of the field of literary 
production constitutes “an economic world inverted: the artist cannot triumph on the symbolic terrain except by 
losing on the economic terrain” (Bourdieu, The Rules of Art 83).
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economic field. The most prominent and widely disseminated form of evaluation are 
comments produced by journalists in broadcasting companies and other media. Sport has a 
tendency to “naturalize forms of organization that have a social and political basis” by 
promoting, in its mediated version, certain notions of “fair” competition and received notions 
of relationships between labour, the concept of the team, and authority, by presenting them in 
an idealised form (ibid. 84-86). As nationalism naturalises the subject as national (Gellner 6), 
capitalising on the dichotomy natural/fake – where the term “natural” stands in for that which 
is true or real – biologism naturalises an axiomatic reproductive instinct, as if motherhood 
constituted the passage into essence of woman, or, relevant to the field of sport, soldierhood 
naturalised as essence of masculinity.
Football, like any sport, may be perceived as a system of communication, which raises 
questions of “the awakening of consciousness” (Bourdieu, “Program” 160). The relation 
between the master and the student is often “entirely oral and visual, or better, mimetic” (ibid. 
161), i.e. productive of a particlar mode of understanding; an understanding with one’s body. 
This kind of silent, or practical, form of communication, “from body to body” (ibid. 160), 
precedes the symbolic, and makes appeals to knowledges that are already in the body, or 
situated in the habitus. Football may then be perceived as a kind of mimesis, or as a sort of 
symbolic gymnastics, which, as the rite or the dance, or any form of artistic production, 
“always contains something ineffable, [...] something which communicates, so to speak, from 
body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words and concepts, and which pleases (or displeases) 
without concepts” (Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 2). As with the practice of gift 
exchange in Kabyle society, each signification receives its meaning only be through the 
response it triggers off, producing a kind of subconcious or pre-symbolic communication 
(ibid. 5; “Program”, 160).
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The sensory and evaluatory systems of the habitus may afford the appropriate site for 
an investigation into this kind of bodily communication, and an investigation into a “theory of 
belief” (“Program” 161). Obedience, produced through bodily disciplines “consists in large 
part in belief, and belief is what the body (corps) concedes even when the mind (l’esprit) says 
no” (ibid.). Football, as is the case with all sports, offers ways of obtaining a concent from the 
body that the mind may otherwise refuse. This kind of “domestication”, or dressage, of the 
body, may serve to explain the space dominant regimes “grant to corporeal practices, which 
help to somatize the social by symbolizing it, and aim at reinforcing social orchestration 
through its bodily and collective mimesis” (ibid.).
When we approach the pleasures of the couched practitioner, or spectator to mass 
mediated sport, it may be necessary to construct an apparatus that will enable us to account 
for significant differences between everyday and scientific interpretations of sport spectacles. 
Bourdieu makes use of the term illusio to account for such discrepancies. Illusio “directs the 
gaze toward the apparent producer – painter, composer, writer – and prevents us asking who 
created this ‘creator’ and the magic power of transubstantiation with which the ‘creator’ is 
endowed,” (Bourdieu, The Rules of Art 167) and may serve to explain the supernatural powers 
that are often ascribed to élite athletes. Illusio indicates that all actors, including spectators 
and sociologists of sport, are already interested in the field, or game,36 at the moment of 
engagement, even if our investment is never transparent, or non-ideological, since we will 
never finally arrive at an answer to the question of who produced the producer.
36 An element of illusion may be necessary for us to participate in any field of social practice. Implicit in 
the term social actor is the notion of having a stake in the game: “To understand the notion of interest, it is 
necessary to see that it is opposed not only to that of disinterestedness or gratuitousness but also to that of 
indifference. To be indifferent is to be unmoved by the game [...]. Indifference is an axiological state, an ethical 
state of nonpreference as well as a state of knowledge in which I am not capable of differentiating the stakes 
proposed. Such was the goal of the Stoics: to reach a state of ataraxy (ataraxy means the fact of not being 
troubled). Illusio is the very opposite of ataraxy: it is to be invested, taken in and by the game [...]. Each field 
calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest, a specific illusion, as tacit recognition of the value of the 
stakes of the game as practical mastery of its rules.” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 116-117).
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3.1. The subject
The traditional reading of Bourdieu has emphasised a tension between an agent, on the one 
hand, and structure, on the other. Theorists such as Bourdieu, Giddens, Bhaskar, etc., have 
been compared with each other with regard to how they are situated on a continuum that 
emphasises the autonomous capacity of agents to act or the limiting effects of structuring 
structures (King 216-231). The reception of Bourdieu’s work has highlighted the structuring 
elements of his approach to society against other theorists who have put more weight on an 
autonomous actor.
We have previously discussed the knowing subject in Bourdieu and the sense of fields 
characterised by a dispersal of differential subject positions (chapter 3). Here we shall go into 
further detail regarding the constitution of subjectivity in Bourdieu and compare it with the 
kind of subject we encounter in discourse theory. Finally, we will ask how the kind of 
relational approach to agency we find in Bourdieu can help us understand the formation of 
differential social identities.
The subject in Bourdieu is situated between the poles of objectivism and subjectivism. 
The two terms may need some explanation. Wacquant defines subjectivism in terms of a 
sports metaphor: in this kind of approach to behaviour there is “no objective moment, and the 
soccer ‘field’ remains a purely phenomenological form [in Merleau-Ponty], grasped strictly 
from the standpoint of the acting agent” (p. 22). While apprehending the game solely from the 
perspective of the player, subjectivism fails to bridge the “internal and external structures, 
here between the sense of the game of the player and the actual constellation of the field” 
(ibid.). Subjectivism here receives a meaning close to individualism, as it assumes the 
perspective of individual players as the sole source of meaning for social analysis.
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In Outline of a Theory of Practice Bourdieu shows how the concept of habitus 
intervenes to disrupt a subjectivism that postulates “voluntarism or spontaneism” (p. 82). 
Again, the presupposition of an individual acting spontaneously and voluntary is complicated 
by the habitus, “the product of history [which] produces individual and collective practices” 
(ibid.). The assumption of a spontaneously or voluntarily acting individual is further specified 
as in opposition to Bourdieu’s approach in The Logic of Practice. Here he criticises “the 
postulate that rational action can have no other principle than the intention of rationality and 
the free, informed calculation of a rational subject” as absurd. Rational actor theory – the idea 
that individuals act voluntarily and freely as rational agents in so far as they maximise 
economic profit at minimum cost – relates actions directly to economic interest and disregards 
the possibility that “practices can have other principles than mechanical causes or conscious 
ends” (“The imaginary”: 50).37 Again, subjectivism in the guise of rational actor theory is 
unable to appreciate the social structures that envelop subjective actions. A term such as “field 
of action” becomes a descriptive term for a physical space without theoretical status 
(Wacquant 22 n39).38
Objectivism is a term Bourdieu uses to describe a mechanistic imposition of structures 
without any recourse to subjective agency. In Wacquant’s words, objectivism poses an ersatz 
subject who passively supports “forces that mechanically work out their independent logic” 
(1992: 8). In Outline of a Theory of Practice Bourdieu describes as objectivist those 
approaches which enable a position to social analysis that breaks with actors’ subjective – 
doxic – experience of their social world (pp. 1-30). The objective truths of social actions are 
inaccessible (in explicit form) to those who inhabit the social world of analysis. Bourdieu calls 
37 See also the elaboration of the logics of cultural and symbolic capital in chapter 1 and 3, above, which, 
in Bourdieu's cultural analysis, are attempts to demonstrate that actors may obey “an economic logic without 
obeying narrowly economic interests” (“The imaginary”: 50).
38 Chapter 3, above, discusses the terms habitus and field in further detail.
69
for a type of analysis that combines this kind of objective truth with an understanding of 
“structured dispositions within which those [objective] structures are actualized and which 
tend to reproduce them” (ibid. 3). An economic determinism that leaves no room for 
contingent articulation is also at odds with the kind of discourse analysis posited by Laclau in 
that it treats as historically necessary that which can only come into being as a result of 
political processes.39
There are two points to be drawn from this exposition of these terms in Bourdieu. 
Firstly, subjectivism and objectivism do not occupy the same plane of analysis in his work. 
While subjectivism tends to be associated with a phenomenology bereft of social context or a 
model of rational choice agency that assumes agents that act with the singular purpose of 
maximising individual economic benefit – what Bourdieu refers to as “narrow economic self-
interest” (“The imaginary” 50) – objectivism is located on a plane of analysis that appears 
necessary but not sufficient in a holistic social or cultural analysis. Subjectivism can be 
rejected, objectivism seems necessary. The way beyond objectivism is to reincorporate what 
has been called lived experience, or the kind of practical logic that actors employ in order to 
make sense of their life worlds.
Secondly, it follows that Bourdieu’s style of analysis is not reducible to some location 
on a continuum from individualism to structure-without-agents. The latter, the kind of 
objectivism Wacquant refers to as operating an ersatz (dummy) subject, is acknowledged by 
Bourdieu as a first step in the objectivisation process any social analyst must partake in. To 
step out of the immediate subjective experience of those who participate in the game entails 
removing oneself from the doxa – the established truth – of the the field, so as to objectify the 
structures that dominate it. The simplified division between agent and structure outlined by 
39 Laclau and Mouffe offer a refutation of economic determinism in “Post-Marxism without apologies”. 
See also comments on articulation and discourse analysis in chapter 3, above.
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King, and alluded to by Wacquant, has tended to reproduce the dichotomous relationship 
Bourdieu opposed between subjectivism and objectivism. It is only when the subjective 
experiences of actors – their practical logic or feel for the game – are reincorporated into the 
analysis that we can achieve the level of truth aimed for by Bourdieu when he urges the 
cultural analyst to establish what he refers to as total social facts.40
The debate over structure and agency has juxtaposed a structure without agent to an 
individualistic, atomistic agent bereft of context. One way Bourdieu has overcome this false 
dichotomy is by pointing out how structures are not only structuring of agents’ acts, but also 
structured – i.e. in turn circumscribed and not the final determinants of acts.41 Furthermore, 
one misreading of Bourdieu, implied by King’s association of Bourdieu with Giddens, 
assumes that there is “a little bit of individualism” retained in Bourdieu’s cultural analysis. 
This is misguided for two reasons: as shown above Bourdieu rejects subjectivism on the 
grounds that it does not sufficiently account for the contexts and structures agents operate 
within, and, additionally, Bourdieu’s critique of substantialism effectively bars any recourse to 
an individual actor without context. As David Swartz notes
Bourdieu criticizes incessantly what he calls “substantialism,” 
“realism,” or the “spontaneous” theory of knowledge as a key 
obstacle to developing genuine scientific knowledge of the 
social world. For Bourdieu, the substantialist vision of social 
reality designates an epistemology that “recognizes no other 
reality than that which is directly given to the intuition of 
ordinary experience.”42 It focuses on the “realities of ordinary 
sense-experience, and by individuals in particular.” 
Substantialist thinking “privileges substances” over 
relationships, for “it treats the properties attached to agents -- 
occupation, age, sex, qualifications -- as forces independent of 
40 See the remarks on the concept “practical logic” and “total social facts” in the opening of chapter 3, 
above.
41 We can perhaps say that the apparent structures are “overdetermined” by the field of class relations (see 
also the discussions of field theory in chapter 3, above).
42 The quote is from Pierre Bourdieu, “What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical 
existence of groups,” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 32, 1987: 3.
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the relationship within which they ‘act’”.43 (Swartz 61)
The limit of King’s engagement with Bourdieu is due to the too quick association of agency 
with a simplistic notion of an individual, the result of which is to make unfounded claims with 
regards to Bourdieu’s alleged legitimation of decontextualised individuals as elements of 
cultural analysis. The critique of substantialism indicates that behind the term “individual” in 
Bourdieu, there cannot be found the kind of substance, or essence, we associate with 
individualism. The individual remains a movable piece in a conglomerate of concepts 
available to the cultural analyst.
The use of Bourdieu to justify social analysis premised on individualism – an 
approach that treats the properties of agents as detached from social contexts – disregards the 
critique of how the individual in sociology has been used as a tool to abstract and reduce to 
objects those who are studied by the cultural analyst. In this view, sociology is one of a 
number of ways in which practitioners have been reduced to individuals. This is a reductionist 
view: the objects of analysis (its “subjects”) are already presupposed as individuals, and this is 
why sociology has been solicited as a tool to reinforce a certain view of society – namely one 
that assumes an atomistic or non-existent society inhabited by individuals bereft of social 
contexts in which they act.
The insufficiency of this kind of understanding of society makes necessary the social 
force employed through sociology, but also through the various manifestations of sports in 
schools, in order to establish the individual as a privileged harbinger of meaning and order. 
The gap between actors’ lived experience and the framework of analysis offered by the 
dominant mode of understanding society is tentatively joined by the production of belief: 
consent to the kind of social analysis that privileges individualism is solicited through social 
43 Bourdieu, Distinction 22.
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practices such as sport. It is through school sports, among other practices, that we are “hailed 
into being” as individuals44, and through such practices we are made to believe with our 
bodies. Individualist interpretations of the social are habituated and naturalised, and this is 
why an individualist perspective on society in turn appears commonsensical to practitioners. 
Cultural analysis should be concerned with objectifying these kinds of taken for granted 
assumptions, which appear doxic to those who inhabit the field we investigate, but which 
nevertheless remain at the level of voluntarism, as it disregards the coercive element of social 
orchestration.45
In addition to the relational argument against individualism in Bourdieu, one should 
also note the diverse uses of agent in his writing. The agent can be abstract, such as when 
Bourdieu describes fields as exhibiting the ability to attract practitioners. Is not the field itself 
the active agent here? While explicitly rejecting rational choice theory and substantialism, 
such as the attribution of substance to an individual outside or prior to its socially 
contextualised acts, Bourdieu also relies on a use of social agency in his writing that is 
multidirectional – power flows both from the subject, while it remains structured – and 
inclusive of subjects that are conceptual in addition to substantive.
In this sense, Bourdieu opened for a kind of agency that can be described as a “process 
of subjectivising” (Wright 9-28). This subject has no fixed substantive content, and is defined 
by flux and change, rather than solidity and fixity. Pursuing such a notion of subjectivity 
inexorably leads to the question of its “fragile consistency[:] for if the subject is not a ‘placed’ 
entity – either as a ‘mass’, or as their representative in a party – but rather an ensemble of 
actions, what holds it together?” (ibid. 12). By defining the subjective in reference to a 
44 See further discussion of the coming-into-being of individuals in modern thought in chapter 7, where, 
following Foucault, schools are identified as one of the first arenas where national subjects were trained and 
examined, and thereby brought into existence as individuals.
45 See also further discussions of the term social orchestration in the introduction and in chapter 7 on the 
regulation of desire through spectacular sport.
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process rather than a fixed, “placed” entity, the subject may encompass “a series of paintings 
or mathematical formulae as well as a collection of political militants” (ibid.). Crucially, the 
subject is no longer reduced to a singular and decontextualised individual, but defined in 
terms of structure or, even, assemblages of acts.
This sense of subjectivity is closely aligned to the notion of subjectivity operative 
within discourse theory. To Foucault discourse is the medium through which power produces 
subjects. The active agent in this view is, again, not primarily the subject, but discourse and a 
power that is productive through it. Discourse is productive of a dispersal of subject positions 
and the totality of subject positions is exhaustive of the possible perspectives practitioners 
may hold.46 A subject position indicates both a “conceptual repertoire and a location for 
persons within the structure” (Davies and Harré 46). The notion of a discourse characterised 
by a dispersal of possible subject positions is strictly analogous to Bourdieu’s field theory, 
where each field is inhabited by agents that occupy a set number of finite positions. In the 
field of sports Bourdieu shows how the field can be conceptualised according to the space of 
possible body-relations: by contrasting boxing with aikido or tai-chi, Bourdieu shows how 
attachments to these sports signifies a preference for a particular body-relation – or nexus – 
such as hard/soft or direct/indirect.47
46 See further discussion of the term “subject position” in relation to sport in chapter 3 above.
47 See also the discussion of the space of sports in chapter 8 and of Bourdieu's field theory in chapter 3 
above.
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3.2. Case: Reading the referee
The quasi-legal status of the referee makes this figure an interesting case to distinguish 
between various approaches to sport. In this chapter I will primarily be interested in 
juxtaposing the analytic philosophy of sport proposed by Bernard Suits with the practical 
approach to cultural analysis put forth in the work of Bourdieu.
As a preface, spectacular sports events tended to serve as instances of social 
orchestration to Bourdieu (“Program” 161). Therefore, football on this level can be seen as an 
instrument to naturalise relations of dominance. The referees’ self-perceptions add to the 
quasi-legal position of this role: as a mediator between opposing interests, the analogy to the 
judge in a court room may be envisioned. A central concern seems to be how to get the body 
to remember a voluntarist social imaginary.
*
Put simply, football is a game of 22 players divided into two opposing teams, and their actions 
are overseen by a referee. Its sphere of activity is limited to the pitch, to the duration of the 
football game, and by rules which circumscribe the players’ actions. These rules are upheld by 
the referee. As a social field, football consists of more than the 22 players and a referee, and it 
takes place in more locations than merely the pitch. It also includes the media, spectators, 
administrators, sponsors, and it is enabled by a whole legal and socio-economic system 
around it.
In the analytical model, referees embody the law, upholding the rules of the game, 
while, in a social model, they are agents with a specific habitus, which is different from, but 
also related to, the habitus of the 22 players.48 It is the specificity of the referee’s habitus that 
is of interest to us here, because, if referees are defined by what they do, one question is how 
48 Habitus is a term used in the cultural analysis of Pierre Bourdieu. For a discussion of the term, see 
chapter 3 and Swartz (pp. 94-116).
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it is possible to produce practitioners that enact the laws in a uniform way. If we gave 
someone a rulebook and a black shirt, would they act the same way as other, more seasoned, 
referees? If this habitus comes into being through a game-like activity where the necessary 
dispositions are embodied in the subjects, referees must acquire and master these dispositions 
in order to succeed as referees. These dispositions predispose practitioners to act without 
reflective thinking – a kind of automated practice. This practice is bodily and it tends to 
reproduce the state of the field as it was at their point of entry into it.
If referees articulate themselves as teachers or judges, are the relations between their 
roles as referees and their roles as teachers and judges external to each other? In other words, 
is it a relation of analogy, a linguistic relation, between football and these two fields? Judith 
Butler argues that naming is a productive activity, and that this kind of performativity, the act 
of naming, is the aspect of discourse that has the capacity to produce what it names.49 When 
referees see themselves as teachers, they may well be teachers. When they see themselves as 
judges, they may well be judges. These acts of naming are also acts of performances, situated 
in a space where the language becomes a part of the body. At this moment, Butler argues, it 
becomes impossible to distinguish clearly between the language to describe the role and the 
role itself. Rather than perceiving football merely as a game, then, it could be read as a play 
where referees act out roles similar to those of the chorus in the ancient Greek drama – they 
get to warn players, they are aware of the script before it is acted out, and they know more 
about the totality of the play than the other actors. They are empowered to name the acts of 
those with stakes in this particular game. If football, in the analytical model, was like a board 
game, with clearly distinguished and distinguishable roles assigned to each piece, with Butler 
it resembles a play – a play where each role has the potential of being rescripted as the play 
unfolds.
49 For a closer discussion of Judith Butler's notion of performativity, see e.g. Osbourne and Segal 2003.
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This chapter is an attempt to understand how referees fit in to the game. I will use 
three approaches to social analysis as tools in a reading of interviews with international 
referees. I will discuss, partly, how we are to understand the role of the referee in football, 
and, partly, the relationships between elements of the three approaches to the social. These 
approaches are not necessarily in conflict with each other, but, rather, are complementary 
ways of understanding the referee’s role in the game. Adding to the analytical model of sports, 
which sees the game predominantly as populated by actors with a stake in the outcome, and 
the contention that football is a social field, inhabited by structured subjectivities, Butler 
argues that each subjectivity is also a participant in an ongoing struggle to name, or define, 
the field. This chapter discusses ways of understanding the role of referees in relation to these 
approaches to the social.50
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the actual use that referees make of their 
practice in football complicates the analytical approach to the game. Referees perceive 
themselves as performing a multitude of roles on the field, and their self-perception becomes 
objectified through the use of the performative speech act. By naming themselves as 
educators or judges, they establish these roles as tenable for practitioners of football, and 
make it possible to perform the kinds of practices associated with these roles on the pitch.
Analytical philosopher Bernard Suits constructs football as a board game, with pieces 
that have distinct and non-overlapping functions. The referee, then, has the role of arbiter 
between the players. With no stake in the outcome of the game, referees are not properly part 
of it – they are in some important ways outside the game. Suits’s concern is to achieve some 
analytical understanding of the game. In his model, the players are those who try to get the 
ball into the opponent’s goal. Referees are keepers of the boundaries of the game. These 
50 While Pierre Bourdieu discusses sports in detail in several essays, Judith Butler does not discuss sport 
in particular, but discusses Bourdieu’s approach in more general terms.
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boundaries are those rules Suits calls constitutive of the game, because, while it would be 
possible to use any kind of method to place the ball inside the opponents’ goal, it would only 
be football if the means by which this end was achieved was in accordance with these rules. 
Constitutive rules lay down obstacles to achieve a certain desired state of affairs. These 
obstacles, for instance, not moving the ball around with hands or arms, make it more difficult 
to achieve the desired state of affairs. And it is the referee’s role to ensure that these 
constitutive rules are adhered to. In a strictly analytical approach to the sport, football assigns 
circumscribed and clearly defined tasks to the participating pieces, and each piece’s modus of 
operation is circumscribed by the game’s constitutive rules.  
If one of the 22 players were to score by means of their hand, for instance, it would in 
effect not be a part of the game we call football, since the means through which the desired 
state of affairs was achieved was in violation of the game’s constitutive rules. In consequence, 
the referee may designate the player as an outsider through various sanctions, the most serious 
of which being expelling the player from the game.
Role perception
This perspective on the referee is dominant in referees’ articulation of their own roles. They 
emphasise that they “see the game from a different perspective as a referee as to a player” 
(McLeod), that the pitch appears similar to the courtroom (Pedersen), and that referees must 
make decisions that are legitimate and acceptable to both parties, even the losing team 
(Nkosi). Representing football’s judicial branch, they are neutral with regard to any particular 
game they referee, and must remain disinterested as to the outcome of the game. Suits’s model 
of sports is one dominant way of articulating the referee in the interviews, but it is also 
accompanied by a range of other uses of football. In this way of approaching the interviews 
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int his study, the articulations, examples, or illustrations given by the intervieweesshould be 
considered as metaphors that describe their activities as referees.
To Pierre Bourdieu, these articulations can be seen as expressions of a refereeing 
habitus. Bourdieu defines habitus as “a system of durable, transposable dispositions” 
generative of practice (Logic 53).51 These are acquired at entry into the field through 
initiation, supervised game-like activity, and peer-interaction. South African referee Ian 
McLeod relates his visual capacity as a referee to an experience formative of his inauguration 
into refereeing.  While training to be a teacher, McLeod had ambitions of coaching football in 
extra-mural programmes. Wanting to further his knowledge about the rules of the game, 
McLeod completed a refereeing course. His fellow referees implored him to make a choice 
between coaching and refereeing.
My colleagues, who were refereeing me at that stage, said to me 
“Ian, now, we think you should rather give up playing football, 
because you’re an embarrassment to the referees, because you 
always moan at referees and complain” and they said I should 
concentrate on refereeing, because [...] you go further as a 
referee than as a football player, and [...] to really get involved in 
refereeing you have to, you can’t play and referee, because you 
see the game from a different perspective as a referee as to a 
player. (McLeod)
As a defining moment in McLeod’s entry into refereeing, it describes an inauguration into an 
activity that is relatively autonomous from those of the other agents – the 22 players, 
administrators, spectators, and so on. His change of role from player to referee entailed a new 
kind of observation.
If I’m watching a football match, a televised game or if I’m at a 
game live, I’m concentrating a lot on the referee.[...] I obviously 
enjoy the match, but my eyes are always on the referee, what 
51 See chapter 1.3 for an more detailed discussion of Bourdieu's terminology.
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positions he takes up, how he controls the situations, but I 
suppose after 22 years that’s natural. (McLeod)
This naturalisation of a mode of observation demonstrates how dispositions shape perception. 
Also, the dispositions that are dominantly required, such as neutrality, objectivity and 
disinterest, are reinforced through supervised, game-like activity. When describing his work, 
the South African National Referees Coordinator Philemon Nkosi explained how supervised 
practice and certification programmes are coordinated by the national body.
We have the selection committee, we have the appointment 
committee, we have the review committee, and also the 
technical committee, they are all sub-committees. The main 
committee is the National Referees Committee, which is a 
standing committee at SAFA. So what I do is that I coordinate 
whatever is being decided there, put together and arrange 
meetings thereof, and also coordinate the training schedule for 
the referees. You know, we need to develop our referees, 
maintain the good standard that I believe we have, and show that 
it is sustained. (Nkosi)
These practices produce a system of durable, transposable dispositions. These dispositions 
integrate past experience, and “function at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, 
appreciations, and actions” (Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 82-83). Dispositions, 
the component parts of habitus, describe tendencies of action and thought within a certain 
stratum or substratum of a social group. They are inscribed into agent’s body relations and 
may appear as natural to the agents themselves, such as McLeod’s naturalised mode of game 
observation, and the matrix of perception established through the administrative work of 
Philemon Nkosi.
Peer-interaction among referees is another mechanism to produce cohesion among 
subjects, aiming to achieve a relative degree of autonomy in a larger social field. Norwegian 
referee Rune Pedersen describes a sense of community among his peers. “We support and 
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discuss with each other,” he says, as there is “positive rivalry, a degree of competition to be 
among” the referees. Specifically, peer-interaction among referees is concerned with how to 
enforce the rule-book, how to cope with pressure from other participants in the game, and so 
on. Pedersen notes that it is necessary to have “the courage to make difficult decisions, and to 
take decisions when something happens, and not be frightened of negative remarks” from 
spectators, participants, and in the media (ibid. 51). This kind of interaction among seasoned 
referees serves to further strengthen the relative autonomy of their peer-group.
For agents to achieve success, they are inclined to reproduce the state of the social 
field as it was when they entered into it. The field reproduces itself by generating a habitus 
that is in conformity with the current state of the field. A successful agent has success 
precisely because he or she has mastered the rules that apply in the social field. The rules have 
become a part of the players’ disposition to act, they have become embodied. Referees, then, 
must take up and reproduce the rules that are laid down for the social field in order to become 
part of it. Their dispositions are shaped by the structure of the field, and these structures are, 
again, configured by the economic field – the field of class relations.
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Fig. 3: Bourdieu’s model of social fields and football situated within the field of  
cultural production. Adapted from Bourdieu, The Rules of Art (p. 124).
While some dispositions essential to referees may conform to Suits’s model of sports practice, 
these actors’ positions are structured by fields that circumscribe their operation. In Bourdieu’s 
model, football is a cultural practice in large-scale production. These kinds of cultural 
practices have a low degree of autonomy and symbolic capital, but could generate large 
economic capital. As Bourdieu shows, the field of cultural production should be located 
within the field of power, and both these fields are subject to the inclinations of the larger 
social field, or the economy (The Rules of Art 124).
Football is a field of large-scale production in Bourdieu’s model, but it is a field where 
referees are positioned as consecrated practitioners, as practitioners endowed with a particular 
set of tools for action, but also as symbolic endowments.52 Their position as consecrated 
practitioners enables them to accumulate symbolic capital in distinction to the 22 players. 
52 For a discussion of the term consecration in relation to the nineteenth-century literary avant-garde in 
France, see Bourdieu, The Rules of Art 122-123.
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Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to social analysis enables us to configure football as a social field, 
inhabited by actors engaged in role-playing activities. Apart from acquiring dispositions 
through a game-like activity, these actors accumulate social capital that they may invest in 
practices in adjacent fields, such as in social interaction with fans and spectators of the sport, 
in salary negotiations, and so on.53
The referees expressed concerns about the role of football in the larger social 
community. To the South African referees, football served as a sort of cohesive mechanism. 
Previously set apart by the racialising discourses of separate development, or apartheid, 
football may serve to bridge divisions in the community. McLeod found that “football has a 
vast role to play in bringing people together of all races” (p. 14). Philemon Nkosi defined the 
social function of sports as a
unifying platform, it brings people together. Now, bringing 
people together, you must not set them apart by coming up with 
bad decisions. [...] Also the masses need to understand the laws 
of the game, because, if you don’t understand, you will say, 
“Look that was a goal,” and maybe it was not a goal. And you 
get a guy who’s [...] literate on the laws of the game, and who 
says, “Why do you say it’s a goal?”, and you can’t describe that. 
(p. 21)
As an educational exercise, then, football provides an arena where acts can be negotiated 
within a common legal code. The “masses”, in Nkosi’s terminology, need literacy about the 
laws of the game so as to be able to articulate why a particular act was in accordance with the 
law or not. To Nkosi, then, referees are positioned as educators, vouching for the neutrality of 
the rules in relation to any specific application of them. football is a means through which the 
“masses” may appreciate the utility of the rule-book. Rune Pedersen finds that football 
“solves social problems,” not the least because it preempts other less positive activities (p. 
53 In a discussion of bourgeois lifestyle, Bourdieu defines social capital as “a capital of social connections, 
honourability and respectability that is often essential in winning and keeping the confidence of high society, and 
with it a clientele, and may be drawn on, for example, in making a political career” (Distinction 122).
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49). To Bourdieu, these highly capitalised roles – the judge, teacher and negotiator – remain 
analogies to their dispositions, ways to describe metaphorically what referees do, or as 
attempts to set up homologies with fields outside football.54 Referees’ subjectivities remain 
subordinated by the larger fields of power and class relations.
Reformulating the refereeing subject
These articulations are more than linguistic superstructures to disguise the economic basis of 
the social. Social theorist Judith Butler suggests that a certain “magic of social 
performativity” may undermine the stability of Bourdieu’s model of “economic inclination” 
as structuring of social acts. If dispositions are incorporated knowledges and inclinations to 
practice located in the subjective body, how is it possible to distinguish between subjective 
and objective dimensions of that body? Butler asks whether the theoretical distinction of the 
social and the linguistic can be separated in practice.55 If competency in the practices of the 
field is defined as submission to order, practices become unthinkable, since actors are inclined 
through immediate submission to make a virtue out of necessity. Butler suggests that referees’ 
practices are acts of social performativity, enabling subjects to participate in an “ongoing 
political contestation and reformulation of the subjects” (p. 125).
Since these subjects bring their football personas to other social spaces, referees may 
make use of their social capital in contexts other than in their sporting practice strictly 
speaking. Ian McLeod makes use of his celebrity status during visits to unfamiliar locations.
54 Bourdieu uses the term homology to explain relations between the structure of a given field and the 
structure of the fields of power and class relations: “The field of cultural production produces its most important 
effects through the play of homologies between the fundamental opposition which gives the field its structure 
and the oppositions structuring the field of power and the field of class relations.” (“Field” 44). Homology is also 
used to conceptualize relations among relatively autonomous fields and “homologies in strategies” (Swartz 129-
130).
55 Laclau and Mouffe also do not distinguish between linguistic and other forms of discursive articulation, 
but instead hold that it is the totality of social practices that make up discursive space.
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I can go into any home in the country, I believe, particularly in the townships, 
and they will welcome me. [...] And I hope I brought out a reputation of 
being an honest person, a person of integrity and a person hopefully they 
enjoy seeing refereeing, enjoy meeting socially. (p.14)
Rune Pedersen finds that his role as a referee shapes his relations outside the football pitch. If 
he had been involved in refereeing on a full-time basis, he “would have become a particular 
kind of person. I [...] find it very helpful to have a social circuit that includes people who [...] 
talk about other things, and do other things” (p. 47). Football has uses beyond the game itself 
to those who practise it. These uses are personal and social, and referees themselves reflect on 
the difficulties they have in maintaining a strict separation of their roles as referees and their 
lives outside the game.
Also, referees look to positions of authority to explain their own role. When we 
perceive the referee as a judge, football appears as a model of the legal system in civil society, 
and in accordance with Suits’s view on sports. As educators, referees serve to disseminate a 
way of thinking about the law-book, enabling participants and spectators to argue for their 
perception of the game within the strictures of the law. As negotiators, referees are 
representatives of an apparatus that is both larger than them, and also enables diverse 
strategies to solve stand-offs between participants in the game. The judge, the teacher and the 
diplomat are all empowered positions, privileged in relation to their subjects in terms of 
knowledge and possibilities of practice.
Understanding football as a board game fails to explain how referees make use of their 
sports activities outside the pitch, and it also provides no guide to how referees maintain the 
sort of uniform practice that is required by the board-game metaphor. Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus serves to explain how dispositions are transposed to locations outside the football 
pitch, and his concept of symbolic capital aids in understanding what these dispositions are, 
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and how they are productive of uniform practice. The kind of reproduction of the state of the 
field that is required of consecrated practitioners suggests that referees’ acts are guided by 
structures which leaves little or no room for creative or performative acts. Referees name their 
activities in ways that agree with Bourdieu’s field theory, but also in ways that constitute 
creative re-significations of their practices.
Bourdieu’s practical approach to cultural analysis enables us to move from an abstract 
analytical understanding of the game to the self-perceptions of actual actors – their practical 
sense of the game. However, their sense of their roles are more than a mere representation of 
pre-discursive identities: as with sexual identities, their self-perception is not restricted to 
moments that came prior to their self-constitution in discourse. While the antinomy 
male/female is produced in discourse and not prior to it,56 the perception of the referee is 
produced through practice, and not limited to some abstract rule given before the game 
begins.
The roles of judges, teachers and negotiators are not merely linguistic representations 
of pre-discursive “facts”, but acts of naming, acts of putting into play novel self-perceptions. 
When referees see themselves as teachers, they may well come into being as teachers, and not 
merely referees. To recognise this distinction is to question the division of the social and the 
linguistic in Bourdieu’s approach. If habitus is embodied, its articulations are part of the body, 
and not wholly separable from it. Language, then, is more than an abstract, analytical system. 
Meaning is relational and produced in and through practice.
This sense of discourse will form the basis of our approach to nationalism in the 
following chapter, where the assumption is, precisely, that nations are discursive constructions 
that are articulated in response to particular social contexts – such as an oppressive imperial 
56 Chapter 5 offers a detailed discussion of the discursive production of sex and gender.
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power. Attempts to legitimate nations with reference to a point outside and prior to discourse 
will inevitably be confronted with the social constitution of that point. References to “golden 
age” events are made intelligible through the prism of nationalism, and therefore constructed 
as a moment in a nationalist pre-history.
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4. Nationalisms: Theories of national communities
Bourdieu’s interest in nations lay primarily with the effects of their institutional expression: 
the nation state and nation-wide public institutions. Through these institutions the dominant 
class reproduces and entrenches its privileges:
the institutionalized strategies of distinction through which 
“status groups” seek to make de facto differences permanent and 
quasi-natural, are there for legitimate, by symbolically 
enhancing the effect of distinction associated with occupying a 
rare position in the social structure, are the self-consciousness of 
the dominant class. (1990 Logic: 138)
National symbols, narratives, and so on, therefore feature as legitimating discourses: they tend 
to naturalise differences that are produced in the field of class relations. With regard to 
spectacular sports, Bourdieu notes that the “theatricalization which always accompanies the 
exercise of power extends to all practices, and particularly to consumption” (ibid. 139). 
Nationalist discourses should then be perceived as overarching discourses that stretch across 
the various fields of cultural production. As discourses legitimating differences in the 
economic field, nationalism should be considered as a property of the field of power (fig. 2 
above shows how Bourdieu configures the various fields).
In this chapter I will develop a discursive approach to nationalism and apply such a 
model to the South African formation. It is centrally concerned with Benedict Anderson’s 
view of nations as contingent, limited and sovereign communities. It proceeds from 
discussing the founding elements of nationalism, its relation to articulation and narrative, and 
the main components of Anderson’s model – social antagonism, vernacular languages, and a 
novel conception of time. It then proceeds with a comparison of Anderson’s model with the 
typologies of nationalism proposed by Eugene Kamenka and Peter Alter. The second part 
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offers a historical discussion of Afrikaner nationalism from its early inception in the 1870s 
until its dismantling with the 1994 elections, and investigates how apartheid should be 
classified with our taxonomies. We then inquire into the meaning of 1994, and ask in what 
sense this year could provide us with a messianic moment beyond which the violent practices 
of this national formation’s past can be eschewed.
Nationalism shares properties with religious and ethnic communities, with ideologies 
such as socialism and liberal, and with ad hoc organisations that strive to achieve specific 
objectives and that wither away when their goals are perceived as completed. Nations are 
“deep horizontal comradeships” (Anderson, Imagined Communities 7), expecting a specific 
statement of solidarity in face of other groups (Alter 6). It distinguishes between the in-group 
(believers or nationals) and the out-group (heathens or foreigners), and it offers sets of 
originary myths, founding fathers, and other forms of symbolic clothing, the immersion in 
which signifies ideological adherence among nationalists. The difficulty in defining 
nationalism lies not only with its ideological incoherence or “philosophical poverty” 
(Anderson, Imagined Communities 5), but also with the conflicting purposes and uses of 
nationalism at different times and locations. Is nationalism emancipatory or repressive, a 
sentiment or a movement, authoritarian or democratic, progressive or reactionary? Are the 
specific demands and expressions of particular nationalisms so incongruent that it would 
really be more appropriate to speak of nationalisms in the plural?
Nationalisms have emerged relatively recently. While some nationalists claim to 
represent communities that “loom out of an immemorial past, and [...] glide into a limitless 
future” (Anderson, Imagined Communities 11-12), it is invariably the case that nations emerge 
out of social and political formations that have lost their purpose or that have become 
irrelevant at a particular moment. While there are still significant disagreements on the precise 
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emergence of nationalism, the recent historical emergence of nationalism as ideology and type 
of community raises the question of whether it will be a time when it has lost its capacity to 
generate hopes, emotions and actions (Alter 4), or if different communities and ideologies will 
emerge that may take over these abilities. In the case of South Africa, which will be the case 
of analysis in the second part of this chapter, we may ask if popular notions and political 
pursuance of a regional identity could finally take over the social role that nationalism has 
played in the history of the country.
Nationalism is often understood as the logical outcome, in the form of an ideology 
upholding a kind of social organisation, of the European Enlightenment. Eugene Kamenka, 
argues that nationalism “brought Asia, Africa and the Pacific into relation with European 
history[,] making them part of a universal history”. To him, nationalism is a “modern and 
initially a European phenomenon”, which is “best understood in relation to the French 
revolution of 1789” (p. 3). As the historical origin of nationalism, the French revolution 
asserted the principle of self-determination, and conceived of national autonomy as an 
aggregate of individual citizens’ ability to participate in the common political life of the new 
republic. When Kamenka chooses to uphold the French revolution of 1789 as the founding 
moment of nationalism he indicates that this “universalising” movement originated in Europe, 
and that classically liberal virtues, such as individual freedom and self-determination, should 
be regarded as cornerstones of this novel political ideology.
It is as if nationalism as a field of academic study doubles the effort common to 
nationalisms of seeking justification for its existence in originary myths and founding fathers, 
and that these narratives and forebears are somehow to be found in Europe. Peter Alter, in his 
typology of nationalisms, find the roots of nationalism in the Greek revolt against Ottoman 
rule, and the articulation of a new Greek subjectivity in the writings of Prince Alexander 
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Ypsilantis. Here Alter finds the nation invoked as a vehicle for “liberal ideology of 
opposition,” (p. 6) incorporating ideals of (national) autonomy and (individual) equality. The 
origins of these ideas, Alter finds, lies in the French revolutionary ideals. However, if it is the 
case that the roots of nationalism are “without doubt” to be found in Europe, how do we 
explain the early instances of nationalism in the Peru, Brazil and the USA?
Nationalism, articulation and narrative
In our view, nationalisms are simply all discourses promoting or disseminating the existence 
of specific nations. This definition is designed to emphasise nationalism as a set of practices, 
observing Ernest Gellner’s advice (p. 7) that the national community is best approached not so 
much in the way of formal definitions, but rather with a view to what it does. As a discourse, 
we may approach nationalism as a “structured totality resulting from articulatory practice” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 105). Nationalism is expressed in 
language –  as expressions of national identity, as differentiations between the national 
community and foreigners, and through uttering particular national symbols, such as the 
national anthem and national founding narratives – and outside language, as gesture, dress and 
other symbolic activities. In each case, nations are invoked as discursive moments, and they 
come into being as results of articulation. Taking off one’s hat may be an expression of 
respectful obedience, but taking it off while the national anthem is being broadcast during a 
public spectacle would predominantly signify the articulation of a nationalist sentiment. As 
nationalisms are produced through practices of articulation, they may encompass any 
linguistic or extra-linguistic “practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified” as a result of it (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
105). If the removal of one’s hat may yet constitute a floating signifier – a “difference that is 
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not discursively articulated” – it becomes a nationalist practice when it is articulated as a 
“differential position [...] within discourse” (ibid.) – in our case when the hat was taken off 
during the national spectacle. Nationalism provides a structured, if not necessarily coherent, 
frame for meaning and signification, offering myths of origins and destinies, founding fathers 
and national villains, and they are productive of subjectivities and national rituals.
Nations, the objects of nationalist discourses, are not eternal or essential, even if 
nationalists like to portray them as such. Most self-conscious nations came into being less 
than 200 years ago, even though their protagonists often equip them with naturalising 
discourses, portraying nations as arising from time immemorial and sometimes as a natural 
part of a person’s being, like “a nose and two ears” (Gellner 6). Eric Hobsbawm refers to the 
invented character of national traditions, sometimes expressed as “semi-fiction [...] or by 
forgery” (p. 7). The term nation emerged to designate the various student bodies attending 
medieval universities, where students where lodged according to their place of birth 
(Kamenka 3). ‘Nation’ is derived from Latin nationem “nation, stock, race,” also “that which 
has been born,” from nasci “be born” (Harper 2001).57 Already the variety of national 
designations indicates the contingent character of these communities, such as in the case of 
South Africa, where the place of the nation has emerged through a series of migrations, 
frontier wars, imperial decisions and struggles over recognition and autonomy. Also, in the 
case of Norway, the precise boundaries of the national territory have changed, indicating that 
there is nothing natural about the nation, but that it is the result of numerous contingent 
moments.
Analogies between various nationalist discourses demonstrate that these nations are 
not as different as they like to portray themselves. National narratives share certain formal 
57 Patriotism, derived from Latin patrie, signifies “love of the fatherland”, and introduces a positive 
evaluation. As George Bernhard Shaw is reputed to have said, “patriotism is believing your country is better than 
all the others just because you're born there”. I will discuss patriotism further in the section on South Africa.
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attributes, particularly their obsession with myths of origin and foundation, and elevation of 
founding fathers, and, at least in certain nationalist discourses, designations of national ages.58 
In the ideology of the dominant formation at the time of the National Party government in 
South Africa, the land where the first European settlers arrived was uninhabited, and, in its 
religious articulation, was granted to them by divine ordinance (O’Meara 67-77). The 
founding fathers of the nation also included the “trekkers”, pioneers who ventured into the 
heartland of today’s South Africa, armed with a rifle and a dream, and who, in the face of 
grave dangers and an unfriendly environment, stood tall and conquered new land. So-called 
Afrikaner ideology also included a dystopian narrative. After the arrival of British colonists, 
the nation entered its “heroic age,” signified by the South African war of the early twentieth 
century, followed by its “iron age”. The organisations, institutions and other protagonists of 
Afrikaner nationalism insisted on the restoration of a national “golden age” through the 
modern medium of the nation state. In Norway, the nationalist movement of the nineteenth 
century found the origin of the Norwegian language in Old Norse, the language of the 
Vikings. Their time was constructed as the “golden age” of a nation that had fallen prey to 
conquest by foreigners. In both cases, nationalist historiography relies on stock elements of 
nationalist discourse.
Should we then conclude that nationalist historiography is wrong? Hayden White 
argues that modes of history writing are by nature “poetic” when they give historical events 
an “explanation” and a “point” or justification. In addition, there are no grounds on which we 
can finally determine the objective truthfulness of a given historical narrative, since the 
attribution of “truthfulness” to a historical narrative is a product of the situatedness of the 
author, and not as a property of the text itself (p. xii).59 Since poesis (Latin, “poetry”, from 
58 The terms “golden”, “silver”, “bronze”, “heroic and “iron” age occur in Hesiod’s Works and Days.
59 The question of objective representations and the possibility of language as a mirror of social events is 
debated in greater detail in chapter 2.
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Greek poesis “composition, poetry”, from poein “to make or compose”), or creativity, is a 
property of all historical narrative, it would never be possible to arrive finally at a true, 
unmediated representation of things as they really happened prior to their representation in 
some language. It does not follow, however, that historical narratives are necessarily false, nor 
that national subjectivities are a priori expressions of false consciousness.
Social antagonism, language and time
If the values of French republicanism fail to explain why the new political imagining became 
national, and if a liberal ideology of opposition to empire is insufficient to explain the form of 
subjectivities in the New World, it may be necessary to specify further the conditions under 
which the early nationalisms emerged. Benedict Anderson calls attention to the central 
antagonism that was productive of nationalist movement in the Americas. Imperial rule 
entailed that those who arrived latest in the colony would occupy its highest positions, with 
the Creoles situated below them. The central, organising antagonism, the moment when the 
presence of another “prevents me from being myself” – when a peasant cannot be a peasant 
(Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 125) – was constituted by a moment of 
newly-arrived imperial subjects having preference to positions in the colony, obstructing or 
barring Creoles from these positions.
These new subjectivities, construed as national in opposition to imperial, draw on 
previous subject formations, and, in particular, rearticulate moments of the dynastic realms 
and religious systems inherited from the empire. While religious systems became imaginable 
“through the medium of a sacred language and written script” (Anderson, Imagined 
Communities 13), print-capitalism undermined their coherence through its ability to 
manufacture texts in the vernacular, enabling fragmentation, pluralisation and territorialisation 
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of the sacred languages. Dynasties, hierarchically organised between a divinely legitimated 
high centre and a population of subjects, declined with the introduction of the modern idea of 
sovereignty, which enabled governance “fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square 
centimetre of a [...] territory” (Anderson, Imagined Communities 19), and had to be self-
consciously defended as “monarchy” from 1789.
While print-capitalism enabled national consciousness by facilitating a relatively 
unified written code below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars, and a rising awareness of 
boundaries between these new codes, it also enabled a regular output of local (which later 
became national) news in the colonies. It made possible a sense of simultaneity of world 
events: while one event took place in Madrid, something else was recorded as taking place in 
Lima. Newspapers created and brought together communities, shaped by a philosophy of 
enlightenment and liberalism, and produced the possibility of simultaneity in cross-time, but 
their emergence does not suffice to explain the form taken by the resistance to the imperial 
centre.
The creole upper class, central to imperial stability, but condemned to second rank 
because of their place of birth, was instrumental in manufacturing the nations of the New 
World as a vehicle to improve their career options. After independence, the status of those 
who arrived altered from “high” to “low”, from imperial subjects to immigrants. These 
elements together – print-capitalism, the antagonisms of the creole functionaries, and the 
precursory dynastic and religious systems – produced the new national subjectivities, and 
made it possible to declare limited and sovereign nations. Nations, then, are imagined, but not 
invented, limited and sovereign communities (Anderson, Imagined Communities 6). Empires 
were rearticulated as regimes that prevented subjects from being themselves, and, in contrast 
with the preceding religious systems’ conception of space, nationalism asserted a limited 
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community: beyond a nation there would always be other nations. Furthermore, the novel 
community of subjects, the nation, should govern itself, and not be governed from above or 
outside.
Three typologies of nationalism
If, as Benedict Anderson claims, nationalism should be grouped with kinship and religion, 
rather than with ideologies such as liberalism and socialism, we may assume that there is 
more than one type of nationalism, as there are several types of kinships and religions.60 We 
will discuss three such typologies in some detail. They are arranged according to linear 
temporality, and emerge as a product of each theorist’s definition of nationalism.
60 Ernest Gellner makes the reservation that nationalism is not an inherent attribute, even if has come to 
appear as such (p. 6).
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Fig. 4: Three models of nationalism
Even if England most clearly qualified as a nation in the eighteenth century – with its 
parliament, an upper class that saw its own and the national interest as coinciding, and a 
relatively broad dissemination of a written vernacular – it was the principle of national 
autonomy, as it was asserted through the French revolution of 1789, that became the lynchpin 
of nationalism as the “basis for a new political order in Europe” (Kamenka 1976: 8). 
According to the new principle, the nation became the fundamental category, serving to define 
and delimit a sovereign people. In this early formation, the nation was conceived as an 
aggregate of individuals who could participate as citizens, through a common language, in a 
common future.
97
In German nationalism the nation was conceived as an organism with individuals as 
subordinate parts. Divisions between nations were as fundamental as the distinction between 
species in the animal kingdom, and these divisions were laid down by “God and Nature” 
(Kamenka 11). The primary task of German nationalism was not to achieve democratic and 
popular sovereignty, as it had been in France, but the revival and unity of an already 
established national spirit. To Kamenka, both liberal and organic types of nationalisms may 
serve as foundations for political progress. With the advent of the twentieth century, 
nationalism became necessary for social and economic progress as well. In Kamenka’s 
opinion it is in Mexico that nationalism finds its first fusion with social and economic 
progress (p. 17).
In his concept of Risorgimento nationalism, Peter Alter attempts to fuse Kamenka’s 
liberal and organic types. The Risorgimento movement for unification – a movement that 
came out of Italy – may be unifying (fusing diverse parts into a nation), as in Italy and 
Germany, or secessionist (seeking sovereignty in the expense of imperial rule), as in Greece 
and Finland. It will in either case have an emancipatory effect, and it was productive of a new 
social stratum, a “new”, or re-invented, self-conscious people. Furthermore, nationalism 
served to fuse social groups and shape new identities which could, in effect, manufacture a 
new “liberal ideology of opposition”, and assert autonomy, and national and individual 
equality (Alter 19). Risorgimento nationalism could form national identities from political, 
economic, cultural, linguistic or religious elements.
Reform nationalism, in Alter’s view, emerged as a response by some Asian states that 
proved “inferior in certain economic, technical and military respects when confronted by 
Western powers” (p. 23), to serve in defence of the ruling stratum’s economic, cultural and 
political control of the territory. In Japan nationalism served as a vehicle for integration, and 
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to marginalise opposition to radical social changes. Reform nationalism anticipated central 
elements in anti-colonial nationalism, which emerged as a state ideology after 1945 in part to 
consolidate the state and divert attention from domestic problems (Alter 113). To Alter 
integral nationalism constitutes a particularly malign form of absolutism, in which 
nationalism serves as a substitute religion, and where there is no recourse to individual rights. 
Alter associates this form of nationalism with right-wing radicalism in Britain and with 
imperialism in Italy and Germany.
Benedict Anderson claims instead that nationalism first appeared in the former 
colonies of the New World, and that, while contingent on the decline of imperial legitimacy 
and religious systems, it was enabled through the spread of print-capitalism, and a novel 
conception of simultaneity in cross-time (Imagined Communities 24).61 Nationalism in 
countries such as Brazil, Peru and the USA serves as the model for a second type or wave, 
denominated official nationalism. From the mid nineteenth century it was possible to 
implement nationalism from above, and by making use of the state. In Europe and Asia a 
number of monarchies made use of nationalism as a vehicle for renewed legitimacy as 
dynasties could no longer be justified as empowered through divine prescription. Official 
nationalism constitutes as set of policies available to states where the ruling class felt 
threatened, such as with Siam and Hungary (Anderson, Imagined Communities 110).
The momentum of the nationalist movement is only properly to be found in Europe 
with its third wave or type, referred to as linguistic nationalism. This kind of nationalism had 
as its philosophical origin the theories of Herder and Rousseau, asserting that each nation was 
signified by a separate language and culture, which expressed the nation’s “historical genius” 
(Anderson, “Western nationalism and Eastern nationalism” 40). This movement ushered in 
61 Anderson borrows the notion of a temporal shift from Walter Benjamin. I will discuss the differences 
between their implementation of the concept in the concluding section of this chapter.
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dictionaries for national languages and the writing-down of oral literary traditions in Greece, 
Germany, Norway, and, later, Bangladesh. With the advent of television and new information 
technologies, however, increasing numbers of people are making use of different languages in 
different contexts, potentially undermining the appeal of linguistic nationalism.
Anderson suggests that a combination of electronic communication and massive 
migrations of populations may be productive of a new form of nationalism, in which the 
territorial location of its subjects is of lesser importance. “The internet, electronic banking and 
cheap international travel [allow] people to have a powerful influence on the politics of their 
country of origin, even if they have no intention any longer of living there” (Anderson, 
“Western nationalism and Eastern nationalism” 42). In some cases this kind of long-distance 
nationalism may serve a largely symbolic significance, where the diasporic subject may 
perform a nationalism of choice: that of his nation-of-origin, or of his nation-of-residence.
In all these models, nationalism is a contingent historical movement. To Kamenka, 
nationalism is founded on the idea of individuals as citizens that participate voluntarily in a 
common future. Alter emphasises the capacity of nationalism to fuse groups at its moment of 
inception. For Anderson, nationalism was a way of opposing imperial governance. They agree 
that nations first worked as a liberating force from feudal and imperial governance. After its 
precursor movements, nationalism could then be introduced by states, rather than through 
popular organisation. The modern notion of nation building is related to this kind of official 
nationalism, in that it is now a state that claims custodianship over the national signifier, 
rather than a national movement claiming a right for sovereignty. Today, nationalism is 
commonly used to designate far-right movements outside the state. However, Kamenka, Alter 
and Anderson share their use of the term nationalism to denote a historical epoch that follows 
after feudal and imperial governance, rather than an extremist political ideology.
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While some nationalisms claim that their specific nation has special rights to a mythic 
homeland from time immemorial, all national movements can trace their origin to some 
historical movement from the late eighteenth century. Only with nationalism as a modern 
movement did it become possible to think of two events taking place at the same time in 
different locations. This simultaneity across time was contingent on a dismantling of imperial 
centres and a rise of national communities. Nationalism made it possible to conceive of 
communities that would place creole functionaries at the highest rank. A new conception of 
time and space, combined with social antagonisms which made it useful to imagine 
communities that separated the colonies from the imperial centre, produced modern nations: 
social organisations that were conceived as sovereign, but limited. These characteristics of 
nations were only possible to imagine from the late eighteenth century, and narratives of 
nations before that time are part of nations’ need to legitimate their existence.
4.1. South Africa: Before and beyond 1994
Let us now consider more closely the formation of South African nationalism. Print-
capitalism was introduced with the British conquest of the territory and its gradual inclusion 
in the British empire.62 The Afrikaans-speaking ruling class resisted, most significantly with 
the declaration of two republics, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic of 
Transvaal in the 1850s. With the defeat of these republics in the South African war (1899–
1902), Britain had taken control of the territory that today is referred to as South Africa, as it 
was formally recognised with the declaration of the Union of South Africa in 1910. In the 
62 The history of the media industry is linked to the mining industry, as newspapers were acquired or 
established through Johannesburg Consolidated Investments, a subsidiary of mining giant Anglo American. 
Independent Newspapers, the largest newspaper group in South Africa today, was established by Francis Dormer 
as the Argus Printing Company, with close ties to mining magnate Cecil Rhodes (International Marketing 
Council of South Africa).
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ensuing debate, it was decided that suffrage would continue to be restricted to the white 
minority of the inhabitants of the South African territory.63
Afrikaner nationalism64 found expression with the Genootskap van Regte Afrikanser 
(Society of True Afrikaners) in 1875, which later morphed into the Afrikaner Bond (1880), 
and the newspaper Die Afrikaanse Patriot, “written in Afrikaans rather than the Dutch 
currently in standard use” (Worden 88). The society published its first Afrikaans grammars 
and dictionaries in 1875. With the exodus of Afrikaans-speaking farmers to the cities from the 
1870s, a burgeoning articulation of an Afrikaner volk as a single group oppressed by 
“imperialism” found resonance with farmers resenting the dominance of mining and British 
capital interest in the state. The nation, then, was from the beginning articulated as a 
community in opposition to the empire, analogously to those creoles assigned the roles of 
national pioneers of the New World in Benedict Anderson’s model. While nationalism has 
been considered a universalising movement, including new identities and classes into itself, 
the Afrikaner ideology seems to fit more closely with Anderson’s observation that 
nationalisms emerged as an attempt to contain the working class. With the racist constitution 
of the Union of South Africa, it became possible to articulate class differences along “racial” 
lines, so that the “black danger” could be seen as a threat to white labour.
The early formation of the National Party was not separatist – it did not seek secession 
from the Union of South Africa – but organised around white “national” unity, however, the 
splinter group Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (Purified National Party) emphasised the imperial 
oppression of an Afrikaner people defined in terms of a common language, culture, race, 
history and divinely ordained future. The semi-Masonic Afrikaner Broederbond (established 
63 There was important debate among political groups as to the precise criteria for inclusion in the 
electoral roll, ranging from skin-colour and “ethnic origin” to language and culture.
64 The term “Afrikaner nationalism” will be used here to signify the articulations of a white, Afrikaans-
speaking nation.
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in 1918) had called for a set of objective criteria by which the Afrikaner could be identified. 
In the view of the Potchefstroom academics, each volk was to be considered a separate social 
sphere with a God-willed structure, purpose, calling and destiny (O’Meara 67-77). In this later 
articulation, then, the Afrikaner nation was conceived of as an organism, where its members 
were considered subordinate parts of a larger unity, hence as a kind of organic nationalism in 
Kamenka’s model.
Apartheid
With the victory of the Purified Nationalist Party in the 1948 elections, the South African state 
embarked on a programme of hardening social boundaries along “racial” or “ethnic” lines.65 
Passport laws were toughened, the control of influx to the cities was strengthened, and the 
Immorality Act banned interracial marriages, among a host of other measures. In the 1950s 
Sophiatown was dismantled,66 and it was also in this period that Afrikaans, the language of the 
National Party’s leadership, as well as that of its dominant constituency, gained recognition as 
an official language on a par with English. In short, the attempt to suture the social by erecting 
non-permeable boundaries between whites and non-whites was pursued to the full extent of its 
logic. Cities were to be white, while non-whites were moved into townships and homelands.
Afrikaner nationalism, as it was articulated by the governing National Party, moved 
from emphasising a fusion of social groups (who spoke the same language) to defending, 
protecting and implementing white privilege as it had already been established with the Union 
of South Africa. A new leadership had emerged in the Broederbond, consisting of young 
intellectuals educated in Europe, and with a deep admiration for National Socialism as it 
65 The categories that became dominant towards the end of the apartheid epoch were “white/European”, 
“coloured”, “Indian” and “African”. These categories were of course highly problematic, both in their 
conceptualisation and implementation (Worden 95-96).
66 Sophiatown's singular location inside a major city and its position as a juncture for encounters across 
the racial line made it a particularly pregnant signifier, both to those who opposed the laws of segregation and to 
those in favour.
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emerged in Germany. These pilgrims of a nationalism implemented by the state could be 
classified as integral nationalists in Peter Alter’s scheme: a conservative, absolute right-wing 
radicalism (Alter 26-32). From 1948, Afrikaner nationalism was a tool for nation building, 
consistent with Anderson’s notion of official nationalism, and a vehicle to legitimate and 
consolidate the state.
The apartheid policies were not implemented without protest. The demonstration that 
in some ways inaugurated the modern resistance to apartheid was a peaceful protest in 1956 
by women burning their passports with the slogans, “With passports we are slaves” and 
“Women don’t want passports”. The period also saw the establishment of the PAC, the ANC 
Youth League, and the Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, led by Nelson 
Mandela, later convicted for treason in the Rivonia trials. By 1976 the protests were 
widespread and organised, to some extent, around popular imagery, such as the widely 
circulated picture of Nelson Mandela behind prison bars. When the state, then, introduced 
Afrikaans as a compulsory language in schools, riots broke out in the South-Western 
Townships of Johannesburg (Soweto) and other areas. Schoolchildren refused instruction in 
what was perceived as the oppressor’s language, and took to the streets, marching and singing 
songs of protest. The state responded with bullets, a scenario that was rendered in Sarafina, a 
movie that was used to garner international support for the anti-apartheid movement, in a 
similar way to the use of the picture of Mandela). The international community responded 
with sanctions against the apartheid state.
By the time P.W. Botha took power in 1978, then, it was beyond doubt that the regime 
was in a serious crisis. It was threatened from both within and without, and the state 
articulated the juncture as a conspiracy of communists set to wreak havoc.67 Botha’s remedy, 
67 By this time, the theological justification for white rule was of less importance. Predominantly, the 
situation was articulated as one of an embattled agent of order against a sea of disorder and chaos.
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termed the total strategy, was two-pronged. Domestically, the state would attempt to 
manufacture and co-opt a “black middle class” (this concept is still prominent in 
contemporary discourses on South African society), while, as a matter of promotion, it would 
reformulate a number of oppressive mechanisms to make them appear as more modern 
mechanisms of governance. Hence, homelands were now increasingly referred to as 
“nations”, with a degree of political autonomy. Passports controls were eased, while other 
forms of influx control were intensified. The powers and resources of the secret police grew 
immensely. Various programmes of more “scientific” population control were investigated, 
and foreign operations intensified. In short, the total strategy consisted of intensified 
surveillance, increased powers of detention, and an attempt to appropriate modern discourses 
of democratic nationalism and free, individual choice as a means to sustain the order. It was, 
however, not successful.
The 1980s saw an increasing fragmentation within the hegemonic bloc. Business 
leaders received concessions from the National Party, departing from its traditionally anti-
capitalist line, signalling a shift from state intervention in the political economy to an 
increasing focus on maintaining an orderly social climate for business. The Wiehan report in 
1979 recommended easing the long-standing ban on African trade unions in order to prevent 
wildcat strikes, and the Riekert Commision advised dismantling white job reservation while 
maintaining a rigorous control on influx to the cities. Compulsory primary eduction was also 
introduced, though multiracial schools could only be run privately. Public amenities, such as 
hotels, restaurants and theatres, were no longer compulsorily segregated. In line with the total 
strategy, these measures were introduced to “intensify class differentials while reducing racial 
ones” (Worden 124), or, in a word, to make it possible to preserve entrenched social division 
within a global discourse of “fair capitalism”. The racist social division inherited from the 
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Union of South Africa and elaborated through the National Party government from 1948 was 
rearticulated as a national policy with Botha’s total strategy in an attempt to justify and garner 
support for the regime.
We may codify Afrikaner nationalism in three different ways with Benedict 
Anderson’s model. While there were some parallels between the emergence of an early 
Afrikaans-speaking republic and the pioneering creole nationalisms of the Americas, these 
experiences were relatively short-lived. The central organising element at this early stage was 
Afrikaans as signifier of a national ethos, distinct from that expressed in Dutch. With the 
development of Afrikaans as an autonomous language with dictionaries and grammars, and its 
expression in newspapers, Afrikaner nationalism appears more similar to those linguistic  
nationalisms Anderson describes as emerging with the advent of national romanticism in 
Europe. Finally, with the appropriation of the state in 1948, the National Party also 
implemented nationalism from above, making the South African experience similar to 
Anderson’s official nationalism.
If the official discourse on nations and races was an attempt to naturalise divisions 
already entrenched in the 1910 Union of South Africa, it was also a case of defending the 
privilege of the upper classes and the “innate, inherited superiority” of colonial rulers 
(Anderson, Imagined Communities 150). Official nationalism appealed to “white solidarity” 
as a response to challenges from subordinate groups within the dominant classes. While 
nations are conceptualised in language and as historical destinies, and can be naturalised, 
racism is conceived in blood and as “eternal contaminations” (Anderson, Imagined 
Communities 149). If we consider the political formation of official South Africa after 1910, 
including the apartheid regime from 1948, as a defence of racial privilege, perhaps racism is 
less of a derivation from nationalism than a response to it.68 With the foundation of the 
68 Against Tom Nairn's contention that racism is a derived form of nationalism, Benedict Anderson asserts 
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African People’s Organisation, the forerunner to the ANC, in 1902, and widespread strikes 
and rebellions, racist policies were implemented in an attempt to split subordinate groups by 
appealing to racial rather than national solidarity.
With the failure of the tricameral constitution – which had institutionalised the colour 
barrier as three Houses of Parliament in 1984 – and intensified sanctions from the 
international community, F.W. de Klerk became the custodian of the dismantling of the 
apartheid state. By the time the multiracial Mass Democratic Movement launched its civil 
disobedience campaign (the first sign of a major movement against the regime that included 
large numbers of those who had benefited from it), the National Party was already busy 
repealing some of its most unpopular measures, such as the banning of the ANC and PAC, the 
imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and the colonisation of Namibia. In 1991, the Group Areas, 
the Land and Population Registration Acts were repealed, and the CODESA negotiations 
instituted. After South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, Nelson Mandela and the 
ANC took over as custodians of the South African state.
Beyond 1994
We may now ask in what manner 1994 entails a break in South Africa’s history and a shift in 
the signifying practices of the state. Anderson explains the South African social formation 
prior to 1994 by reference to racism. He makes a distinction between nationalism and racism, 
and argues that racism and anti-Semitism are not derived from nationalism (Anderson, 
Imagined Communities 148). While nationalist discourses were, as products of print-
capitalism, conceived in language, and thought in terms of historical destinies, “racism 
that racism should be considered in a separate categories, since its primary purpose is not to justify foreign wars 
but domestic repression. The new labels attached to the social divisions under Botha, rearticulating racial 
homelands as “autonomous nations”, could imply that as a measure to garner domestic and international support 
for the regime's strategy of domination it was necessary to articulate the opponent as foreign.
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dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless 
sequence of loathsome copulations” (Anderson, Imagined Communities 149). Subsequently, it 
was possible for the apartheid state, while engaging in racist practices domestically, to venture 
into “amicable relations (however discreetly handled) with prominent black politicians in 
certain African states” (Anderson, Imagined Communities 150 n.19). When homeland policies 
were resignified as national – making foreigners of those who had been targets of racist 
discrimination within “white” South Africa – practices that had been considered racist were 
now reinscribed as a property of the nation, rather than as an appendix to nationalism, since 
the total strategy constituted an attempt to make national and “racial” borders coincide. With 
the nationalisation of homelands, it became possible to claim that discrimination that had been 
based on “race” or colour was now a product of national difference. As P.W. Botha’s total 
strategy served to reinscribe racist policies as national difference, the South African state was 
already heading for a deinstitutionalisation of racism before 1994. In this analysis, 1994 
would thus primarily signify a final end to official legitimation of racism as an element of 
governance, while the South African state could continue its existence relatively undisturbed.
The difficulty with this kind of analysis of the South African social formation is its 
strong implications of a suture of the social.69 It is as if current dispossessions of land, for 
example, are issues wholly unrelated to structures put in place by past policies,70 or violent 
69 Laclau and Mouffe illustrate the impossibility of suture in a passage which considers the State's role 
and function in society: “In general, [...] attempts to explain the 'relative autonomy of the State' were made in a 
framework that accepted the assumption of a sutured society - for example, through determination in the last 
instance by the economy - and so the problem of relative autonomy, be it of the State or any other entity, became 
insoluble. For, either the structural framework constituted by the basic determinations of society explains not 
only the limits of autonomy but also the nature of the autonomous entity - in which case that entity is another 
structural determination of the system and the concept of 'autonomy' is redundant; or else the autonomous entity 
is not determined by the system, in which case it is necessary to explain where it is constituted, and the premise 
of a sutured society would also have to be discarded.” (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
139-140).
70 The incident at Kempton Park, where PAC-affiliated officials “sold” plots to squatters, serve to 
demonstrate that the phenomenon of squatting has not gone away, and that it continues to be conceived as a 
problem, the essence of which is the point of contention between the parties (ANC and PAC) and their imagined 
electorate (Randall and Sapa).
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attacks by whites on transgressors of the colour-line should be explained without reference to 
its past institutionalisation.71 What is at stake here is to understand the antagonisms in the 
present as structured, if not subsumed, by relations of the past, or as a shift from an identity 
politics dominated by popular struggles to a realignment of the social in terms of democratic 
struggles (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 137).72 The strong sense of 
historical continuity suggested by Anderson’s analysis of South African nationalism is 
founded on a view of apartheid policies as racist practices prior to their reinscription as 
national policies with the total strategy. In order to understand the post-1994 South African 
social formation, we need to include in our analysis the resignification of racist barriers as 
national with the total strategy.
The question is how to deal with the past, and, in our case, a national past. It is a 
matter of realigning the social in terms of difference rather than antagonism, since the 
territory which is charted as a property of the South African nation continues to inhabit people 
with pasts both in support of and engaged in resistance to the previous, and, to a lesser extent, 
the current regime. But it is also a matter of establishing a juncture beyond which 
antagonisms of the past can be relinquished, since, if no clear break with the types of violent 
practices associated with apartheid can be agreed upon, it will ultimately be impossible to 
establish some position non- or post apartheid.
The end of apartheid in South Africa can be seen as an element in a chain of signifiers 
constituted around relatively concentrated systems, or moments, of mass oppression of groups 
71 In July 2001, Wanda Stoffberg was attacked by two white men as a consequence of running a butcher’s 
shop in a predominantly white section of George, South Africa, that attracted black customers. Her neighbours 
demanded the shop be closed, but she resisted. One night she was attacked outside her smallholding: “At the gate 
of her smallholding, two men attacked her from behind, hitting, kicking and throttling her. Then one of them, 
who she saw from his hand was a white man, carved a “K” into her left breast. He told her: ’This is a message 
from our boss,’ and then said that ’kaffirboeties’ were not permitted to stay in George.” (Sapa 2001).
72 Such a view forms the basis of Aletta J. Norval’s argument concerning the politics of cultural 
recognition in contemporary South Africa, where she argues for an “aspectival, rather than essentialist, form of 
identity – a view of identity which recognizes its own unsutured nature” (p. 105).
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perceived as the dominant regime’s other.73 In each case, the sheer numbers of people 
entangled in these systems have made it possible to single them out, like the holocaust, the 
early modern slave trade, and, in our case, apartheid. Each of them comes with highly 
circumscribed regulations of rights to speak, such as sets of taboos, normative evaluations of 
speakers’, and often also listeners’, moral attributes, and so forth. The density of regulations 
around these signifiers suggests that they embody something unspeakable for those who 
inhabit the discourse, although possibly more so for those who are produced as dominant in 
the historical system. It could be argued that it is the inability to think post-apartheid that 
prevents a putting-to-rest of the issue, and thus continues to structure social relations. 
However, if we accept that holocaust and apartheid are similar signifiers, the situation is in 
some ways analogous to that which faced Europe after 1945.74
After National Socialism in Germany, one could argue, “the memories of the 
survivors” and their descendants were irreconcilable with those of the “descendants of the 
collective of perpetrators”, thus inhibiting “one coherent image of history” (Weigel 167). 
Also, one would be faced with
The simultaneity of the rationality with which the annihilation was 
perpetrated, on the one side, and the irrationality and incomprehensibility of 
the motives and justifications given for it, on the other. (Weigel 167)
The notion of “speaking after Auschwitz”, then, might lend some analogous insight to a 
73 It may be argued that apartheid was more than a system of signification. As Paul Bowman shows, this is 
a key point of contention between Laclau and Mouffe’s style of discourse analysis and the disciplinary approach 
taken by e.g. John Mowitt. While the former hold that there is no anchorage outside discourse – i.e., that the 
discursive is co-extensive with the social – Mowitt claims that discourse can only be anchored in disciplinarity, 
as it is an academic form of knowing, in his view (Bowman 66-71).
74 Jacques Derrida makes the point that “the judicial simulacrum and the political theater of this state 
racism have no meaning and would have had no chance outside a European 'discourse' on the concept of race. 
That discourse belongs to a whole system of 'phantasms,' to a certain representation of nature, life, history, 
religion, and law, to the very culture which succeeded in giving rise to this state takeover.” (“Racism’s last word” 
294). Here the signification is geographically located as a specifically European “discourse”, another potential 
candidate as the other of the current dispensation.
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problematic of speaking after apartheid. What is at stake is to come to terms with the past in 
terms of what Walter Benjamin referred to as Messianic time, rather than his notion of the 
homogeneous, empty time characteristic of nationalism in Anderson’s model. Messianic time 
asks us to deal with the past in some absolute sense, and appears to impel us to relegate South 
Africa prior to 1994 to some pre-nationalist past. Do historical events such as the holocaust, 
the early modern slave trade, and apartheid entail this sort of radical break in our conception 
of time?
When Benjamin penned his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in April 1940, his 
country of birth, Germany, was on the brink of war with his country of residence, France.75 To 
Benjamin, however, this was not so much a war of two countries or nations, but a dispute over 
irreconcilable political differences, the consequence and culmination of which was what we 
today refer to as the Second World War. To Benjamin, the conflict may have appeared as the 
final moment of a certain historical development – the endpoint of a social logic which might 
be cruelly and dramatically overturned only at a massive social and material cost.
Benjamin distinguished between universal histories, characterised by homogenous, 
empty time, and a history writing that aimed to understand Messianic time. Benjamin 
considered a total, universal history impossible, since “only for a redeemed mankind has its 
past become citable in all its moments” (“Theses on the philosophy of history” 246). Such a 
moment would entail the culmination of history itself, the endpoint in which all prior events 
are illuminated. That day can only be postponed, since its arrival would involve the 
termination of difference, and a complete suture of the social. While, in retrospect, it may 
appear as if Benjamin was writing at precisely such a point of finality, his “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History” indicate that, rather, even at such a moment, densely shot through with 
75 Benjamin died five months later, after the group of refugees with whom he was attempting to escape 
France were denied entry to Spain (Arendt 23-24).
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images of finality and endpoints, history remains ruptured and non-sutured. It is not history 
that is considered homogeneous and empty, but universalising narratives that produce 
historical time as homogeneous. According to Benjamin, homogeneous, empty time is a 
construct of historiographers, who, busy writing universal histories, fill their historical 
narrative with facts, assembled in a linear progress narrative.
Is 1994 such a messianic moment in South African history? It would be a mistake to 
consider the year of South Africa’s first parliamentary elections under general suffrage as a 
moment of democratic redemption, of sorts, in the history of the country. Assuming that the 
kind of practices that we associate with apartheid are wholly relegated to the past enables the 
type of “current amazement that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible”, and this 
amazement “is not philosophical” (Benjamin, “Theses on the philosophy of history” 249). By 
allowing the present to be defined as a state of emergency it performs as the rule of which 
fascism becomes a normal expression. “One reason why Fascism has a chance is that in the 
name of progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm,” Benjamin notes (“Theses on the 
philosophy of history” 249). We may need to continue working with two different notions of 
time: homogeneous, empty time, as the dominant form of historiography, would perceive 
fascism as an aberrant form of politics, and underwrite the normality of the hegemonic 
formation as a consequence, while messianic time seeks to find a moment in which such 
political practices can be eschewed.
Does the recent violence against foreigners in South Africa testify to a successful 
transition to a post-apartheid dispensation? While social antagonisms before 1994 were 
structured around white privilege, the recent events were directed against those outside the 
new nation. However, Pallo Jordan, South African Minister of Arts and Culture, connects the 
attack on foreign nationals to the horrors of the country’s past. “We come from a deeply 
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fractured and violent past. Given that historical experience, all of us have to do all we can to 
rid South African society of the anguish, the pain and the degradation of the past.” (Sapa, 
“Jordan launches campaign”). The new South Africa must seek to engender “a sense of unity, 
a feeling that we are one nation, diverse though we may be in terms of race, colour, creed, 
class, gender or social standing” (ibid.), and it is through feelings of belonging and solidarity 
with fellow nationals that Jordan hopes to alleviate fear and violence against outsiders. The 
current South African regime seems to recognise precisely the continuity of violence in its 
history, and the difficulty associated with establishing a moment in which the past can be 
wholly transcended.
Nations provide our lives with a source of meaning that may have been lost with the 
withering away of the great religious systems. They dress up in epic clothing, tell stories of 
themselves as if they hark back to time immemorial, and give promises of a limitless future. 
We will now proceed to investigate how such stories have become part of the way we 
perceive ourselves and our place in the world: how sports are vehicles to embed nations as 
naturalised dispositions to perceive, think and act in our bodies. This is what we refer to as the 
national-sports nexus.
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II The body of sport
This section consists of three parts, all of which are concerned with the production of a body 
that is specifically national. Chapter 5 shows how the body is narrated as an element in the 
epic genre, and this narrative framing of the body was “intended to produce manly virtues in 
future leaders”, as Bourdieu shows (“Sports fan” 343). I then discuss the different kinds of 
bodies produced through cognitivism and as a moment in discourse, arguing that both sex and 
gender are discursively produced.76 Chapter 5.1 shows how the 1998 World Cup framed the 
sports event as an epic on the South African national broadcaster. It also demonstrates the 
contingent, contested character of meaning: questions of cultural autonomy, as well as debates 
over boundaries of gender and “race” are played out on the television screen. This 
demonstrates that multiple meanings can be made from the events, and that any given 
meaning is not produced by the event by itself. Again, Benedict Anderson’s question of 
national time is raised: while Anderson claims that nationalism ushers in a new, homogeneous 
and empty time, the 1998 World Cup event on television sought to establish this moment as a 
clear rupture with the past – a Messianic moment of the type Anderson claims were put to rest 
with the emergence of nationalism.77 Chapter 6 discusses how a set of values are located as 
naturalised beliefs in the body as a result of sports practices in schools and mass disseminated 
sports mediations, and asks if a new “natural” and “authentic” body, domesticated by what 
Bourdieu referred to as the “macrobiotic cult of health” (Distinction 220) is emerging in place 
of the hitherto epic body of nationalism. This new body would enable a more autonomous 
cultural field of sport, since it no longer places nations in a necessarily antagonistic relation to 
each other.
76 See also comments regarding the relation between an analytic, social and performative approach to 
representations or performance of identities applied to the referee in football in chapter 3.2.
77 This is discussed  further in chapter 4.1 above.
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5. The epic body
What kind of gender order is proposed by the epic form of spectacular sports? This is the 
central question of this chapter. After discussing a critique of cognitivism and its atomistic 
conception of the body, we ask how sexual difference and masculinities are produced in sport. 
How does an epic that suggests a sporting order based on singular individuals organised in 
hierarchies stand against novelising strategies, such as satire and laughter?
The etymology of the word sport (from Middle English, to divert, disport, short for 
disporten) testifies to a past in which these activities were the domain of the leisured classes. 
Engaging in sport would be tantamount to wasting one’s time, which would require that one 
had time to waste in the first place, to engage in activities that served no useful purpose, or, to 
put it differently, to get involved in activities that had no use outside their own purpose. 
However, by the time vulgar games were codified, rationalised, and made part of the standard 
education for the sons of the heads of industry as part and parcel of a well-rounded 
gentleman’s education, sport had to make itself useful. The use of vast spaces to pursue sports 
such as cricket or football in public schools served as a reminder of the economic and social 
difference between their participants and those who remained outside the playing fields. The 
haute bourgeoisie, who populated these games, wanted to make sport every bit as useful as 
rest of a schoolboy’s activity, and the purpose of a sport such as football, or football played by 
Association rules, was reinvented as an undertaking to produce erect and upright bodies and 
instill gentlemanly values in its participants. In return, football gained the reputation of being 
a grand and noble pursuit, with the capacity of manufacturing useful and productive bodies 
with the kinds of values that would be beneficial to young men with social ambitions.
This chapter is concerned with the uses of football to social order, and how the game is 
used to inscribe dominant values and codes into the bodies of its contestants. We ask how the 
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body and the categories we ascribe to it is a product of contingent values and codes that are 
contested and subject to change, and, hence, transmutable. The experience of the body itself, 
then, changes with the matrix that is imposed upon it and the notions and values that are 
brought to bear on the concept. Sports tend to conjure a body that is individual and dimorphic. 
Football bodies are classified in accordance with a binary system of sex differentiation, which 
is supplemented by a semiotic system that divides the two sexes along lines of gender, or 
culturally manufactured patterns of appearance and behaviour. This system of classification 
and perception is productive of the kind of dimorphic system of sexed sport that prevails in 
elite and mass versions of football, and the gendered expectations that attach to these 
categories. Is the body also a site to articulate subordinate sex codes, and how may sports be 
used to transmit and disseminate such codes and practices of the body?
The question of whether football should or may be perceived as a narrative has been a 
matter of some debate. Elias and Dunning emphasise the sport’s ability to arouse pity and fear 
in its audience, comparing the game to the Aristotelian tragedy (pp. 48-49).78 However, the 
comic and its never-ending shifts in positions and ranking could also provide a possible frame 
into which sporting contests could be fitted. Whannel finds that “the sporting contest itself, 
while not a narrative, has a structure homologous to that of narrative form. Specifically, all 
sport contests, like narratives, pose an enigma (who will win) and offer a resolution.” (p. 54). 
Perhaps narratives should not be considered as much a part of the game itself as an aspect of 
the experience of sport and as a way of making sense of football. Football may be perceived 
as a kind of narrative that tells stories of bodies by ordering them into a dominantly 
dichotomous taxonomy of sex with attendant gender roles and appearances. As part of a larger 
discourse on the body football offers a field of practice and a narrative in which bodies may 
78 See also chapter 6 and 8 for further discussions of the use of Aristotle’s concept of the tragedy in 
relation to sport.
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be shaped and classified according to schemes of perception and valuation. As Caudwell 
notes, it is “through articulation and materialization – that is, the formulation of body 
discourse – [that] the ‘viable’ footballing subject is ‘hailed’ into social existence” (p. 380). 
Silvennoinen points out that the grand narratives of sport propose moral stories aimed at boys 
by offering “an image of manhood to aspire to” (p. 2). In its dominant form football 
contributes to sport’s “grandiose and pompous surface” (ibid.), and as mass spectacle it seems 
appropriate to count football among the grand, epic narratives that aspire to associate sport 
with the grand and noble pursuits of the social élite.
The epic body
The epic’s close historical entanglement with the emergence of nationalist narratives has made 
it an appropriate form for major sporting events and common denominator for participants 
and stakeholders in these events. As Bakhtin notes, the epic marks the precise moment of the 
king’s withdrawal and the inauguration of a bourgeois national tradition. While the king is 
now absent and inaccessible to rethinking, his locus or position replaced by stories that situate 
listeners as children, or descendants of an epic past beyond human activity, and demand their 
piety. The past to which the epic refers is “walled off from all subsequent times by an 
impenetrable boundary, [and] is preserved and revealed only in the form of national tradition” 
(p. 16). Since the epic is a closed narrative, establishing an absolute separation between the 
past and the present, narrators can have no access to the source of national tradition, and the 
characters that populate the story can have no influence on the narrative.
The absolute past is a specifically evaluating (hierarchical) category. In the 
epic world view, ‘beginning,’ ‘first,’ ‘founder,’ ‘ancestor,’ ‘that which 
occurred earlier’ and so forth are not merely temporal categories but 
valorized temporal categories, and valorized to an extreme degree. [...] In the 
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past, everything is good: all the really good things (i.e., the ‘first’ things) 
occur only in this past. The epic absolute past is the single source and 
beginning of everything good for all later times as well. (Bakhtin 15)
The epic is a world of firsts and bests, of beginnings and peak times in a national history (ibid. 
13), and it is this kind of national tradition that spectacular sports seek to recreate and retell on 
a global level by producing ready-made and unchanging heroic figures.
The epic past is an imagined precursor of a national present, and features heroes and 
villains in fixed, unchangeable roles. It is a monolithic and grandiose narrative that lends large 
symbolic capital to its operator, and one can imagine its alteration to feature a corporate or 
organisational past in the place of a national tradition. It values hierarchical ordering, and the 
allotment of set, particular elements according to a dichotomous ranking. Hence, the 
laughable, low or debased body is excluded from the epic, while the upright, serious and pure 
is valorised to an extreme degree. The kind of recreation of an imagined past that occurs 
through the narrative frame of the epic indicates that spectacular sport entails particular 
perceptions and valuations of bodies, and that these categories tend to produce the kinds of 
bodies that are evaluated by the narrative form.
The current epic body of sport has at least three distinct sources. First, the organisation 
of sport with the purpose of national defence indicates that the sporting body had its precise 
analogy in soldiering. If soldiers under the king’s regime were ideal images of “a bodily 
rhetoric of honour” the modern soldier was a machine constructed “out of a formless clay”: “a 
calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it 
pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit” (Foucault, Discipline  
and Punish 135). Man-the-machine was manufactured as a body that could be analysed and 
manipulated, subjected, used, transformed and improved so as to produce a certain “way of 
being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, 
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propensity or inclination” to act (Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 214). The kind of 
dispositions required by a game such as football are acquired through practice, and inscribed 
into actors’ body-relations. These propensities for action are not independent of the larger 
economy, since the players’ actual practices must negotiate between the larger field and 
actors’ interests and values. Hence, the field of military activity produced a set of principles 
by which football could be organised and conceptualised, and the pliability of the body and 
rigorous training of dispositions gestated in the military field could be reproduced in the field 
of sport, making the modern athlete the apotheosis of soldiering, and a model for warfare as a 
masculine form of culture. As Whannel points out, the modern athlete appears as a “fusion of 
machine and flesh, or flesh made invincible, [and] represent in almost parodic form the desire 
to transform the male body into a muscular invulnerability” (p. 69). The invincible and 
inerrant epic hero stands as the epitome of this kind of masculine warrior fantasy.
Second, the epic as custodian of a national tradition emerges precisely when the king 
abandons his position as purveyor of and embodiment of the law, leaving the stage open for 
the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. This change in hegemony involves an alteration in the 
very conception of the body. In the classical age a violation of the law was considered a 
transgression against the body of the king, since the law was an extension of the emperor’s 
will. Proper punishment should therefore be meted against the body of the perpetrator in such 
a way that there would be no doubt about the supreme power of the king (Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish 46). In this sense the king’s body encompassed the law and the state apparatus, as 
well as all the bodies of those who inhabited his realm and were included in his governance. 
The national body that emerges in the nineteenth century presupposes a polis of citizens with 
purportedly relatively equal rights before the law. Since access to leisure time became a 
hallmark of membership in the emerging hegemonic class, the ability to participate in games 
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such as sport was associated with the values of the new bourgeoisie. Modern sport’s 
association with the grand and noble and its ongoing traffic with the gentlemanly ideals of 
“fair play” and rôle distance serves as a further link with the epic, locating the values of the 
nineteenth-century haute bourgeoisie in the place of a king who has now withdrawn and made 
himself unavailable for further rethinking and consideration. The disinterested, and 
supposedly apolitical, character of sport as a leisured activity of amateurs and the kind of 
physical art-for-art’s sake undertaken at English public schools at the end of the nineteenth 
century is indicative of a view of the body where sport has the purpose of training the body 
when the school boys’ minds are at rest. It was precisely through an automatism of habit, or 
an inculcation of dispositions – a propensity to act without consideration – , that a sport such 
as football was intended to produce manly virtues in future leaders (Bourdieu, “Sports fan” 
343). The predominant political philosophy of football remains intimately linked to the moral 
ideas of the dominant fractions of the dominant class and a theory of amateurism. Modern 
sport’s inclination to perceive its nineteenth-century amateur practitioners as the ideal 
competitors of the sport indicates a kind of nostalgic view of the game typical of the epic’s 
propensity to cherish an absolutely valorised past.
Third, on its return as spectacle for the masses, sport is heavily imbued with the 
quantifiable, measurable and calculable body, and the body of the performer is no longer 
considered part of a social body with the king as its apex, but, in the language of biology, 
imagined as an individual and autonomous member of a human species, which is to say as a 
component part of a scientific body. As Foucault notes, man-the-machine is “both a 
materialist reduction of the soul and a general theory of dressage, at the centre of which reigns 
the notion of ‘docility’, which joins the analysable body with the manipulable body” 
(Discipline and Punish 136). The ready-made and pure hero of the epic is able to convey the 
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new morality of health, with the purpose of shaping the public’s bodies and minds. The 
narrative context of the epic, locating its listeners as children or descendants of a closed and 
purportedly unassailable national tradition, makes it particularly suited for a monoglossic and 
uniform dissemination of dominant values. The epic, as a grand narrative of sport, proposes 
and prescribes a certain body regime, a dualistic conception of the performer, a binary 
codification of sex, and a dimorphic gender regime.
These three sources – the automatisation of military dispositions, the dissemination of 
values associated with the rising bourgeoisie, and the mass production of dimorphic, 
autonomous and healthy individuals – form the basis for football as epic. The epic body is the 
body of officialising sport discourse. Officialising strategies have the purpose of 
“transmut[ing] ‘egoistic’, private, particular interests (notions definable only within the 
relationship between a social unit and the encompassing social unit at a higher level) into 
disinterested, collective, publicly avowable, legitimate interests” (Bourdieu, Outline of a  
Theory of Practice 40), which, in the case of football produced as spectacles for the masses, 
encompass values and dispositions of soldiery inherited from the inception of organised sport, 
values of rôle distance and disinterested amateurism produced by football’s phase of 
appropriation by the social élite, and the values of public health discourse with its interest in 
manufacturing healthy and pure bodies. The interest in purity is an object that public health 
shares with the generic epic hero. The body of official sport discourse mass-produces a body 
that up until that point had been of private, particular interest. The values that are inscribed 
into this dimorphic body – rôle distance, amateurism, purity and authenticity – serve to 
officialise those values that hitherto had been the exclusive domain of a social elite.
Even if the epic body of football plays the game with its socks rolled up, it does not 
necessarily compete under the FIFA flag, since a single organisation cannot hold ownership 
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over the game. The ready-made epic hero of modern football is trained in accordance with an 
individualising training machine, which produces the paradox that while generically mass-
produced, each particular epic body is considered uniquely individual. As Silvennoinen points 
out, “modern sports and sport performances” may be compared to “merchandise placed on 
supermarket shelves”, since they “can be recognized and looked at as something familiar and 
pre-packaged” (p. 4). In order to ensure that the merchandise is not corrupted, and that it 
contains the appropriate combination of values for public consumption, athletes are codified 
as authentically natural, in accordance with a discourse that overlooks that “nature, rather than 
being some pure origin, is already a technology” (Schildrick 158).
Cognitivism and discourse
If the dominant imagination of the sporting body considers it as a natural entity that is being 
trained, or encultured, into an increasingly machine-like ability to perform, the notion of 
nature as a technology suggests that the body is already an artifact of culture, before it is 
exposed to the atomistic, individualising training-machine of modern sport. The atomistic 
conception of bodies’ claim to provide the sole, objective description of how “human beings 
process information” (Moe 164), including information about human beings themselves, may 
itself be a product of the truth regime in which the modern athlete is lodged. If the 
cognitivistic approach to sport perceives “isolated occurent entities to which we attach 
isolated function predicates” (ibid.), it organises the world around subjects and their 
predicates, rather than practices, and even if it may have been productive of the modern 
athlete, it is contingent, and it fails to resolve the question of how an element, such as a rock, 
may become a statue, book rest, missile, or talisman, depending on the discourse in which it is 
embedded, and how a football becomes meaningful only after the player has “processed the 
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different bits of matter that constitute [...] the ball”, i.e. embedded it into the discourse of 
football (ibid.).79
As a discursive juncture the body of sport appears as a site of articulation, and should 
be considered as a contingent locus for expression. The individual product of the modern 
athletic training machine is a possible, even if not necessary, outcome of discursive 
articulation, or joining together of conditional discourse formations. If articulations are “any 
practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result 
of articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 105), the body 
appears as an instance in the totality of elements available for articulatory practice, and the 
very notion of “my body” is in itself the result of contingent articulation, since the body of the 
king encompassed those of his subjects in the pre-modern era, and the social body, or the 
body of sports, may be considered as a body that is articulated across or transverse to the 
bodies of individual performers. The language of the body should be considered as much a 
form of communication that is prior to symbolic articulation as it is contingent upon a 
discourse in which it may be articulated, and, hence, dependent on symbolic expression. 
Finally, there may be strict limitations to the autonomy of “my body” since such a concept 
depends both on the articulation of the body as something that belongs to me, as well as a 
discourse that enables the delimitation of individual bodies, such as the discourse of 
cognitivism.
If the autonomous body of modern sport science emerged as an attempt to fill the 
black box, or “the void between input and output” left by behaviourism, by the same token it 
proposed and launched into practice a model of the human performer controlled by the brain, 
located analogously to the central processing unit of a computer devise, which was left in 
79 Elements can have no meaning outside or before practice since no object can be given outside every 
discourse of emergence (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 107). See also the discussion of 
discourse in chapter 3.
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charge of a range of input and output units across the body of the athlete (Moe 157-159). By 
programming the brain one can programme the performer, improve or alter performance or 
behaviour, which is to say that the brain is the executive of the organism, under which all 
other parts are subordinate (Moe 160). This kind of hierarchical, teleological view of nature, 
human beings, and the way humans and their environment interact, writes cognitivism into the 
anatomico-metaphysical register of man-the-machine which Foucault proposes was launched 
by Descartes (Discipline and Punish 136): It is because I think that I am.
To cognitivism it is the brain that is the location of knowledge to the human organism, 
and it is because humans are comparable to computers that they are worthy of interest to the 
scientist. As Gardner suggests, “if a man-made machine can be said to reason, have goals, 
revise its behavior, transform information, and the like, human beings certainly deserve to be 
characterized in the same way” (quoted in Moe 159). The elevation of the human being to the 
level of computers may appear tautological, since it may be that humans were necessary in 
order for both the computer and the language in which it is described to exist, or, to put it 
differently, neither the computer nor the language with which to describe it could have been 
given outside every discourse of emergence. On the one hand, this raises the question of the 
kinds of knowledges located in the body, but which are not fully articulated or present to the 
performer. These may be knowledges referred to as “acephalic”, prior to the subject, or 
located in a body minus head and heart (Žižek, “Desire”). On the other hand, cognitivism fails 
to raise the question of how bodies relate, and how knowledges are interchanged between 
performers. Is it enough to reprogramme or rewire a brain to alter behaviour? Is not the notion 
of a performer ever exercising alone a mythological creature?
Sport science’s concern with how to produce athletes that perform correctly and 
proficiently has produced a doxa according to which a training of the performer’s body 
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commences with an exercise of his or her mind. By disciplining performers’ bodies in 
accordance with an individualising training machine, cognitivism has assumed that “athletes 
are carrying out rule-governed or program-based (i.e., motor program) information 
processing” in the same way as computers process pieces of program code segment by 
segment (Moe 177). However, this approach “produces an incomplete or erroneous 
understanding of intentional movements in sport” (ibid.), since
our being is so intertwined with the world that it cannot be understood in the 
detached subject-object epistemology that we have inherited from the 
Cartesian tradition. Contrary to the Cartesian stance, “we are,” as Dreyfus 
says, “at home in the world and can find our way about in it because it is our 
world produced by us as the context of our pragmatic activity” (ibid. 172),
which is to say that our world is discursively produced, and a result of contingent discursive 
articulation. In order to explain the sense of having acquired the ability to “perform 
automatically” (ibid. 171) after a prolonged period of practice, it is not necessary to claim that 
the brain has been rewired or reprogrammed. A concept such as Bourdieu’s dispositions 
would suffice, since the claim could be made that the performer has now acquired the 
inclination for practice necessary to participate in a field and be recognised by those who 
operate it.
If the body of cognitivism attempts to programme performers according to an 
individualising, atomistic training machine, the body as phenomenon asks how does this body 
appear, and how does it appear to me. How does this body communicate? What are the 
symptoms of this body and what and how may they mean? In other words, a 
phenomenological or discursive perspective raises the question of how this body can be 
meaningful. The body emerges as a site or location for performance or articulation of sex 
and/or gender, and such articulations may be considered as investments from a range of 
125
actors, investors, and stakeholders in a body that encompasses institutions, subjects, objects, 
strategies, and narratives. The body as a site for meaningful experience “is not only an 
experience of my body, but an experience of my body-in-the-world”,80 or a juncture for 
discursive articulations of the body with objects in the world, which is always contingent, 
shifting and relational.
Discursive production of biological sex
If no objects are given before any discursive articulation, it follows that a construct such as 
the human body does not already exist before language or discourse, but that it is produced 
and constituted in and through discursive practice. Caudwell points out that “the body does 
not exist as a biological entity; instead the body is produced and controlled through a series of 
regulatory practices” (p. 375). The notion of the body as a discursive articulation enables “a 
move beyond the idea that sex is ‘natural’ and pregiven” (ibid. 371), since the binary division 
of man and woman is constituted in and through linguistic practice. Justification of sexed 
dimorphism by reference to, say, chromosomal set-up cannot suffice to “reclaim a ‘natural’ 
body untainted by its discursive constitution – for such a body has no existence,” and can be 
refuted by reference to the constructed character of such concepts, and by pointing out that 
“all meanings, whatever their source, are contestable and open to continual reinscription” 
(Schildrick 151).
The dominant sexual dimorphism of bodily representations in sport divides bodies into 
two – exhaustive, non-overlapping and mutually exclusive of sex –by imposing binary sexual 
categories that are alleged to be neutral, objective descriptions of bodies. Games are divided 
into sexed categories of play when they are turned into sports. “When sähly was thrust 
through the ‘sports machine,’ it turned into salibandy (‘floorball’), no longer played in mixed 
80 Moe 174, quoting M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith, London: 
Routledge, 1962: 141.
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teams but with men and women in separate ones” (Silvennoinen 5). These binary 
representations are supposedly natural or prior to language, even if these categories are 
constructed in language and preserved through linguistic and other forms of discursive 
practices, which is to say that the dominant dimorphic sexual categories of sport are socially 
constructed. If nature is a discursively produced concept, categories of nature are always 
already coded with cultural values and there can be no neutral, objective, or pre-linguistic 
categories into which bodies may be put. The sexual binary of sport, as an extract of the range 
of possible combinations of sexual manifestations, writes itself into the series of dualisms that
have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been systemic to the 
logics and practices of domination of women, people of colour, nature, 
workers, animals – in short, domination of all constituted as others, whose 
task is to mirror the self. Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/other, 
mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primitive, 
reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/ made, active/passive, 
right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man. The self is the One who is 
not dominated, who knows that by the semice of the other, the other is the 
one who holds the future, who knows that by the experience of domination, 
which gives the lie to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be 
autonomous, to be powerful, to be God. (Haraway 177)
The designation of bodies into these categories, and the perpetuation of such a binary system 
to classify athletes is “tautological [as] there will never be a true sign of a true sex, whatever 
the hopes of the IOC” (Hood-Williams 290). If the category of male in this dimorphic system 
is associated with activity, culture, fatherhood and reason, the female category is thought as 
connected to passivity, nature, motherhood, and emotions. It is in such a system of domination 
that female may be perceived as a position in relation to the dominant, or as that which is 
marginal or marginalised, rather than a fixed or essential category that is given prior to 
discourse.
The male and female sexual categories are less than stable or fixed, and the very 
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instability of this dimorphic system opens the possibility of rematerialisation and 
rearticulations of bodes as sexed phenomena. “Bodies never quite comply with the norms by 
which their materialization is impelled” (Butler 2). As Caudwell shows, “most sport is 
premised on dimorphic sex and the notion that sex difference is ‘natural,’ stable, and fixed. It 
is this acceptance of sex as pregiven and prediscursive that continues to uphold the notion of 
the sex/gender disctinction” (p. 384). However, even if sex is “regulated and formulated in 
order to propel a system that operates to legitimate, and exclude, particular sporting bodies,” 
the very possibility of transgressing the dominant sexual order serves to enable practices that 
rearticulate sporting bodies. Some football players “successfully disobey the sex-gender-
desire rules and resist the idea of sexual differentiation. They offer bodies that refuse to 
comply, and it is in these moments of mistaken sex identity that the sexed body is 
rearticulated” (ibid.). It is perhaps in relation to those bodies that transgress the dominant 
order of sexual categorisation that the dimorphic system asserts itself most forcefully, such as 
when the dominant order of sport reestablishes and materialises its dimorphic sexual 
categories through sex-tests (ibid. 378) as a way to police the boundary of the sexual 
dichotomy and to uphold the notion of binary coded sexual difference.
Discursive production of masculinity
The system of sexual differentiation in sport is supplemented by a classificatory system of 
gendered appearance and behaviour. Masculine and feminine gender roles may be perceived 
as a semiotic system of the body, by which the binary categories of the sexed body are 
naturalised. As Whannel points out, “part of the ideological work that is performed through 
the representation of sport stars is precisely to do with the normalization of hegemonic 
masculinity and the marginalisation of alternative masculinities.” (p. 64). Since the “male sex 
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role” is “hegemonic” (Connell 84), it is not natural or given prior to discourse, even if it may 
come across as naturalised because of the force with which it is iterated through 
representations in public spaces such as sport. To Julie Kristeva masculinity is the category 
which is taken for granted while the feminine is othered (Moi 204-221). Sport tends to 
provide resilient metaphors for the perpetuation of a patriarchy in which masculinity, or the 
dominant notion of gendered sexual behaviour, serves as the unmarked category, or the 
antithesis against which the “other” is measured (Sabo and Jansen 202-217). If the dichotomy 
between masculine and feminine is metaphysical and not grounded in objective, natural, or 
pre-discursive essences, bodies can never be fully inscribed as sexed or gendered.
In this semiotic system women are constructed as sexed, embodied, and as subject to 
nature’s rhythms and limitations.
In such a binary and hierarchical logic of nature-culture the presence of one 
element is necessary for the absence of the other. The sign “nature” acquires 
its cultural value only because of the other sign, “culture”, to which it is 
opposed. The ideology of this dichotomy needed invisible women in the 
public sphere. To the extent that they were in focus on this arena, they were 
associated with sexuality. (von der Lippe 174)
As the unmarked category against which dominant notions of masculinity may be established, 
feminine finds its dictionary definition as “womanish, effeminate”, the latter term designating 
the practice of “making unmanly, to enervate. To grow weak, languish”, while masculine is 
defined as “manly, virile, vigorous, powerful” (Pronger 144). Since it is the masculine 
category that is unmarked, and serves as the norm or centre against which the other is 
demarcated, it is to a large extent “women’s footballing bodies [that] are disciplined by the 
woman-feminine-heterosexual imperative that supports sport’s system of sex-gender 
differentiation” (Caudwell 376), while for men it may be more a matter of not suffering a loss 
of masculine capital by being associated with appearances or practices that are coded as 
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feminine in the dominant order.
The semiotic system of sport tends to perpetuate the dominance of hegemonic 
masculinities. Even if, or, perhaps, precisely because, that which is feminine and masculine 
are taken as social constructs, or as patterns of sexuality and behaviour imposed by social and 
cultural norms and not a necessary expression of a binary biological code, the particular 
values that should be associated with the biologically coded sexes remain a matter of 
contestation. Attending and participating in sport tend to serve as male bonding exercises with 
the capacity to “reinforce men’s collective power over women” by perpetuating “familial 
patriarchy, the mythos of the frontiersman, and the symbolism of the phallus” (Sabo and 
Jansen 207).
The disciplinary regime of sport operates a semiotic system that divides the two sexes 
that is regarded as natural, or prior to discourse, along lines of gender, or culturally 
manufactured patterns of appearance and behaviour. In a sport such as football there are at 
least three disciplinary practices that produce a body as recognisably feminine, or in 
conformance with the dominant sex-gender order. These are practices that regulate body size, 
appearance, or “the use of the body as an ornamental surface”, as well as “the bodily display 
of a repertoire of appropriate gestures and postures” (Caudwell 376). The body as a site for 
inscription of gender signification includes body hair, as “hair is viewed as a critical aspect of 
femininity and therefore a crucial indicator of sex” (ibid. 383).
From sport’s early phase of appropriation “the athleticism and muscular Christianity of 
nineteenth-century English public schools was originally built around a reappropriation and 
reconstruction of Greek idealism, and proposed the construction of rounded and harmonious 
development of mind and body” (Whannel 65), and provided a space in which to separate 
men from women. Sport offered a field of practice by which men could be seen to act while 
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women were relegated to the roles of passively spectating, admiring and providing cricket 
teas (ibid. 67). The athlete of the early twentieth century was characterised by “masculine 
‘traits’ like audacity, power, freedom, independence, pride, potency and ambitiousness. [...] 
The up-right position of the back and the stretched arm in front of the body were to connote 
masculinity.” (von der Lippe 171). Woman was symbolised as an introvert figure, who folded 
her arm around her body, her knees together and slightly bent and the 
expression of her face connoting aspects of mildness. The semiotics of the 
feminine body was to symbolize humility, subjection, resignation and 
weakness. [...] The arms of a woman within mainstream bourgeois ideology 
were not to be trained, while muscles of the legs were supposed to be 
invisible, at least those on the thighs. (ibid.) 
In contrast to the received notion that it is the body that shapes gender roles, it would appear 
that it is notions of gendered appearances and behaviour that tend to shape the body.
It is apparent that the taken-for-granted notion that women and men have to 
be distinguishable is most evident within sporting contexts. In addition, there 
is the structural and discursive demarcation of sport as “women’s sport” or 
“men’s sport.” Football in particular has been and continues to be defined as 
a “man’s sport.” In this way playing usually acts as a signifier of manliness 
for men and mostly functions to obdurate the man-masculine-heterosexual 
order. (Caudwell 378)
The boundaries between categories of sex and gender are as diffuse as the concepts of sex and 
gender themselves, and a human body that features broad shoulders or short hair may be 
classified as a property of the male sex category, or as a masculine body. Such conceptions of 
what it means to be man or woman and how these sexual categories should be signified is 
naturalised to the extent that “the Women’s World Cup 1999 logo included a ponytail to 
signify femininity” (ibid. 380). Masculine or feminine are used to characterise appearance and 
behaviour, and dominantly as marking bodies as properties of either category of sex. Hence, a 




Since sport served as a masculine proving ground, muscular intensity signified the extent to 
which a male body could measure up among his peers. From its inception sport served as “one 
of the social practices that most clearly serves to demarcate gender” (Whannel 70). If in the 
Western sexual economy courage, strength and power has been conflated with virility and 
potency, masculinity has become associated with physical strength, dexterity, and sexual 
prowess. The kind of heterosexist hegemony that dominates mass manufactured sport tends to 
assume binary heterosexual terms where men’s physical contacts with men are rigidly 
proscribed by heterosexual assumptions and rules of engagement and interpretation (Sabo and 
Jansen 207). However, to Pronger, who tends to identify masculinity with muscularity, the 
“development and display of physical strength” in athletics is a strategy to operate power 
relations between men and women:
Given the patriarchal heterosexual significance of masculinity, it can have a 
special meaning for gay men. In their personal lives, many urban gay men do 
not benefit significantly from the hegemony that masculinity is meant to 
afford men. [...] Gay men can come to see that the power relations for which 
the semiotics of masculinity and femininity constitute a strategy have little to 
do with their lives. The meaning of masculinity, consequently, begins to 
change. Although masculinity is often the object of desire for gay men, its 
role in their lives is ironic. [...] For many gay men, masculinity and 
femininity cease to be experienced as what one is, and they become, quite 
consciously, ways in which one acts. (Pronger 144-145)
As effeminate behaviour in men is regarded as a sign of homosexuality, men may employ 
appearances and behaviours that are regarded as feminine in order to call attention to their 
sexuality. In this view, power should not be perceived as located or owned by any particular 
group or individual, but exercised and put into practice. Gendered codes of appearance and 
behaviour may be used to signify and reinscribe sex and gender roles that challenge the 
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dominant binary order.  
Effeminate behaviour in men and masculinity in women may be perceived as at odds 
with the established sex-gender order to the extent that they become unintelligible, and are 
considered as “abject bodies” (Butler; Caudwell 377). A hairy woman’s body or a man’s body 
that behaves in a manner that is considered effeminate may produce resistance and attempts to 
reestablish the dominant sex-gender order. As “queer subjects have publicly challenged 
hegemonic heterosexual notions of masculinity and femininity and resisted mutually 
exclusive and dimorphic gender norms” such transgressive practices have met with highly 
negative responses from the dominant sex-gender order. Caudwell points out that while 
international tennis player Martina Navratilova has “effectively unsettled the rigidity of 
gendered expectations and broadened the scope of acceptable gender performance” in sport, 
“the butch lesbian body is largely pathologized and abhorred in sporting contexts” (pp. 381-
382).
Moral entrepreneurs may find a particularly attractive arena to counter their sense of a 
crisis in masculinity in sport as a “symbolic arena in which heroes can parade, epitomizing the 
finest, most noble values and providing role models to which boys can aspire” (Whannel 7). 
The healthy, heterosexual masculinity of epic sport may be put to use in promoting, 
perpetuating and naturalising a certain conception of what should be (re-)constituted as a sex-
gender order. Attempts at naturalising a particular conceptualisation of gender and sexuality 
can never be sutured, as such endeavours to establish a norm for gendered appearance and 
behaviour can only be established against an outside which will always threaten to crack or 
blur the boundary between that which is conceived as the orderly, normal and natural inside 
and the unruly and threatening outside, and, hence, depends on the outside for its very 
constitution. Whannel finds that “sport, in this sense, is a form of magical performance in 
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which, despite its manifest physicality, sexuality has been masked and marginalized. 
Encounter with female sexuality can be erased and encounter with homoerotic desire can be 
repressed. But, to preserve these fragile barriers and to police heterosexual masculinity, 
cultures of hardness develop.” (pp. 67-68). However, such attempts to suture a heterosexist 
conception of sex and sexuality through sport in its dominant representation must always run 
up against the outside against which it is discursively produced.
The closed epic structure is always threatened by novelising strategies, or discursive 
manoeuvres to transform the epic and bring it into contact with the present. Such novelising 
strategies include the unmasking of the wise man, such as in the Socratic dialogues, 
highlighting the excessive rather than the strictly limiting aspects of humans, and establishing 
the possibility of a refashioning of the self (Bakhtin 20-40). While the image of the Roman 
centurion and his muscular male torso may have had the purpose of deterring or inhibiting 
other men, in the context of gay athletics the same representation may invite or attract other 
men (Pronger 151). The possibility of a misreading of this image may enable the kind of 
ambivalent laughter where the meanings of the dominant order of gender and sexuality are put 
to the test. Novelisation brings about the possibility of knowledge, rather than memory, as the 
creative impulse of signification by “uncrowning” the emperor and making him subject to 
experimentation and games. A man with bulging biceps and thunderous thighs wearing a 
slinky dress and a tiara indicates how novelistic representation may be put to utopian, rather 
than merely dystopian use.81
5.1. Case: South Africa in the 1998 Football World Cup
We should expect [“inventions” of tradition] to occur more frequently when a 
rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for 
81 The example is from Pronger 151.
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which “old” traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which they 
were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional 
carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, 
or are otherwise eliminated. (Hobsbawm and Ranger 3)
This chapter investigates the relationship between sport, marketing and the making of national 
identity in post-apartheid South Africa. The screening of the 1998 Football World Cup on 
South African television provides a fascinating opportunity to track the emergent contours of 
this triangle. The Football World Cup was the occasion of an interesting contrast with the 
Rugby World Cup of three years before, since while the latter was a moment of victory for the 
South African team, the former was a occasion of defeat. Both were crucial events in the 
making of a national tradition, though the Football World Cup provides in many ways a more 
revealing negotiation of this tradition under construction.
The chapter is an attempt, then, to examine in some detail this moment of symbolic 
dissemination, looking in particular at an emerging set of national symbols as they were 
presented and negotiated by the SABC, the national broadcaster. National traditions are often 
narrated in terms of the epic genre.82 One of the reasons for my interest in the presentation of 
the Football World Cup has been to analyse its framing in terms of its potential as future epic 
– since the epic can only be fully realised at a point in time removed from the national event.
We look, too, at the emergence and construction of the individual voice in the context 
of the new democracy. Both advertisers and the national story disseminated by the SABC 
promoted the sporting individual as a national icon, whose authority as such invests him with 
authority in the national discourse.
Two months after the Boipatong massacre in 1992, an incident that left forty-two black 
people dead, thousands of white South Africans stood cheering to the national anthem of the 
former apartheid regime, “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”, in a packed rugby stadium in 
82 See also chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of Bakhtin's notion of the epic.
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Johannesburg.83 The African National Congress (ANC) had finally endorsed the match against 
New Zealand – critical to abandoning the isolation of South African sport – while negotiations 
over a peaceful settlement were still in progress. The game was the first international rugby 
event on South African soil since the end of the sports boycott, which had lasted from the 
1960s and ended with the culmination of the Apartheid policy. The ANC stipulated, however, 
the “Die Stem” should not be played. Rugby officials, set on rejoining the international 
sporting community, agreed to refrain from playing the anthem. However, “since the majority 
of fans were waving the flag and singing the anthem vigorously”, rugby president Louis Luyt 
arranged for the anthem to be played anyway (Nauright 165). The political signal emanating 
from the stands of Ellis Park on 15 August 1992 was interpreted as one of traditionalism and 
defiance, directed against the form and content of South Africa’s political transformation. One 
sports administrator concluded that the incident was “a reminder of the minority white 
dominance and blatant arrogance” that prevailed in South African sport at the time. He 
perceived the incident as “a flagrant disregard for the emotions felt over apartheid symbols” 
(Nauright 176). The incident illustrates Hobsbawm’s proposition about societies where old 
social patterns are weakened or destroyed. “Die Stem”, always contested as a symbol of 
nation, was deployed here as a sign of resistance to change.
Scholars have commented on an emerging “new iconography” in South Africa.84 The 
Football World Cup offered an opportunity for the new power-holders to align themselves 
with what is possibly the country’s most popular sport. South Africa’s opening match against 
France was seen by more than four million people in South Africa.85 At this moment, the new 
83 Chapter 4.1 discusses South African nationalism at greater length.
84 The expression is from Balseiro (p. 5). She suggests further that “in the developing post-apartheid 
order, new images of linguistic and racial plurality are being created on a stage where tradition and post-
modernity coalesce” (ibid.). De Beer and Steyn portray the way South African symbols were seen as “apartheid 
symbols” in reports and letters to the media around the time of the 1992 Olympic Games. The South African 
team did not wear the Springbok emblem and the national flag was absent. The IOC had “decided against the 
wearing of political slogans” (De Beer and Steyn 228-229).
85 In the most recent census (2001) the population of South Africa was about 45 million.
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regime could use the state-owned broadcasting media to transmit the new national doctrine 
and its symbols to a significant proportion of the population. This chapter is an attempt to 
examine this national moment of symbolic dissemination, and in particular the political 
dimension of the emerging national symbols as they were presented on the SABC.
The Football World Cup took place in a space defined as equal. International football 
offers a space of limited and (relatively) sovereign teams, in a potentially equal relationship. 
The supposed objectivity of football can be construed as a promise of achievable equality, 
which can be projected onto the nations that participate in the World Cup, and, furthermore, 
onto the fans that cheer for “their” national team.
Epic tradition
The SABC’s mediation of the Football World Cup constituted an example of epic tradition in 
the making. The mediation of South Africa’s opening game was in part an attempt to inscribe 
the event into a tradition of national epics. In the SABC studio before the game, Mark 
Mangena concurred that “this is the time we have been waiting for. South Africa has a chance 
today to write history.”.86 Mangena conflated the football team with the spectators by stating 
that “we” can write history, in a moment when the national football team embodied the nation. 
He described a history of the nation by constituting the football game as a potential subject for 
a national epic. To promote national consciousness, the SABC transmitted a music video 
during the broadcast. The video featured slogans such as “To be South African is to believe in 
miracles” and “For this united nation, no challenge has been too great”.87 These banners were 
mixed with authentic footage of famous moments in recent South African history, such as 
86 All quotations from the transmission are from a transcript of France-South Africa (1998).
87 Notably, the song is written and performed by the American artist Robin Kelly. “I Believe I Can Fly” 
and first featured on the soundtrack of the basketball movie Space Jam (directed by Joe Pytka, Tony Cervone 
and Bruce W. Smith, 1996) starring the black American basketball superstar Michael Jordan.
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Nelson Mandela taking the presidential oath, with the former president F.W. de Klerk by his 
side, and Mandela in a Springbok team jersey and cap cheering alongside South African rugby 
captain Francois Pienaar, recapturing South Africa’s victory in the 1995 Rugby World Cup. 
Reiterating the national significance of these images functioned to educate viewers in a 
common national heritage. This in itself contributed to establishing an interpersonal, or 
national, tradition, onto which new epics could be built.
While promoting collective virtues, for instance through the banner “Tonight we rise 
above the troubles of daily life and stand together again”, the video defined South Africanness 
as “believing in miracles”, a belief in the extraordinary. The agent of these miracles appears to 
be, in apparent contradiction to the messages of collectivity, the singular individual. This is an 
excerpt from the lyrics:
I believe I can fly,
I believe I can touch the sky
I think about it every night and day
Spread my wings and fly away
[...]
‘Cause I believe in me
If I can see it then I can do it
If you just believe it, there’s nothing to it
I believe I can fly
The singer is able to “fly away” and “touch the sky”, allegedly because of his faith in himself. 
Promoting a vision of complete and singular individuality, the words of the song promoted 
values central to liberal conceptions of a market-oriented new South Africa: after the upset of 
racially based justifications of social difference the “market economy seems to be the 
mechanism that now enforces the racial segregation once upheld through the nefarious 
combination of legislation and brute force” (Balseiro 6). Strategies of the market economy, 
such as the doctrine of individual abilities powerful enough to subdue structured differences, 
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were inscribed into the South African epic framing the South African team’s game in the 
Football World Cup.
The coverage of the France-South Africa opening match made use of multiple 
narrators with varying degrees of autonomy (for example, the anchor in the studio receiving a 
report from a journalist at a local drive-in cinema), and several levels of narration (the 
broadcaster determines formal aspects of both the editorial and commercial content, but these 
narrative instances are relatively independent of each other). Furthermore, the degree of 
independence granted to one narrative was structured by its level in the hierarchy of narration 
(the length of commercial breaks was determined by the broadcaster). Audiences structure 
their viewing around the levels of narration, for example, by not watching the screen during 
commercial breaks. No narrating instance can claim omnipotence. The SABC can partly 
control the content of advertisements through its rules and other forms of imposition, but an 
advertisement’s final design is controlled by the advertiser.
Individual values
Messages at different narrative levels displayed similar elements in the broadcast. To a certain 
degree both advertisers and the national story disseminated by the SABC promoted individual 
values. In the music video described above, the young black football player Benni McCarthy 
functioned as a national icon, symbolising a personal ability to fly. Later in the broadcast, 
featuring in an advertisement, he was made to represented the unique sporting individual with 
authority to recommend a certain brand of deodorant. These two discourses, the national and 
the commercial, dominated the football game throughout the transmission.
Modern national narratives are more often than not financed by commercial sponsors, 
whose messages increasingly occupy the aural and visual space. The Los Angeles Olympic 
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Games were so thoroughly sponsored that the “blurring of the line between the two realms [of 
commerce and sport] was so complete that, at times, it was difficult to tell exactly what one 
was watching” (Jhally 79). During the SABC’s transmission of the Football World Cup, the 
commercial breaks variously sustained and departed from the national story. While some 
advertisements were clearly designed for the event (particularly those for products that are 
marketed across the globe), others were re-runs of commercials familiar to regular SABC 
viewers. The transmission included seventeen commercials before the game started. About 
half of these used the nation as a central selling-point. The scheduling of commercials, with 
regular commercial breaks before and after each half, and sponsors paying to display their 
logos on the screen during the game, adhered to principles of advertising apparent in previous 
transmissions of international sporting events (de Beer and Steyn 219-20).
The commercials that bonded with the event did so in various ways. In one instance, a 
national chain of stationery stores pronounced its profound allegiance to the nation in an 
advertisement for music tapes. The advertisement featured an artist in the popular kwaito 
genre, a local form that merges R&B with techno and “African” music, followed by both 
black and white announcers proclaiming that “kwaito is the sound of the new South Africa”. 
The existence of a modern “new South Africa” was the main commercial argument. In this 
instance, the discourse of modernity linked non-racialism to emerging musical forms, 
pronounced in the new nation.
Some advertisers linked the modern nation to projected advances in sport. A shoe-
polish manufacturer announced that its brand had been “protecting the shoes of Africa’s most 
aspiring football stars”. The advertisement closed with the message, “Shine on, Bafana 
Bafana, shine on”, thus suggesting that this particular brand of shoe polish provides a bond 
between the aspirations of individuals and those of a perceived national sporting collective.88 
88 Bafana Bafana, the common name for South Africa's national football team, was introduced by the 
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Similarly, an insurance company enunciated its dedication to the South African Olympic team 
by depicting a black businessman who, imagining himself a sprinter, races across a downtown 
intersection. In both instances, national advances were lined to individual imagination, and 
ultimately to the particular product for sale.
Multinational advertisers can economise on their advertising budgets by producing 
commercials that will appeal to audiences from more than one nation. The Football World 
Cup provided an opportunity to link sport to the product on offer, so that the product became 
associated either with the event or with the particular sport. A global soft-drink manufacturer 
promoted its brand in an advertisement without spoken words. In the absence of any spoken 
language – language being one of the hallmarks of the nation – spectators were addressed as 
members of a sporting community, rather than a national community.89 In this advertisement 
football was constructed as one of a number of popular practices that stretch across national 
boundaries. Advertisements drawing on sporting subjects across national borders support the 
idea of an autonomous sports world through representations of sports communities 
disengaged from linguistic or national divisions.
Questions of autonomy
The relationship between the languages of football, nation and commerce highlights a central 
concern in post-Marxist study of culture in general, and of football in particular. In traditional 
Marxist analysis the economy figures as a determinant of superstructural discourses, such as 
those of football and the nation (Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 75-84). 
The subjugation of these practices and identities to the economy is evidenced by struggles and 
black mainstream newspaper the Sowetan. The expression is a duplication of the isiZulu word for “boys” and is 
often used as a term of endearment.
89 The English-language banners at the end of the advertisement function as a logo for the soft-drink 
manufacturer. Although this instance of a “branded language” raises questions of imperial linguistic practices, 
English is not presented on a level of competing national languages. A rational globalisation of the product 
necessitates homogenising its marketing lingo, it could be argued.
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negotiations over independence from economic determinants. The issue at stake is whether 
sport is experiencing an evolution or devolution of autonomy. If sport’s self-determination is 
merely a function of the mode of production, the degree of autonomy can be measured as 
relative to the market’s dominance. Linear perceptions of sport’s autonomy, where the growth 
of “market value” is necessarily paralleled by a demise in self-determination on the side of 
sports, are faced with several complicating factors.
The market is not sport’s only negotiant. While states endeavour to encapsulate the 
messages of international sports events, sport’s share in the deal is to reach a vast audience, a 
constituency of potential players and supporters. Audience ratings suggest, furthermore, that 
viewing increases when national identity is addressed: 78 per cent of those who had their 
televisions switched on watched the game between France and South Africa, which topped the 
ratings in all linguistic groups, with a total of around four million viewers. South Africa’s 
game against France reached an audience rating of 25.5, with high scores in all linguistic 
groups. When it became clear that the South African team would be knocked out in the 
opening stage of the tournament, interest waned for their final game against Saudi Arabia. The 
viewer consequently decreased to 20.9 in the Nguni/Sotho group, and to just 10.1 in the 
English/Afrikaans group. These figures indicate that both an emergent South African 
discourse and football gains from the partnership. The alliance between nation and sport is 
motivated by the partners’ common need for exposure; the partnership between nation and 
football is facilitated by the market.
A central characteristic of television’s treatment of sport is that of “audience-building 
by forging points of identification with the viewer” (Blain, Boyle, and O’Donnell 45). In the 
introduction to the opening match, for example, the presenter informed viewers that “our” 
first match was about to start, and that “our boys” were preparing for the game. National 
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broadcasters, including public broadcasters such as the SABC, may underline the national 
element in common to viewers and the mediation in an attempt to build audiences. Goldlust 
notes that secular rituals are designed to “symbolise the validity of the social order and 
reconfirm the collective identification of the populace to the principles upon which it is 
based” (p. 130). National meanings are attached to these rituals when they are disseminated. 
As a national event, South Africa’s venture into top international football offered an 
opportunity to reaffirm the SABC’s position as a national broadcaster. During apartheid 
SABC’s audience was largely white. The Football World Cup served as an event through 
which the SABC could present and confirm a new national doctrine on race relations. By 
addressing a wider audience, such a broadcasters may use major sporting events to increase its 
viewership and legitimacy as a public service broadcaster.
The National Professional Football League (NPSL) became dominant in South Africa 
in the 1970s. The NPSL was set up by the whites-only Football Association of South Africa as 
a professional competition for “Africans”. The competing South African Football Federation 
Professional League (SASF-PL), run by a non-racial organisation, had less access to capital 
and municipally controlled grounds. In the late 1960s, two prominent players, Orlando Pirates 
and Moroka Swallows, left SASF-PL for NPSL, while some teams left the whites-only 
competition for one of the “African” leagues. John Nauright attributes the NPSL’s dominant 
position to the large support for the clubs Pirates and Swallows, and the fact that their crowds 
“attracted greater sponsorship and [the NPSL] became the dominant professional league” (p. 
119). In contrast to other sports, such as rugby and cricket, by the time of the Football World 
Cup, football had been racially integrated at the top national level for more than twenty years. 
Football was thus an arena where the new regime’s ideology could be disseminated to an 
audience already familiar with multiracial representations.
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“Race” and gender
The introduction to the match served to represent neo-South African values. Presenters Navan 
Chetty and Connie Masilo, embodying the colour (“race”) diversity promoted by the new 
regime, introduced the broadcast in a mix of English and Sotho, two of South Africa’s eleven 
official languages. Immediately following the introduction, SABC’s division for elite sport 
broadcasts, Allsport, transmitted its jingle, an “African” male-choir singing over a slogan 
proclaiming “Inspiration for the Nation”. Mixing “cultures” that were previously seen as 
separable, and that indeed were separated by law, the video promoted English as the main 
language of South Africa, but also reconfirmed a heterodox version of the previous linguistic 
hegemony.90
Echoing the Freedom Charter, the Preamble to the Constitution asserts that “we, the 
people of South Africa ... believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our 
diversity”. This diversity stretches beyond the limits of linguistic difference. During the 
transmission the unifying element was often stressed verbally while diversity was visually 
represented. In the music video described above, the song’s celebration of individual ability to 
fly was supported by a positive evaluation of diversity and unity. The broadcast’s insistence 
on the priority of unity did not deny the possibility of diversity within the nation. Studio host 
Martin Locke went on to tell his viewers that “this absolutely diverse nation has truly come 
together” for this game. The metaphor of a social gathering, a mass meeting, allows for the 
possibility of difference among the participants.
Representations of unity streched across “racial” boundaries in the transmission of 
South Africa’s opening game, but generally assigned to men the roles of performers and 
analysers. Women were most often rendered as spectators and supporters. The football game 
90 A hegemony which was at least dual (Afrikaans and English) and always heavily contested.
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and its framing elements served to reiterate the sexual division of labour that characterises 
mediated sports: “If women are accommodated into the discourses of televised football, they 
are treated in both a marginal and trivial manner. Football as portrayed on television remains a 
bastion of male identity.” (Blain, Boyle, and O’Donnell, 39). In a study of two Australian 
newspapers, women’s share of sports coverage was found to remain at 13.5 per cent between 
1965 and 1990 (Brown 9).
In the World Cup broadcast, women were present as active participants in only two 
instances. Firstly, female dancers were depicted in the report from a male journalist on the 
atmosphere in Marseilles prior to the game. These were his opening comments in the report: 
“These were the dancing girls that were entertaining everyone on the streets outside [Images 
of girls dancing with exposed bellies.] Pretty girls with colourful dresses. Brazilian skirts, the 
whites of England, the skirts of the South African part was clearly unbelievable stuff [sic].”
A contrast emerges between the male body, which participates in the making of 
national identity through skill and will, and the female body, which, though physically active, 
is rendered passive as a sexual spectacle for consumption. Women’s role therefore remains 
symbolic. It is interesting to note the trend in the 1990s for football teams to stage beauty 
competitions for their female fans, the winner to represent the team at matches and social 
and/or marketing occasions. This trend can be seen as a reaction to the growing number of 
female fans who follow the teams. Apparently, no similar representative image is considered 
necessary for male fans. In this sense, men’s presence as spectators is naturalised whereas 
women’s is symbolically contained.
After the first commercial break, a female reporter interviewed spectators attending a 
live screening of the game. Asking the participants about their predictions for the match, her 
questions centred around the emotional aspects of the collective viewing experience. The final 
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words of her report were intended to elicit a party-roar from the crowd: “It sure is happening 
here. And all of you, we want a big serenade: What do we say to France?” In short, although 
she was reporting from the live screening, her questions made it possible to project her as a 
party hostess. Women were permitted to comment on “trivial” aspects and bring colour to the 
event.
The SABC’s attempt to construct a unified, multiracial identification around the South 
African team represented a tradition in the making. While the broadcast opened with grand 
epic gestures, the game was reinterpreted immediately after it was clear that South Africa had 
lost to the hosts. In an interview after the match, then deputy president Thabo Mbeki was 
asked what his message was to the players when he visited them at their hotel before the 
game. In his response Mbeki expressed the separation between the nation and the nation’s 
sporting representatives. His message was that “the whole country wishes them very well, and 
everybody is looking forward to their [sic] doing very well, today and during the rest of the 
tournament.” Asked about South Africa’s prospects in the tournament, Mbeki answered that 
“the confidence of the team has grown, and I think they’ll do better next time.” The all-
encompassing “we”, so predominant in the opening stages of the transmission, was nowhere 
to be found in the deputy president’s replies. Instead he used the pronouns “them”, “their”, 
and “they”. The team could no longer be said to embody the nation, in Mbeki’s statements, 
but at most to represent it.
The football match against France will hardly be inscribed into a tradition of high 
points in neo-South African sporting history. South Africa’s triumph in the 1995 Rugby World 
Cup has become a founding moment in the national sports tradition, because epics can only be 
constructed around national victories. As Bakhtin reminds us: “The world of the epic is the 
national heroic past: it is a world of ‘beginnings’ and ‘peak times’ in the national history, a 
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world of fathers and of founders of families, a world of ‘firsts’ and ‘bests’” (p. 13). Mbeki 
was unable to inscribe the moment into a national epic tradition, and instead distanced the 
team from the nation.
France, who won a victory over South Africa in the opening game, later went on to 
win the World Cup. President Jacques Chirac claimed that the “multi-coloured” team was a 
projection of France’s soul: “This victory shows solidarity and cohesion. It shows that France 
has a soul or is in search for one … This tricolour and multi-colour team has given a beautiful 
image of France and its humanity” (Webster 18). The victory was interpreted as a projection 
of “us”. Chirac did not distinguish between the nation and the team as Mbeki did in his post-
match comments. In the case of victory the French national leader used the occasion to 
promote a certain political view of the nation. His statement was inserted into a debate over 
political co-operation with Jean-Marie Le Pen’s right-wing National Front. While Le Pen had 
been arguing for “national preference”, Chirac warned that holding talks on co-operation with 
Le Pen on the issue was “out of place and potentially dangerous” (Webster 18).
It should come as no surprise that the SABC used the Football World Cup to 
disseminate a version of the new South African nation. Common myths and traditions are 
central to imagined national communities, and the World Cup was a possible moment in a line 
of national victories. The national broadcaster used epic elements in an attempt to fix the 
meaning of the nation’s recent past as leading inevitably to the birth of the multicultural 
nation: an invention of tradition.
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6. National, authentic, excessive: Toward a globalised body of  
sports
Those who set out to investigate the relationships that constitute power and its investment in 
the body are confronted with a number of questions concerning the locations and inscriptions 
of values, and how such values are signified and articulated in practice. This chapter contrasts 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu with remarks Michel Foucault gave on the embodied nature of 
power. Foucault made a connection between desire and the work of power on the body, 
implicating that this association is productive of both resistance and coercion.91 Our bodies are 
regulated and shaped by power, and empowered in the very process of moulding. What is at 
stake, then, is, on the one hand, to make an account of the kinds of investments that power 
make in the body, and the values that are inscribed into it, and, on the other, how bodies may 
respond, and, in the process becoming subjects of empowerment. 
The concerns here are as much with values of the body, as they are with values in the 
body, or what may be referred to as a theory of belief. As Foucault points out, the modern 
subject is "a reality fabricated by [a] specific technology of power that I have called 
'discipline'. [...] Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals 
of truth" (1977: 194). This kind of understanding of the body, then, is intimately linked with 
the production of consent. As Pierre Bourdieu notes, "obedience consists in large part in 
belief, and belief is what the body (corps) concedes even when the mind (l'esprit) says no" 
91 Mastery and awareness of one's own body can be acquired only through the effect of an 
investment of power in the body: gymnastics, exercises, muscle-building, nudism, 
glorification of the body beautiful. All of this belongs to the pathway leading to the 
desire of one's own body, by way of the insistent, persistent, meticulous work of power 
on the bodies of children or soldiers, the healthy bodies. But once power produces this 
effect, there inevitably emerge the responding claims and affirmations, those of one's 
own body against power, of health against the economic system, of pleasure against the 
moral norms of sexuality, marriage, decency. Suddenly, what had made power strong 
becomes used to attack it. Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to 
a counter-attack in that same body. (Foucault 1980: 156)
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(1988: 161). Discipline brings about belief, and a kind of belief that is inscribed into the body 
of its subject. The micro-technologies under investigation in this chapter shape dispositions, 
and are put to work as vehicles in the production of subjects.92 
If values in the body refer to the inscription of particular values into the physical 
properties of subjects, nationalizing the body entails a process of embodiment, whereby 
distinct values are signified as national. These properties are, by extension, expressed through 
the body, as attachments of value to the body of the subject. In other words, these processes of 
evaluation express themselves both in terms of how bodies are valued – i.e. which signifiers 
need to be in place for bodies to be considered valuable, and which values are expressed 
through the body – and in the sense that these values are inscribed or embodied in subjects of 
power. However, as Claudio Tamburrini points out, there may be a contradiction in terms 
between the notion of sport, and particularly professional sport, as a field mass production, 
and its dominant values, such as the gentlemanly code of "fair play," and an air of 
disinterested rôle distance (2000: 215-216). Furthermore, as these values are expressed 
through events of mass dissemination, they are also, in turn, inscribed into the bodies of 
spectators, and, through the technology of discipline, the bodies of children. 
This is not to say that the values that are inscribed into national bodies through the 
Football World Cup or through the Physical Education curriculum, are of the same kind as 
was the case with the national discipline dreamt of in the late 18th century. Comte Jacques-
Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert, urged that "discipline must be made national," disputing the 
"vulgar prejudice by which we are made to imagine that empires are subjected to an 
impervious law of decline and ruin" (Foucault 1977: 169). Rather, the values of the military 
body, which Napoleon sought to inscribe into the entirety of the social body through 
92 To Bourdieu, dispositions signify actors' "predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination" of action and 
thought (1977: 214 n.1).
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meticulous individual training and control, are increasingly complemented by a cluster of 
values that are attached to a body signified as "natural," "healthy," or "authentic." This chapter 
shows how the body produced through the Physical Education curriculum in Norway is 
changing from a military body, via a body appreciative of "fair play," a disinterested air of 
rôle distance, and of sports as ends in themselves, to a body enmeshed in what Pierre 
Bourdieu referred as the "cult of the natural and authentic." Such a body enables a more 
autonomous cultural field of sport compared to nationalism's epic body, since it no longer 
places nations in a necessarily antagonistic relation to each other. Instead, the impure and 
unnatural poses as  new opponents of the sporting body. After a discussion of a possible 
paradox resulting from applying certain notions of authenticity to sports in schools and as 
mass disseminated spectacles, the question is raised if not the current obsession with the 
natural and pure in combination with a rigorously quantified body points to that sports 
increasingly functions to symbolize excessive and ineffable aspects of our existence. 
Bourdieu's notion of illusio shows how participants can arrive at this understanding through 
an experience of the seductive character of sports, and only then being in a position to become 
conscious of this effect and, in turn, emancipate themselves. 
School sports: A Physical Education curriculum
In order to situate the purpose of Physical Education as part of the national curriculum in 
Norway, it is necessary to understand how it was inserted into, on the one hand, a totality of 
sporting practices, and, on the other, the totality of education as a moment in the construction 
of national bodies, or, as one of a number of practices set to instil a sort of national discipline. 
The sports movement in Norway was originally conceived as a measure of national defence 
against Swedish rule. Therefore, exercises intended to form character "in youth and soldiers" 
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were central to Physical Education at its inception. In the 1922 national curriculum, Physical 
Education was referred to as gymnastikk, after its single constituent element, a sort of 
gymnastics exercised in groups, emphasizing control of each individual pupil's activity, as 
well as coordinating the entirety of the unit. Drill exercises were central, and the teacher 
would use commands such as "Straight," "Attention," and "At rest" (By 1998: 3-4).  The 
purpose of Physical Education was both to produce a body that may be subjected, used, 
transformed, and improved, as well as to facilitate the kind of hierarchical observation that 
would link visibility and power, characteristic of the military camp. 
The kind of political anatomy of detail prescribed by Napoleon's national discipline, 
produced children's bodies as national capital available for inscription. Disciplinary power 
was elaborated through three simple instruments: hierarchical organization, normalizing 
judgement, and the combination of the two in the examination (Foucault 1977: 170). The 
military camp-style organization of Physical Education in the 1922 curriculum lent itself well 
to these techniques. Children could be ordered according to how they were evaluated on a 
normative scale, and in keeping with their internal rank. The semi-judicial status of normative 
judgement made it an invaluable component in the attempt to implement a "military model as 
a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder" (1977: 168). This meticulous attention to 
detail in each child was a founding moment in producing the modern subject as individual.
When sport was included as a general field of practice in the national curriculum of 
1939, central targets for Physical Education included reinforcing pupils' health and imbuing 
them with a sense of "good and beautiful body posture and teach[ing] them to use limbs and 
joints effortlessly and freely," as well as making pupils "fond of gymnastics and sports, so that 
they sustain their physical exercises after terminating their school education" (By 1998: 5), in 
other words, an approach intended not only to design bodies for military defence, but to instil 
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in them an appreciation for sports as ends in themselves. School sport in Norway were 
adapted in their usage from English public schools, where vulgar games had been 
appropriated by a principle of conversion into "bodily exercises, activities which [had 
become] an end in themselves, a sort of physical art for art's sake" (Bourdieu 1993: 342). As 
these practices were disseminated through the vehicle of national curricula, the political 
philosophy of sport remained intimately linked to the moral ideas of the dominant fractions of 
the dominant class, including a theory of amateurism and a code of "fair play." 
The distinctive values of dispositions are expressed both in a person's outward 
appearance, for instance through her or his body-posture (soldier vs. civilian, school master 
vs. pupil, etc.), and in the relational assessment of practices. Thus, when the field of sport 
codes in the Physical Education curriculum were expanded from the singular Linge-
gymnastikk in the 1922 curriculum, to the more general "gymnastics and sport" 17 years later, 
the shift may be understood as an expression of changes in the field of power, and, ultimately, 
in the field of class relations. The Labor party (Arbeiderpartiet) took government for the first 
time in 1936, and the shift in political power entailed a dethroning of the hitherto exclusivity 
of gymnastics – perceived as an activity associated with the upper-class – and an expansion of 
the array of sports included in Physical Education. Also, the organisational apparatus of sport 
had changed. Soon after its inception in 1861, national sport association branched into two 
separate associations. In the early twentieth century, voluntary sport was administered by two 
country-wide organizations, the bourgeois National Sports Organization (Landsforbundet for  
idrett) and the socialist Worker's Sports Association (Arbeidernes Idrettsforbund). In 1939, the 
year of the new Physical Education curriculum, these two organizations merged. However, 
even though Labor took political power and the workers's sports movement was included in 
the sporting mainstream, the values associated with the dominant fraction of the dominant 
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class strengthened their position in the Physical Education curriculum. 
Sport was among the activities designed to train the character of future leaders, both 
with regards to their body posture, i.e. the outward image of their bodies, and by inculcating 
courage and "manliness." The sons of the aristocracy attending English public schools were 
imbued with a will to win, common to all subjects regarded as soldiers, but, in their case, as 
"will to win within the rules." "Fair play," then, was constructed in accordance with 
an aristocratic disposition utterly opposed to the plebeian pursuit of victory at 
all costs. [...] "Fair play" is the way of playing the game characteristic of 
those who do not get so carried away by the game as to forget that it is a 
game, those who maintain the "rôle distance" [...] that is implied in all the 
roles designated for future leaders. (Bourdieu 1993: 343)
The habitus has its own system of evaluation, homologous to the field of class relations, and 
Physical Education serves to assess the degree to which children are capable of acquiring the 
preferred dispositions.93 The formation of character, finding physical expression in exercises 
intended to control body posture, body-object articulations, and so forth, is intimately linked 
to a system of values through technologies of discipline. 
The current curriculum shifts the emphasis further from its inception as a military 
body, via a body appreciative of "fair play," rôle distance, and sports as ends in themselves, to 
a body that can be characterized as "natural" and "authentic." "Play, sports, dance, outdoor 
life," as well as "natural" experiences, form the central components of the current curriculum. 
The evaluation of children's bodies is now articulated as a study of their "motor skills" 
(Ministry of Education 1996: 110), should extend beyond the realm of Physical Education 
classes to become part of "the daily education," and emphasise individual abilities, work 
processes and results (Ministry of Education 1996: 79). Adding to the classical age's 
L'Homme-machine (Foucault 1977: 136) and its image of the disciplined soldier – the ability 
93 The habitus is an expression of "the unity of the system of dispositions" (Bourdieu 1993: 350). 
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to stand straight, make exhaustive use of the body, etc. – Physical Education produces a body 
imbued with more gentle values expressed as a dancing body, or a body engaged in outdoor 
life. 
As Bourdieu shows, the value of sporting practices are regulated according to the 
physical engagement of the body, so that the most distinctive practices are those with the least 
body contact, such as golf, tai-chi, or, indeed, gymnastics, while, for instance, wrestling and 
American football stand at the other end of the continuum, requiring complex engagement 
with other bodies (1988: 154). While the 1939 curriculum did not explicate any specific 
sporting codes that should be incorporated in Physical Education, excepting the continued 
inclusion of gymnastics, the current curriculum makes particular mention of "dance" and 
"outdoor activities," but no reference to any contact sport. On the one hand, these more gentle 
activities require little or no engagement with other bodies, and, hence, serve to establish the 
most distinctive practices as those preferred by the curriculum, and, on the other, their 
ascending popularity coincides with the emergence of a new bourgeoisie and the invention 
and marketing of "a new form of poor-man's elitism" (Bourdieu 1984: 220). These new 
distinctive practices find their expression in, for instance, a preference for hiking in the place 
of the industrial bourgeoisie's penchant for golf. Physical Education, and its emphasis on 
outdoor life and "the personal and social benefits of a healthy life-style" (Ministry of 
Education 1994: 3), demonstrate the rising dominance of the new bourgeoisie. As Bourdieu 
points out in a study of life-styles in France in the 1980s, practitioners of the "new sports, 
often imported from America by members of the new bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie, in 
particular by all the people working in fashion – designers, photographers, models, 
advertising agents, journalists –" constitute a new kind of counter-culture, which, however, 
"reactivates all the traditions of the typically cultivated cults of the natural, the pure and the 
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authentic" (Bourdieu 1984: 220). 
The dispositions required and taught through the current curriculum, as well as 
practices marked as distinctive, are manifestations of the values and political philosophy of 
the dominant fraction of the dominant class, and also marks the inauguration of a new set of 
values, associated with an emergent petite bourgeoisie. In the current curriculum, dance, 
outdoor activities and attention to ethical norms, such as "fair play," are complemented by a 
set of guidelines with regards to health, diet and life-style choices from the age of 10. In other 
words, despite the emancipation of sport from its inception as an area of activity reserved for 
the few, its political philosophy prevails, articulated as a "cult of 'fair play', the code of play of 
those who have the self-control not to get so carried away by the game that they forget that it 
is 'only a game'" (Bourdieu 1984: 215). Furthermore, through the inclusion of a set of values 
associated with an petite bourgeoisie, a "gentle, invisible education by exercise and diet which 
is appropriate to the new morality of health is tending to take the place of the explicitly ethical 
pedagogy of the past in shaping bodies and minds" (Bourdieu 1984: 219). 
Elite events: Beyond the national body
The kind of "authentic" child, appropriated through "outdoor life" and "natural experiences," 
serves as a further elaboration of the dispositions required by school children. The 
disciplinary formation of character, articulated as an attention to "motor skills," the values of 
amateurism and rôle distance, and a new morality of health and authenticity are productive of 
a new national body, which stands in a complimentary, rather than contradictory, relation to 
the individual postulated by early humanism. However, implementing the cult of the authentic 
as a requirement in the curriculum leads to a paradoxical situation. As Walter Benjamin points 
out, "the whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical – and, of course, not only technical 
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– reproducibility" (2003: sec. II), hence it cannot be inculcated, shaped, or manufactured. The 
notion of authenticity "has its basis in ritual, the location of its original use value," (2003: sec. 
IV), as opposed to exchange value, indicating the ritualistic and pre-capitalistic imaginary of 
the authentic. The paradox lies in that the curriculum now requires reproduction of a sphere 
that in itself – to Benjamin – is beyond reproducibility.
To return, then, to our initial distinction between values of the body and values in the 
body, the sporting body is now inscribed as a natural machine, and the corresponding values 
are written into the bodies of school children and through regulations and representations of 
elite sport. In diachronic terms, the values of the preferred sporting body has shifted from its 
early conceptualizations as a military body – organized in sport association with the purpose 
of national defence, trained through camp-style gymnastics in schools, and finding expression 
today in team sports and the intensive quantifications of mass produced sporting events – to a 
leisurely body, – organized in amateur sport clubs, imbued with notions of sport as a physical 
art for art's sake in the training of the industrial bourgeoisie's children in private schools, and 
finding continued expression in the gentlemanly code of fair play today – to the natural, or 
authentic, body, groomed in schools through the technology of the Physical Education 
curriculum, articulated in the teaching of health, diet, and life-style choices from the age of 
10, and disseminated through mass sporting events through the application of anti-doping 
discourse to elite athletes. The meaning of these mass sporting events are increasingly 
hegemonized as national, characterizing each performer as a representative of a nation, or 
presenting events as a gathering of nations, and so on.
The values of the body are quantified, so that nations are ranked according to the 
performance of their athletes, the degree of amateurism measured on the degree to which 
teams play in accordance with the gentlemanly code of fair play, and the distinction between a 
156
healthy and unhealthy. The measuring and quantification of the sporting body finds its precise 
analogy in the way nations are classified according to their inhabitants' expected age of death, 
i.e. as a quantification of life itself, and an attribution of this measure to the national body. 
However, perhaps it is from this location, we should start our investigation into the causes and 
conditions of the inscription of these values of the body into the bodies of children and 
spectators of mass sporting events. As Stuart Hall observes, any signifying practice, or 
practice of articulation, also constitutes a "politics of signification":
The conduct of a social struggle depends, at a particular moment, precisely 
on the effective dis-articulation of certain key terms, e.g. 'democracy', 'the 
rule of law', 'civil rights', 'the nation', 'the people', 'Mankind', from their 
previous couplings, and their extrapolation to new meanings, representing the 
emergence of new political subjects. (1982: 78)
If sport is not so much a matter of training for war, flaunting the ability to waste time with 
leisurely activities, or building a healthy body, it is an allegory over life itself. In other words, 
sport may interrogate existential questions, such as why or what it means to exist. What may 
be at stake, then, is, on the one hand, the disarticulation of elite sport from sport as a popular 
practice, to unhook the supposedly necessary connection between sport and nations, and, on 
the other, the re-articulation of sport with, say, the domains of the political and aesthetic. If 
sport interrogates questions of existence, "the cult of health may be a deception as to the 
reality of death. [...] If we stay healthy, we stay alive, and that should be our primary concern. 
In this view, life is identical to the meaning of life" (Møller 1999: 122).94 
If sport derives its meaning, not by way of some ethical prescription, but through an 
aesthetic value, then it may be that this value is not properly located neither in the militaristic, 
leisurely, or authentic articulations of sport. To critics like Elias and Dunning, it is the 
94 "Sundhedsdyrkelsen [kan] være en måde at belyve dødens realitet på. [...] Holder man sig sund, holder man 
sig i live, og det er det primære. Livet er i dette perspektiv identisk med livets mening" (my translation).
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Aristotelian drama's notion of catharsis, or the cleansing of the audience by arousing in them 
feelings of fear and pity, which is the defining component of sport's aesthetic function in 
society.95 Bertolt Brecht notes that drama aiming to produce catharsis enables the audience to 
go back to their daily chores as a result and prevent the spectator from "readily adopting a 
critical attitude to the things depicted, i.e. prevents him more effectively the better the art 
functions" (1995: entry 17 Oct 1940). Møller suggests that we instead consider the 
predominant aesthetic value of sport to be associated with expressions of excess, that is, as 
ways to negotiate death as life's existential condition, since "it is expenditure – waste, loss, 
and excessive enjoyment – which is the actual productive force of culture" (1999: 108).96 
Mass disseminated sporting events are visual spectacles allegorising the excessive. In 
this view sport functions not primarily to producing catharsis in an audience, but in 
symbolizing that which goes beyond – and therefore defies – description. Bourdieu notes that 
the rite or dance "always contains something ineffable" (1977: 2), which in his view, signifies 
that sport, considered as rituals or communicative endeavours, includes a pre-symbolic 
component. Based on studies of ritualistic societies, George Bataille suggests that it is 
"organized transgression, together with prohibition, which defines social life" (1996: 70). 
Transgression, or the excessive, should be considered 
a complement to the profane world, [since] the worlds of the profane and the 
holy constitute society together, or successively, as its two complimentary 
forms. The profane world is the world of prohibitions. The holy world 
95 Within its specific setting sport, like other leisure pursuits, can evoke through its design 
a special kind of tension, a pleasurable excitement, thus allowing to flow more freely. It 
can help to loosen, perhaps to free, stress-tensions. The setting of sport, like that of 
many other leisure-pursuits, is designed to move, to stir the emotions, a well-tempered 
excitement without the risks and tensions usually connected with excitement in other 
life-situations, a 'mimetic' excitement which can be enjoyed and which may have a 
liberating, cathartic effect, even though the emotional resonance to the imaginary design 
contains, as it usually does, elements of anxiety, fear – or despair. (Elias and Dunning 
1986: 48-49)
96 "Det [er] udgiften – ødselheden, tabet og den excessive nydelse – der i egentlig forstand skaper kultur" (my 
translation). 
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emerges through limited transgressions. It is the world of parties, rulers and 
gods. (1996: 72-73)
With the industrial revolution, the world of the sacred was increasingly subordinated to the 
profane, as bourgeois values of accumulation and acquisition were constructed in opposition 
to the French nobility's overindulgences. Expenditure, expressed through waste, loss and 
excess, offers a hatchway beyond the utilitarian and acquisitive attitude of the bourgeoisie. As 
Bataille notes, "the only obvious and concrete distinction between prohibition and 
transcendence are of an economic nature. The prohibition relates to work, and work is 
productive: during profane time, reserved for work, society accumulates resource, and 
consumption is reduced to the minimum requirement for production. The days of celebration 
represents sacred time" (1996: 70). With the logic of accumulation, then, it is precisely lack 
and insufficiency that needs to be overcome, and and sport may represent an arena where 
there is no scarcity, where the body, as it were, spills over itself and becomes uncontainable 
and excessive. 
Disarticulating sport from its preferred meanings – as harbinger of military discipline, 
purveyor of a gentlemanly code of conduct, and inculcator of a morality of health – facilitates 
an articulation of sport with aesthetic values, and not necessarily in association with the 
cathartic ideals of the Aristotelian drama. A subordinate reading, then, may entail a perversion 
of the very concept of elite sport with its attendant moralities. Slavoj Žižek notes that, while 
the neurotic acknowledges the Law "in order to occasionally take enjoyment in its 
transgressions (masturbation, theft, etc.), and thus obtains satisfaction by snatching back from 
the Other part of the stolen jouissance," the pervert seeks to establish the Law, as when the 
proverbial male masochist "gains satisfaction from the very obscenity of the gesture of 
installing the rule of Law – that is, out of 'castration'" (1999 "Fantasy": 117). Perversion, in 
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this sense, means a reinstallment of the Law, or a rearticulation of key terms, such as sport or 
nation, with subordinated signifiers. Perhaps equally significant illustrations of this kind of 
elision are cases where the term nation is rearticulated, such in the concept of a sporting 
nation, queer nation, or, as in the Norwegian composition "We are also a nation, we who are 
but an alen of height," i.e. a nation of children, where "nation" is radically delinked from its 
Latin root natio (to be born), which again may be constitutive of new political subjectivities. 
In these inscriptions, "nation" simply signifies community. 
"Fair play" prescribes practitioners to maintain their rôle distance to the game. Play 
beyond such distance is excessive and, according to the dominant political philosophy of 
sport, must be contained. Paradoxically, however, such involvement may constitute precisely 
what Bourdieu refers to as illusio, or the recognition that one is "invested, taken in and by the 
game" (Wacquant and Bourdieu 1992: 116). To engage in sport, and particularly as a 
professional athlete, one must recognize "a specific form of interest, a specific illusion, as 
tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game as practical mastery of its rules" (1992: 
117). It is illusio which produces the confusion in spectators, causing us to concentrate on the 
"apparent producer – painter, composer, writer – and prevents us asking who created this 
'creator' and the magic power of transubstantiation with which the 'creator' is endowed" 
(1996: 167). In order to uncover the illusion – to objectify the fantasmatic – it is necessary to 
first have experienced and have been taken in by the excessive aspect of sport. Only then are 
we in a position to distinguish the gentle from the untrained, the authentic from the contrived.
Freedom and the excessive
In his late writings on sexuality Foucault considered the subject of desire as the latest in a 
series of "sorrowful subjects" inaugurated by early Christianity and becoming dominant with 
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the advent of bourgeois morality. This subject are characterised by a founding lack – a lapse, a 
missing fullness – and are constituted so as to never be fully able to close this gap. In 
Christian ethics of sexuality this takes the form of a double movement. 
First, there is the task of clearing up all the illusions, temptations and 
seductions which can occur in the mind, and discovering the reality of what 
is going on within ourselves. Second, one has to get free from any attachment 
to this self, not because the self is an illusion, but because the self is much 
too real. The more we discover the truth about ourselves, the more we have 
to renounce ourselves. … That is what we could call the spiral of truth 
formulation and reality renouncement which is at the heart of the Christian 
techniques of the self. (1999: 183)
The growing scientific interest in desire serves as a force of power to elicit obedience and 
consent. It is a subject that is founded on "the subjugating coordinates of self-negation and 
self-deciphering" (Bove). However, to Foucault pleasure can be enlisted as a site of resistance 
– of "responding claims and affirmations, those of one's own body" – against power.  When 
Foucault juxtaposes the increasing interest in (the illusory character of) desire with a 
disappearence of pleasure from philosophical debate, this is an index of his shift in emphasis 
from "processes of liberation" to "practices of freedom" (Bove). While liberation in certain 
theologies may mean emancipation from desire itself, freedom is constitutive of power. What 
we have to do with here is not so much a subject that is unaware of its own bondage and 
inauthentic relation to itself – and which needs to be liberated from its schackles and returned 
to state of singular unity with its prelapsarian state – as with a subject that is already free. This 
is not a subject that needs to be liberated from "false conciousness," as much as it is already 
making use of "the possibilities intrinsic to power relations themselves" (Bove). 
There is an ethical concern in Foucault's writing on the subject that implies a critique 
of an understanding of the self as always lacking, always being in a state of non-fulfilment 
and absence, and suggests to put in its place a subject that enjoys. There is, however, a 
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difference in the understanding of the terms desire and enjoyment in Foucault and the 
psychoanalysts Jacques Lacan's work. Desire, with its association to lack, separation and 
alienation, enables pleasure to be scientised and submitted to what Freud referred to as the 
pleasure principle: a principle that has as its purpose to limit enjoyment. Foucault takes as his 
example as story from St. Francois de Sales where an elephant is taken as the most 
appropriate metaphor for human sexuality, as it "couples not, but from three years to three 
years" (1999: 183). It is as a kind of dictum to enjoy as little as possible that power lodges 
itself in the body, and it is against such a dictum that subjects constantly try to transgress the 
prohibition – castration – of her or his enjoyment. It is against this understanding of desire as 
a limiting agent that Foucault suggested pleasure be mobilised.
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III From production to reception
While the previous part was concerned with how and what kind of body is produced through 
the national-sports nexus through school sports and elite events, this section deals with how 
such events are made meaningful in subjects. Bourdieu perceived sports as inculcating a form 
of belief in their practitioners (see chapter 3 above for a further discussion on naturalisation, 
dressage and illusio). Nationalist discourses and the epic, national body are automatised and 
made to appear natural through sports. However, the open-ended character of signification 
discussed in chapter 2 means that beneath the dominant nationalist anchorage of such events 
other articulations are possible. Here I suggest that there is a potential excess of meaning in 
spectacular sports that enables such events to become potential sites of subjective truth: 
beyond the barren, fantasmatic character of spectacular sports one may come to interrogate 
the notion that spectacular sports are something else than a game, and what this means for the 
subject’s “truth of desire”, or what Slavoj Žižek calls “‘acephalic,’ non-subjectivized 
knowledge” (Žižek, “Desire”).
In chapter 8 I claim that there is a limit to Bourdieu’s theory of mass mediated sport: 
while Bourdieu claims that such mass spectacles render the subject increasingly passive, this 
view disregards the active component in the making of meaning discussed in chapter 2 above. 
The insight into the way sports produce a silent language in the encounter between teacher 
and performer is overlooked by Bourdieu in the moment of televised sports events. However, 
may not this wordless language be enlisted to produce meanings that are unofficial and 
remain “below” the level of explicit articulation, so that there is a potential activity in 
watching sports that is as secretive as it is visceral: a twitch in the leg when a favoured player 
attempts a difficult shot at the goal, a desire to push forward along with a charging striker.
163
7. Dressage and illusio: Desire and spectacular sport
It is an “acephalic,” non-subjectivized knowledge. Although (or, rather, for 
the very reason that) it is a kind of “Thou art that!” which articulates the very 
kernel of the subject’s being, its assumption desubjectivizes me, i.e., I can 
only assume my fundamental fantasy insofar as I undergo what Lacan calls 
“subjective destitution.”  (Žižek “Desire”)
Spectacular sport frames the subject in a national, epic world of fathers, firsts and bests (see 
chapters 4 and 5 above). By narrating our fundamental fantasies, sport regulates desire 
through allegories of the excessive body, phantasms of peak moments and phallic dominance, 
and a symbolic conquest of youth, women and the working population. May the subject 
nevertheless experience a kind of subjective destitution from sports and what may be the 
effects of such an experience? Can televised football induce in the viewer a recognition of 
what Bourdieu called the illusio of social orchestration?97
It is to a large extent the body which is the location and vehicle for understanding and 
communication in sports, and it may have been this aspect of popular games that made them 
suitable for codification and autonomisation by the élite at the end of the nineteenth century 
(Bourdieu, “Program” 160, 161; “Sports fan” 342).98 When sports return to the people in the 
form of mass dispersed spectacles, they are enmeshed in structures that serve to frame their 
meaning and constitution as objects of desire (“Sports fan” 346). In this sense, religious and 
social investments in popular games in pre-capitalist societies find their analogies in the way 
elite sports events are invested with desire, and the manner in which desire is regulated and 
managed through visual narratives.
Elite sports events produced for the masses may be approached as machines or engines 
97 See chapter 3 for a fuller discussion of the term illusio. The term is also central to the remarks in the 
conclusion.
98 Chapter 3 and 8 offers more detailed analysis of these aspects of Bourdieu's conceptual apparatus and 
his view on elite sports.
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that mediate desire, in the sense that they serve to exhibit the Lacanian “object a”. Desire in 
Lacan is “metonymical, it shifts from one object to another” (Žižek “Desire”), while object a 
endows desire with a certain formal frame of consistency. Object a, then, is not what we 
desire, but the cause of desire, or the image or representation that induces desire in the 
subject. Since desire is metonymical, it makes little sense to declare some absolute or singular 
representation as the cause or object of desire. Rather, spectacular sports serve particularly 
well as a desire engine precisely because of the endless shifts in mediations that on the surface 
appear strikingly standardised. On the other hand, the gaze of the spectator on the couch, 
“bereft of all practical competency and who cares more about the extrinsic aspects of practice, 
such as the result, the victory” (Bourdieu, “Program” 160), elucidates the lack which is 
contained by the image, since the spectator must always remain on the hither side of the 
screen onto which the image is transmitted.99
The analogy with the child’s trauma of experiencing its own reflection in a mirror, the 
effect of the so-called “mirror stage,” is striking.100 Only on realising that it can never be as 
whole or sutured as its appearance in the mirror can the child experience the kind of paranoiac 
alienation or imaginary servitude that is characteristic of the formation of a social I (Lacan, 
“Mirror stage” 4-7). Through an experience of the mediated image as a misapprehension of 
his desire the spectator of elite sports events may recognise the ways in which his or her gaze 
and the mediated image serve to manage and regulate his or her fantasies. As the mirror stage 
inaugurates a fictional agency of the ego, so does the gaze enable the kind of trauma by which 
I may realise that I can never fully be myself, and the fantasies on which I rely for the 
99 However, see the  critique of Bourdieu's notion of a subject rendered passive by spectacular sports in 
chapter 8 and a fuller discussion of representational theories in chapter 2.
100 The terms mirror stage and mirror theory are applicable to different concepts and events. While the 
former describes the entry of the child into the symbolic order, and – by extension – the variety of possible 
relations between the subject and a social context, the latter is descriptive of a certain theory of meaning, namely 
that the world of signs represent or stand in for a world that is represented, and that there is no mediating event 
that intervenes between these two worlds.
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constitution of my desire are structured misapprehensions. The supplement, as it were, to the 
visually repetitive character of elite sports events may be that they narrate our fundamental 
fantasies – these little pieces of imagination by which we can gain access to reality (Žižek 
1999 "Fantasy": 104-124).
Since these fantasies are produced both through the gaze of the spectator and the 
images that are mediated to him or her, the metonymical shifts in objects onto which the 
spectator’s desire is transferred occurs both on the retina and on the television screen. These 
fundamental fantasies are manufactured by the way we observe, and through investments of 
desire in the objects that appear on the screen. However, even if desire is metonymical, these 
minute shifts in images that are invested with desire are structured both in the moment of 
production – by nation states, sports organisations, television producers, manufacturers of 
sporting equipment, and so on – and in the moment of reception, i.e., in and through the gaze. 
What object a, the cause of desire, confers on the subject is a formal frame of consistency, and 
this frame is further reinforced through the way visual narratives are structured and ordered in 
generic formats or frames. In other words, what is at stake is to identify the specific 
techniques and modalities by which desire becomes habituated and productive of subjects 
with embodied beliefs in an identity between the cause and object of their desire.
The excessive body
Representations of peak events in mass mediated sports are consistently framed as allegories 
of the excessive body, and of a state in which there is no lack or scarcity. Analogously to hard-
core pornography, elite sports mediate visual signs of desire. The innumerable repetitions of 
the same record breaking event, spectacular goal or nationalist feast share characteristics with 
the “repeatedly inflated, ‘spending’ penis” of hard-core pornography’s “money shot” 
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(Williams 108). These images take the shape of a Lacanian object a, endowing desire with a 
certain formal consistency. Peak events in mass mediated sports are produced in a structured 
way, and organised through a whole set of technologies to ensure their reproduction in slightly 
shifting representations while maintaining their formal or generic coherence.
The training machine to which all elite athletes submit is organised as a disciplinary 
regime. It is this form of discipline that “‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a 
power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish 170). Its instruments of dominance – hierarchical observation, 
normalising judgement, and their combination in the examination – serve at every moment to 
place “individuals in a field of surveillance” in order homogenise, “capture and fix them” 
(ibid. 189). This disciplinary regime and its meticulous attention to detail in each performer 
produces modern subjects as individuals, inaugurating “the man of modern humanism” (ibid. 
141). This notion of the individual posits a moral, or knowing, agent “as an autonomous 
sovereign subject” (Schildrick 152) whose acts are detached from any particular context and 
from other actors (ibid. 150). In other words, it is an atomistic disciplinary regime that 
manufactures athletes as individual specimens.
Hence, while on the surface it may appear as if each record breaking event or 
spectacular goal stands out in its own singularity, these moments are carefully manufactured 
by submitting athletes to a Fordist training machine engineered to satisfy the demands of an 
individualising desire engine. A Fordist mode of production, with its characteristic assembly 
line model, is designed to mass produce standardised and pre-defined products, and its 
application to athletes serves to engineer performers that can fulfil and embody de Coubertin’s 
Olympic ideals, “higher, stronger, faster”. Far from coincidental, the peak moments of elite 
sporting events are carefully planned and meticulously organised to ensure the reproduction 
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of visual spectacles that may generate and order desire in spectators.
Nationalism may be perceived as a form or genre onto which mass disseminated sports 
events, such as the Olympic Games or the Football World Cup, are grafted. Nations are 
imagined as communities that “loom out of an immemorial past, and [...] glide into a limitless 
future” (Anderson, Imagined Communities 11-12), and it is perhaps their “philosophical 
poverty” (ibid. 5) that urges them to seek justification in an epic world of originary myths and 
founding fathers. “The world of the epic is the national heroic past: it is a world of 
‘beginnings’ and ‘peak times’ in the national history, a world of fathers and of founders of 
families, a world of ‘firsts’ and ‘bests’” (Bakhtin 13).101 Mass disseminated sports events are 
dominantly framed by the epic genre which provides a coherence mechanism for meaning and 
signification (Barthes 74). The way peak moments of elite sports events are narratively 
framed serves to recycle the notion of founding national moments and construct performers as 
national subjects.102 Performers are manufactured to produce new records and championships 
in order to fortify the notion of national founders, firsts and bests. The Fordist training 
machine, then, serves to satisfy the demands of nationalist narratives under state 
custodianship, providing images that can reflect a sutured national past of peak moments 
(Bakhtin 30). The epic genre formally frames the minute metonymical shifts in images 
spectators invest with desire.
Phantasms
Sports organisations such as FIFA, the international football body, and IOC, the International 
Olympic Committee, followed nation states in their foundational history and provide stories 
101 See also the discussion of the epic in chapter 5 and a fuller treatment of nationalism in chapter 4.
102 Even if nationalism has tended to hegemonise the meaning of elite sports, such subjectivities may 
interfere with sports performance. To Bruce Lee, a “martial artist is firstly a man, which is ourselves: 
nationalities has [sic] nothing to do in martial art” (p. 5).
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that have generic relations to nationalism. The IOC narrative constructs Pierre de Coubertin as 
its founding father and restorer of the ancient Olympic Games (Simonovic 3), which, in 
effect, locates the ancient games in an absolutely valorised past (Bakhtin 15) and provides a 
mould for apprehension of each Olympic feat and record breaking event. The current version 
of the Olympic Games is seen as a reflection of the ancient games, and the originary myth of 
the games constructs it as rooted in European soil. Analogous to nationalist narratives and 
their supposedly European forebears (Alter 19; Kamenka 3), international sports organisations 
and their foundational stories belong “to a whole system of ‘phantasms,’ to a certain 
representation of nature, life, history, religion, law,” constituting them as a kind of “‘delivery 
of arms’ [...] of European exportation” (Derrida, “Racism’s last word.” 295). These 
international organisations serve as custodians of the code, political philosophy, history of 
records, and other paraphernalia that define sports as fields of cultural production relatively 
autonomous to the field of class relations (Bourdieu “Sports fan” 341-343). The stake in the 
autonomisation of sports by a social élite in English public schools was a “monopolistic 
capacity to impose the legitimate definition of sporting practice” (Bourdieu “Sports fan” 344). 
When sports return as visual spectacles these organisations and their symbols are associated 
with peak moments, serving to invest them with desire in spectators.
The diffusion of elite sports through television entails that its production is regulated 
by the demands of the mass media and their consumers, advertisers and owners. The 
increasing competition between the established organisation and major corporate interests 
over sports has generated conflicts concerning the ways in which peak moments can be 
produced most efficiently, which, in one case, resulted in the formation of an Inter-European 
Champions’ League in football within the bounds of the Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA).103 Furthermore, media interests continue to push for changes in the 
103 Per Ravn Omdahl, then-President of UEFA, notes that in the late 1990s, when “powerful media 
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codes of sports to make them more attractive to television advertisers.104 Manufacturers of 
sports equipment and the media complex have found different avenues of challenging the 
current dominance of FIFA. In commercials repeatedly aired during the 2002 Football World 
Cup, a multinational corporation gathered a host of players with individual sponsorship 
contracts to play a “friendly” game – as two teams both playing for the same company. In 
such a way, the corporation suggested ownership of the game itself, dissolving the opposition 
between the two teams on a corporate level. It is “commercial imperatives” that “drive the 
production” of televised images.105 “‘Watching’ sports is one of the few transgenerational 
experiences that men and boys, fathers and sons, still share in the post-Fordian economy. [...] 
The images of manly character that boys and men consume in sports media become embodied 
by star athletes who reflect and reinforce men’s collective power over women.” (Sabo and 
Jansen 207; 205). Since the demand that the commercial media makes of sports is that they 
deliver viewers or consumers to advertisers, athletes represent “the peak performance of 
manly youth”, transcending “the ordinary constraints of embodiment and mortality” (ibid. 
203). It is in the form of spectacular goals, record breaking events and other peak moments 
that sports are coded as “responsive” to a “target market” (ibid. 207).
Containing desire
In this system of mediated consumption the spectator on the couch represents a potential 
consumer. The work of sports in reproducing the structures of dominance in the field of class 
interests joined some of the major teams and wanted to break away” from UEFA and establish their own league, 
the club teams were persuaded to stay by UEFA's proposal of a new Inter-European league. The following year 
another group made an attempt to sever ties with UEFA. This time the group consisted of a “mix of Spanish Pay-
per-view, Berlusconi, German Kirch, Murdoch” and others. Omdahl estimates that such break away attempts 
constitute a “threat which football will have to confront for many years ahead. We are particularly concerned 
with the linkage between the media, ownership of football clubs, and control of TV distribution.” (p. 35).
104 Before the 1994 Football World Cup, a proposal to cut each half of the game in two was tabled, which 
would have the effect of dividing the game into four periods of 20 minutes, “so that there would be more time 
for commercials” in televised versions of football events (Pedersen 50).
105 See also the discussion on masculinities in chapter 5.
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relations is to provide images that can deliver consumers to advertisers. Since the market for 
spectacular sports is constructed as demanding events that can reproduce patterns of 
masculine domination, the mass media strives to provide recurring instances of peak 
performances of manly youth transcending the body and the constraints of mortality. These 
spectacular moments are framed within the epic genre, representing a world of “peaks”, 
“firsts” and “bests”, and it is this narrative form which provides coherence to the foundational 
stories of nations and sports organisations, or the system of “European ‘phantasms’” that are 
invested with desire through their mediation in elite sports events. Performers are carefully 
manufactured by an individualising traning machine to produce the record breaking events, 
spectacular goals and nationalist feats required to feed a desire engine with innumerable 
minutely shifting repetitions that can substitute or stand in for a Lacanian object a, conferring 
a formal frame of consistency to desire in spectators. It is in this sense that spectacular sports 
narrate the fundamental, or deep-seated, fantasies that must remain a screen’s width beyond 
the grasp of the viewer.
This desire engine constructs performance as a drive for knowledge, manufacturing 
performers that can “push the envelope”. They should run faster, jump higher, have more 
physical strength than any human before them, and these peak performances are equipped 
with measures that are constructed as objective. The scientific training machine producing 
these performers submits to this drive for knowledge “heedless of cost – satisfaction is here 
provided by knowledge itself –” thus reinscribing “this inexorable drive-progress of science 
which knows of no inherent limitation” (Žižek, “Desire”). Perhaps the desire engine of 
spectacular sports and its system of phantasms is produced by and productive of a “European 
upbringing and perception of society” that transforms “young people – regardless of their 
social position – either to dolls wrapped in cotton or to withered, chronically morose 
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machines for industry or ‘business’” (Reich 149).106 Hence, the peak events of elite sports 
serve both to trigger and contain desire in audiences, working at every moment as a 
technology to manage the spectators of mass mediated sports.
The desire engine of spectacular sports establishes boundaries for desire through 
procedures of containment and discourses of contamination. Sports participate in a “symbolic 
conquest of youth”, with the “aim of ensuring complete and continuous containment of the 
working population” (Bourdieu “Sports fan” 348), and, as part of an officialising “law and 
order” ideology, serve as a guard and bulwark against social outsiders, hooligans, criminals, 
drug addicts, and so on (Bennett 295-303). Sports operate a typology which demarcates the 
healthy and orderly inside from that which belongs on the outside. For instance, the 
gentlemanly code of “fair play”, inherited from the political philosophy developed during 
sports’ phase of appropriation by the social élite in the late nineteenth century and 
autonomisation from the field of class relations, operates an interdiction against doping, 
which, in effect, excludes the rank of those who are willing to take their profession seriously 
enough to consider “gambling with the body itself” while privileging the “macrobiotic cult of 
health” associated with the new bourgeoisie (Bourdieu “Sports fan”: 354; Tamburrini 202-
204). The ban on doping, establishing a typology of legal and prohibited drugs, declares that 
“one must respect a norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk 
impunity, anomaly or monstrosity” (Derrida, “The law of genre” 224-225).
The desire engine of spectacular sports feeds images and visual narratives to those 
fundamental fantasies that constitute and reproduce the pattern of domination in the field of 
class relations, and it is productive of fantasies that are embodied in subjects as structured 
propensities of the gaze. Spectacular sports contribute to the production of subjects that rely 
106 “Men vår europeiske samfunnsforestilling og –oppdragelse har forvandlet de unge – uavhengig av 
deres samfunnsmessige stilling – enten til dukker intullet i vatt eller til uttørrede, kronisk gretne maskiner for 
industrien eller ‘næringslivet’” (my translation).
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on these minutely shifting mediations of peak events for their constitution and who identify 
with them to the extent that they mistake the cause for the object of desire. However, the gaze 
may enable an experience of the lack contained in the image, which may give access to the 
kind of non-subjectivised, or acephalic, knowledge located at the “kernel of human structure” 
(Reich 171).107 This knowledge is prior to reason and its coating of civilised behaviour, and 
before those fundamental fantasies that are constitutive of subjects. Might the kind of trauma 
or “subjective destitution” brought about by the loss of a fundamental fantasy, or by the 
apprehension of these visual narratives as mistaken objects of desire, facilitate the experience 
of desire as always mediatised, and give rise to the truth effects of “full speech”, or “speech in 
which subjective truth reverberates” (Žižek, ”Desire”)? May we through such an experience 
“break the constraints of fantasy and enter the terrifying, violent domain of pre-synthetic 
imagination, the domain in which disjecta membra float around, not yet unified and 
‘domesticated’ by the intervention of a homogenizing fantasmatic frame” (Žižek, “The 
Spectre of Ideology” 122)?
107 “Dette tredje og siste laget – som utgjør den menneskelige strukturs biologiske kjerne – er ubevisst og 
fryktet” (my translation).
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8. The limits of Bourdieu: A passive subject?
 There’s something apologetic about mass mediated sport spectacles. In 2007, the European 
Commission and the European Football Union, UEFA, broadcast an advertisement entitled 
“Get out of your armchair” as an accompaniment to the season’s Champion League football 
games (Sweney). The advertisement was aired more than two thousand times, as if to remind 
viewers that the real purpose of televising this game is not primarily so that you should enjoy 
90 minutes of top international football, but to encourage you to get out of the armchair, lose a 
few pounds, and participate in the European-wide campaign on obesity.
Just watching the game for the love of it does not seem to be enough. Consider an 
analogy from the art world. If we were to watch international opera or ballet, we may want to 
sing and dance afterwards, but would our own singing and dancing be the primary purpose of 
us watching the show? There does not seem to be need to justify broadcasting ballet or opera 
via public service television with its possible health benefits. While the high arts aspire to 
bring audiences to experience the sublime, football can hope for little more than to entertain. 
Fig. 8: UEFA armchair advertisement
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Is not this difference a product of the specific character of its audiences rather than some 
intrinsic aspect of the practice itself? If so, the corollary would seem to be that experiences 
that we associate with the high arts might be produced by a popular cultural expression such 
as mass mediated football.
Indeed, the matrix we make use of when we approach a cultural expression – our 
preconception of whether the current expression is high art or a form of popular culture – may 
be the very cause of our experience of the sublime or the entertaining.108 The difference in 
broadcasting environment between football and ballet may be due to the fact that while the 
former is associated with the masses, the latter is primarily consumed by the cultured and well 
to do of society. Those who enjoy ballet may not need cultivation. Nowhere is the difference 
in social capital between these to cultural forms expressed more succinctly than in the writing 
of Pierre Bourdieu. Variations in taste give expression to socio-economic and sexual 
differences as well as to class aspirations. Perhaps this dichotomy is the productive moment 
behind our perception of football in contrast to ballet: low culture against high culture, the 
masses against the cultivated, those who need to be brought up in contrast to those who are 
already erect.
Our purpose here is to investigate Bourdieu’s view on mass mediated sport spectacles, 
with a particular consideration of football. While Bourdieu assumes a particular historical 
development in sports, we ask whether he disregards the specificity of modern elite sports as 
mediated, and the consequences this may have for experiences of the game. Are Bourdieu’s 
analytical tools predisposing him towards a certain elitism when recording the effects of 
mediated sports on those who watch them, and does his normative view on modern sport 
108 Consider Duchamp's dada-ist work The Fountain: It becomes a sculpture and available to sublimation 
only once it enters the high-art context of the modern museum. In this work of art Duchamp demonstrates how it 
is the context rather than some intrinsic character to the artwork that determines our experience of the sublime as 
opposed to the everyday.
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spectacles bar him from appreciating those pleasures we may find in an apparently passive 
consumption of televised sports?
In his writing on sports history Pierre Bourdieu noted that those activities we today 
refer to as sports tend to have a common trajectory: Born of vulgar games by and for the 
common folk, these activities were disconnected from their religious and bodily purposes and 
reinserted into a context where they could function as a physical art-for-art’s sake for the 
pupils of public schools in nineteenth-century Britain (“Sports fan”: 342-343).109 Sports 
claimed their cultural autonomy by refashioning these games in accordance with the 
mechanisms of high modernity: rationalisation, calculability, predictability and a corpus of 
rules which turned common games into activities with a distinct distance from material 
interest.
They were then returned to the masses, but now as spectacles performed by 
professionals and for consumers with an ever-diminishing ability to grasp the necessities 
associated with playing the game produced for them (“Sports fan” 344). At this point they 
should perhaps be considered less as games than as plays that produce a cathartic effect in 
order to maintain a social equilibrium.110 Sports appear as highly scripted performances 
manufactured to be consumed by audiences whose illiteracy in elite sports performance 
reduces their interest to those extrinsic aspects of games associated primarily with the gains of 
winning or losing.
The space of sports
In Distinction, Bourdieu notes how those cultural forms that have achieved a high degree of 
109 See also the discussion of Bourdieu's view on sport and his field theory in chapter 3.
110 To Elias and Dunning it is its cathartic element that is the defining component in sport’s aesthetic role 
in society (pp. 48-49). Bertolt Brecht noted that the Aristotelian drama, aiming to produce catharsis, enables 
audiences to go back to their daily chores as a result of the cleansing process, preventing them from “readily 
adopting a critical attitude to the things depicted, i.e. prevents him more effectively the better the art functions” 
(entry 17 October 1940).
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autonomy from the economic field tend to favour distance between the artwork and the 
viewer, in accordance with Kant’s aesthetics of disinterest. On approaching these kinds of 
cultural artefacts – ballet, opera, modern sculpture, and so forth – we are expected to maintain 
our distance and not get too involved in the object. These forms of aesthetic production come 
with a particular cultural competence: a pure gaze acquired through a kind of implicit 
learning, enabling the viewer to sift out all things that may serve to rouse the kinds of 
passions and emotions “ordinary” people experience in their “ordinary” existence (Bourdieu, 
Distinction 48-49).111 It is for these reasons that the ability to appreciate high art, or objects 
made for the field of limited cultural production, betrays the viewer. The ability to recognise 
these objects as artworks tacitly identifies the viewer as someone who has acquired the codes 
of cultural competence associated with the cultural elite.
It is here that we find the crux in Bourdieu’s dictum that the logic of the cultural field 
is that of the economic field inverted. The higher degree of autonomy from the economic 
field, the more symbolic capital we associate with the art form: the more distinctive the kind 
of recognition offered to those who associate with it. For instance, while the production of 
ballet is far more autonomous from the economic field than football – it is often supported by 
state subsidies and taught through governmental programmes – it also confers far more 
symbolic capital on those who have the ability to appreciate its practice. Football is more 
ingrained in the economic field, but also awards little symbolic capital to its practitioners and 
spectators. The logic seems to be that the fewer who appreciate and practice a cultural form, 
the more symbolic capital it commands.
Football offers little symbolic capital, but may reward elite practitioners with 
considerable economic gain, embedded as the sport is within the field of economic 
production. It is regarded as the world’s most popular sport, and the 2002 World Cup final had 
111 Quotes from Distinction refer to the Norwegian 1995 translation.
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1.1 billion viewers, according to FIFA (Harris). Bourdieu distinguishes between cultural 
practices in large- and small-scale production (“Field” 38; The Rules of Art 124). While ballet 
and some less popular sports, such as aikido and golf, may on occasion be made available to 
wider audiences, none of them has an audience on the same scale as football. Consequently, 
having an association with practices in the field of small-scale cultural production offers a 
higher distinctive value than an association with a mass-produced spectacle such as football. 
Bodily practices such as ballet, aikido and golf are generally more autonomous of the 
economic field.
There is a further reason why sports such as golf and aikido have a preferred status 
among the petty bourgeoisie. In the system of preferences with regards to sport, the 
determining element is “the degree of engagement of the body” (Bourdieu, “Program” 157). 
The most distinctive value is bestowed on sports that euphemise violence to the highest 
degree, so that, in golf, distance is created “by the very logic of a confrontation which 
excludes all direct contact, even through a ball” (ibid. 158). The distinction accorded to golf 
over football is a product of a threefold difference: There is a significant difference with 
regard to the characteristics of those who practice it; they can be distinguished by taking 
account of their location within the field of cultural production; and they can be delineated 
from each other by accounting for inherent characteristics, specifically their euphemisation of 
violence.
The Kantian distance to the object appears to offer an approach to the body that fits 
better with the more distinctive practices. In Bourdieu’s sociology sports are converted from 
vulgar games to sports by adopting the function as a physical art-for-art’s sake for the well to 
do. Detached from their religious and bodily purposes sports were appropriated as bodily 
exercises that aimed to instil virtues in future leaders (“Sports fan”: 343). One must at all 
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times remain aloof and composed, both when participating in the game and when one plays 
the role of spectator. Yet there is a distinct difference between the audiences of golf and 
tennis, on the one hand, and football, on the other. In the latter sport we find audiences that 
lose their composure and allow their feelings to be agitated.
Struggle over definitions
What is at stake in modern sports is something far more than notions of belonging and 
identity. We could put it this way: While we ordinarily assume that the rousing of emotions 
associated with mass mediated spectacles such as sport triggers a sense of belonging in the 
audience, it may be that this emotional excitement causes spectators to slip out of 
consciousness, let their guard down, and forget “who they are”, i.e. their identity, even if just 
for a moment. By forgetting that the game is merely an illusion, and becoming involved, 
audiences are made available to social orchestration.112 Sports constitute attempts to assert a 
“monopolistic capacity to impose the legitimate definition of sporting practice and of the 
legitimate function of sporting activity” (Bourdieu “Sports fan” 344). They represent 
struggles over the definition of the legitimate body and the legitimate use of the body. When 
popular sports are relegated from practice to spectacles on television these struggles include 
not only the uses of bodies but also the meaning and purpose of physical activity, even when 
undertaken by others.
There is something insidious about mass mediated sport spectacles in Bourdieu’s 
writing. He notes that “sports shows encouraged by television create more and more 
spectators who lack all practical competence and pay attention only to the extrinsic aspects of 
practice, such as the result, the victory” (1988: 160). As popular games are turned into 
professional events, audiences are alienated from the passtimes they themselves made. Mass 
112 See also the discussions in chapters 4-6 on the production of nationally codified bodies through sport.
179
mediated sports reinforce social orchestration through bodily and collective mimesis (ibid. 
167).
In this sense mass mediated sports are truly cathartic, like plays that arouse pity and 
fear in order to cleanse audiences of those passions. Consider George Orwell’s “Two Minute 
Hate”:
The Hate rose to its climax. ... At this moment the entire group 
of people broke into a deep, slow, rhythmical chant of ‘B-B! 
...B-B!’ – over and over again, ... For perhaps as much as thirty 
seconds they kept it up. It was a refrain that was often heard in 
moments of overwhelming emotion. Partly it was a sort of hymn 
to the wisdom and majesty of Big Brother, but still more it was 
an act of self-hypnosis, a deliberate drowning of consciousness 
by means of rhythmic noise. 
Sport spectacles allow audiences to release their libidinal energy, or feelings of pity and fear, 
as their team of association wins or loses the competition. Perhaps it is this character of 
hypnosis or drowning of consciousness that Bourdieu had in mind when he considered that 
modern sport spectacles produce audiences without any practical competence in the game. As 
a narrative, modern sports appear to provide the perfect supplement to liberal capitalism by 
providing stories of global competition circumscribed by a supposedly equal investment of 
power and opportunities in those who participate. It is the ideological character of this 
narrative and the increasing monopolisation of the power to define the legitimate body and 
legitimate uses of the body that is hidden from the consciousness of spectators by pacifying 
and, in Orwell’s words, hypnotising them.
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Nevertheless, there are two problematic assumptions behind Bourdieu’s argument. 
First, does he not take for granted that there is a unity over a vast period of time to a popular 
agent when he claims that spectators are “reduced to passive understanding” and that are “less 
and less capable of that understanding which comes through practice” (1988: 160)? For 
instance, remarking on the “widening … gap between professionals and amateurs” Bourdieu 
notes that in dance, its constitution as a relatively autonomous field of cultural production for 
professionals is accompanied by a “dispossession of the profane, who are … reduced to the 
role of spectators” (ibid.). However, we cannot assume that it is the same dancers who were 
practitioners in its state as a vulgar form and who are sidelined as spectators more than a 
hundred years later. Bourdieu’s view appears nostalgic, looking back to a supposedly organic 
state of wholeness when there was no separation between the people and their cultural forms. 
We are left to assume such as state, since while the modern, contemporary version of dance is 
explicated to a considerable extent, we are given only cursory hints at the ritual function of 
dance in its vulgar form.
In opposition to village dancing, often associated with ritual 
functions, courtly dance, which becomes a spectacle, 
presupposes specific forms of knowledge (one has to know the 
beat and the steps), and thus requires dancing masters inclined to 
Fig. 9: Historical development of sports in Bourdieu.
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emphasize technical virtuosity and to perform a work of 
exegesis and codification; from the nineteenth century onward 
there appear professional dancers. … Then, finally, you have a 
total break between star dancers and spectators who do not 
practice dance and who are reduced to passive understanding. 
(ibid.)
If we assume a spectator who has no memory or experience of practising dance, would not the 
modern star dance event be a wholly different phenomenon from village dancing, requiring 
alternative tools for analysis, and not some secondary or derived form of an originary or more 
authentic version of what is essentially the same practice?
Second, the nostalgic aspect of Bourdieu’s historical analysis of sports does not appear 
conducive to a full understanding of the modern sport spectator as active interpreter of 
mediated events.113 His analysis rests on the notion that watching television pacifies 
audiences. Even if the preferred subject in Bourdieu’s sociology is an active agent – in 
contrast to a passive spectator duped to enjoy or suffer his or her own objectification – the 
questions remain whether we can assume consumption without interpretation, and if 
interpretation without some kind of active engagement is possible. As Stuart Hall has shown 
there is always room for alternative interpretations of media texts, and this phenomenon 
entails that some kind of interpretative activity is required by spectators to make sense of 
sports. To Hall there are several possible positions for the reader of a text, or a spectator of 
mediated sports (“Encoding/decoding” 136-138). The spectator may fully share the codes of 
the event and produce a preferred or dominant reading, in which case the code, or language of 
transmission, appears transparent. Alternatively, readers and spectators may challenge or 
reject outright the dominant code, and produce degrees of oppositional or counter-hegemonic 
readings. However, even a full acceptance of the preferred position in mediated sports 
requires some kind of interpretative activity on the side of the spectator to make sense of the 
113 The notion of interpreation as an activity is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.
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event.
Scholars who have taken a more descriptive approach to audiences’ experiences 
challenge Bourdieu’s normative and didactic view on mass mediated sports. Precisely because 
sports constitute struggles over legitimate meanings of bodies and sport spectacles may be 
seen as important primers for gender socialisation. Through sports talk fathers teach their sons 
about themes such as discipline, skill, courage, competition, loyalty, fairness, hierarchy and 
achievement. Sports are sites of male bonding. Here men unite in their common difference to 
– and perhaps power over – women. Audiences’ bodies may be passive to some extent while 
watching the game, but there is activation of a common imagery of familial patriarchy, 
mythos of the frontiersman, and a symbolism of the phallus (Sabo and Jansen 204).114 In order 
to make sense of media events audiences reach for these narratives and images to structure 
and interpret their experience.
While the purpose of sport in its officialisation phase was to instil virtue in future 
leaders by disciplining their bodies in physical exertion, in its popularisation phase virtue is 
taught on the sidelines of the game and among amateur spectators of professional performers, 
where elite practitioners now serve as models in a didactic narrative structure. Narratives of 
sport propose moral stories aimed at boys by offering “an image of manhood to aspire to” 
(Silvennoinen  2). To Gary Whannel, “the ideological work that is performed through the 
representation of sport stars is precisely to do with the normalization of hegemonic 
masculinity and the marginalisation of alternative masculinities” (p. 64). Scripts that 
emphasise patriarchy, the frontiersman and the phallus come across as highly circumscribed 
homoerotic, and yet apparently heteronormative, ways of making sense of mass mediated 
sports.
114 There is a fuller discussion of masculinities in sport in chapter 5.
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Unofficial pleasures
While these modes of reception may be dominant, – or, in the language of Stuart Hall, provide 
the preferred position for the spectator – there may be other ways in which audiences make 
meaning and draw pleasure from these events.115 For instance, even if athletics and healthy 
heterosexual masculinity are popularly equated, the impossibility of controlling the 
interpretation of mass mediated sport images enables radically different engagements with 
such events. Brian Pronger mentions that in a gay context a “muscular appearance [which] is 
meant to deter other men” may come across as attractive and sexually inviting (p. 151). The 
possibility of a bond between those who appreciate the double entendre of the muscular male 
body enables a kind of aesthetic community that is unofficial and subordinate, and yet it may 
provide a highly meaningful way of making sense of mass mediated sports.
Let us consider one comment made on South African television during the 
transmission of the opening game of the 1998 Football World Cup game between South 
Africa and France to highlight some of the difficulties associated with arriving at a certain 
meaning of mediated sport and the complexities involved in measuring the effects of sports as 
mass mediated spectacles.116 In a report from a South African reporter located in Marseille 
prior to the game itself television audiences were shown images of girls of various 
nationalities dancing in the streets. Comparing the performances the reporter commented on 
the “Brazilian skirts, the whites of England, [and] the skirts of the South African part was 
clearly unbelievable stuff” (Fjeld, “Soccer Rites” 401). The preferred reading fails to 
recognise that the female body provides “a sexual spectacle for consumption” on the sideline 
of the main event. A counter-hegemonic interpretation would take account of how this 
115 Bourdieu notes this effect when he admits that “writers' efforts to control the reception of their own 
works are always partially doomed to failure (one thinks of Marx's 'I am not a Marxist'); if only because the very 
effect of their work may transform the conditions of its reception” (“Field” 31).
116 The transmission is the topic of chapter 5.1 and is discussed in detail there.
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narrative supports what Jayne Caudwell refers to as the “man-masculine-heterosexual order” 
of sports (p. 378). The feminine body is established as an ornament to the virile, powerful and 
productive male body (ibid. 376; Pronger 144). While an oppositional reading would identify 
the ideological gendered implications of this sports text, Bourdieu’s notion of a duped and 
pacified spectator renders an audience with little or no room for critical interpretation. On 
closer examination we discover that not only may spectators reflect on the binary gender 
codes in this comment, but the text may provide ironic signals with regard to sexual desire on 
the part of the television reporter. Brian Pronger notes that
Given the patriarchal heterosexual significance of masculinity, it 
can have a special meaning for gay men. [...] Gay men can come 
to see that the power relations for which the semiotics of 
masculinity and femininity constitute a strategy have little to do 
with their lives. The meaning of masculinity, consequently, 
begins to change. Although masculinity is often the object of 
desire for gay men, its role in their lives is ironic. [...] For many 
gay men, masculinity and femininity cease to be experienced as 
what one is, and they become, quite consciously, ways in which 
one acts. (Pronger 144-145)
In the words of Judith Butler, gender becomes a matter of performance – a doing (p. 33). In 
his admiration of these street dancers, the South African commentator brought into being the 
possibility of a male subject desiring the position of a dancer in skirt, rendering open the 
possibility of an ironic or negotiated audience position. The possibility of a subject not 
objectifying the dancing women, but desiring their position entails a kind of identification that 
appeals to our memory and imagination, even if such identification remains wordless.
Silent language
Bourdieu makes reference to such a silent language: to him the body has its own language. A 
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silent, mimetic relation characterises communication between master and student in physical 
education, and this silent, body-to-body communication entails a kind of awakening of the 
body. The body understands, “outside conscious awareness, without being able to put our 
understanding into words” (1988: 161). What if even the slightest familiarity with a codified 
game such as football may be recalled by spectators, and that this memory of practice enables 
those who watch to make aesthetic judgements of performance beyond the mere winning or 
losing? Would not the bodily pleasure of a particularly skilled shot or swing of the hip count 
as an enjoyment that is beyond words precisely because it has never been articulated in a 
spoken tongue, and isn’t it in this body-to-body transmission that we find a guarantee for its 
unofficial and yet meaningful existence, and that its pleasures will remain beyond 
verbalisation?
Sports orchestrate the body, producing consent from the body that the mind might 
have otherwise refused (ibid. 167). This consent is manufactured by somatising the body in 
two ways: The bodies of those who participate in sports are domesticated and immersed in the 
game so that they forget the necessary element of illusion in the game, and more willingly 
accept orders that the mind would have rejected. In Bourdieu’s sociology somatisation 
through sports also takes place by pacifying spectators and rendering them unable to grasp the 
full extent of their own ideological consumption.
Nevertheless, are there not at least two senses in which audience may produce 
subordinate and unofficial pleasures from mass mediated sports? Firstly, the inability to 
completely and totally orchestrate the social enables spectators to draw unofficial pleasures 
from the open character of signs of masculinity in sports. For instance, are displays of virility 
meant to deter or invite other men? Secondly, the wordless memory of our own experience of 
sports supplements and leaves its trace when mass mediated spectacles are made meaningful. 
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Is there not in such experiences a memory of the body that cannot be fully articulated and 
therefore never be completely dominated by social orchestration?
The monopolistic capacity of modern sports to define the body and its uses to the 
masses remains incomplete. Subordinate and silent aesthetic communities retain a degree of 
autonomy with a capacity to counter the dominant meanings and audience positions of mass 
mediated sports.
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9. Conclusion: The national sports imaginary
Having now reached the limit of Bourdieu, we turn again to the notion of truth. In this study 
we have encountered three such notions. First, the view that the world is represented in 
signifiers, so that there is a referential relationship between signs and the world they refer to. 
One version of this view is referred to as the “mirror theory” in chapter 2: the idea that 
representations are mirrors of a world of signifieds, and that mediations mirror events. 
Second, knowledge and truth are located beyond abstract, analytical systems, such as those 
offered by Bernhard Suits’s view of sport discussed in chapter 3.2, in the sense that we may 
know things with our bodies. Such knowledges may never reach the level of conscious 
articulation, as Bourdieu points out. Sports are practices that automate habits – they produce 
an automatic form of consent – through a kind of team spirit or belief. We “know”, then, 
through sports in an embodied, not yet fully conscious way. This kind of knowledge is 
precisely what Slavoj Žižek refers to as ideological: it is an “unknown known,” which is to 
say that automated knowledges are things we do not even know that we know (“Atheist”; In 
Defense of Lost Causes 457). This notion of truth is discussed with reference to orchestration 
of the social body in chapter 3 and 6. Third, Lacanian psychoanalytic and philosopher Žižek 
proposes that there is a non-subjectivised form of truth – what we referred to as acephalic 
knowledge in chapter 7 – that is accessible in privileged moments. This notion we find again 
in Jacques Lacan’s social subject. To the Lacanian subject, truth is a property of time – it 
occurs as a momentary experience – and it is a necessary component in “symbolic castration”. 
Žižek explains that
by being filtered through the sieve of the signifier, the body is 
submitted to castration, enjoyment is evacuated from it, the body 
survives as dismembered, mortified. In other words, the order of 
the signifier (the big Other) and that of enjoyment (the Thing as 
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its embodiment) are radically heterogeneous, inconsistent; any 
accordance between them is structurally impossible. (Žižek 
1989: 122)
However, the encounter between the body in enjoyment and the signifying order also 
produces a possibility of change for the subject. Žižek points out that the “big Other” – the 
symbolic order – itself is dismembered, as it is organised around “a fundamental 
impossibility, structured around an impossible/traumatic kernel, around a central lack. 
Without this lack in the Other, the Other would be a closed structure” (Žižek, Sublime Object  
of Ideology 122). The impossibility of such a sutured structure  was discussed with reference 
to the South African regime of apartheid in chapter 4.1, and with reference to attempts to 
suture an epic body of nationalism in chapter 5. It is by recognising this impossibility – the 
lack in the Other – that the subject may reach a “de-alienation”. The subject realises that
the Other itself ‘hasn’t got it’, hasn’t got the final answer – that 
is to say, is in itself blocked, desiring; that there is also a desire 
of the Other. This lack in the Other gives the subject – so to 
speak – a breathing space. (Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology 
122)
It is in the context of this third sense of truth that I provide an overview of some of the central 
parts of the study in this conclusion. A discursive approach presupposes that there is a realm 
of elements – signifieds – that, through a process of articulation are converted into moments 
of discourse. This process is discussed in further detail in chapter 3. The body, then, is a 
product of articulation, and in this study the emphasis has been on the body as a site for the 
national-sport nexus. Nations and sports variously express themselves through the body, and 
the relations between these discourses is contested and changing. Chapter 5.1 shows how a 
South African nation in the making and various contenders, such as commercial vendors and a 
notion of an autonomous cultural field of sports, vied for a stake in the new South African 
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body, as it was expressed through the 1998 Football World Cup. Chapter 6 discusses the 
possibility of a novel body, situated in the wake of the epic, national body described in the 
previous chapter. This new body brings the promise of a stricter autonomy to sports and it is 
articulated as “healthy”, “natural” or even “authentic”. The struggle over the body is again 
central to the discussions in part III. In the two chapters that make up this part the emphasis is 
on the capacity of mass mediated sport to produce a particular kind of body, how does it 
trigger, contain and regulate desire (chapter 7) and what are the possibilities for a physically 
passive subject to enter into a process of “de-alienation” from spectacular sports (chapter 8)?
After some concluding remarks that intend to bring to bear questions of signification 
on discipline, Bourdieu’s concept of illusio, nationalism and sport, I will summarise some key 
concepts and arguments that run throughout the work and signpost where these ideas are 
discussed at greater length.
*
In London – one of the capitals of world football – one inevitably encounters the signature 
icon of the London tube – “Mind the gap” – illustrated by a red circle crossed by a blue 
horizontal bar. The abundant significations, or polysemic character, of this slogan include a 
reminder of the different levels of significations, as if saying, “Be aware that there is a lag 
between signifier and signified.” This is a primary insight of de Saussure’s 1916 Course in  
Linguistics which announced that the Sign was split into these elements, illustrated by the 
formula “S/s,” or signifier over signified. This gap informs the discussion of Lacan’s “The 
agency of the letter in the unconscious since Freud”, where he noted that “the signifier and the 
signified [are of] distinct orders separated initially by a barrier resisting signification” 
(“Agency” 148), insisting that the “topography” of the unconscious is structured like a 
language, and “defined by the algorithm: S/s” (ibid. 163).117 The bar resisting signification 
117 It is also in this essay that he mounted his attack on what he referred to as the “sociological poem of 
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constitutes a site or moment beyond comprehension, but also an apeiron that enables 
polysemy or a multiplicity of meanings attached to the same element.118
By minding the gap between the train and the platform on the London tube, one may 
be reminded of the lag between basis and superstructure or use value and exchange value, 
illustrated by the vast difference in pricing between the elite players of London football clubs 
and their unpaid colleagues in amateur leagues, the variety of prices on football equipment, 
and the use of certain football profiles to enhance the exchange value of certain products 
without adding anything to their use value. If this kind of analysis disregards the fact that the 
attachment of a certain player to a product may add pleasure and symbolic capital, and 
consequentially to its use value to a consumer who appreciates this player and who would 
experience benefits from purchasing and making use of this product among her or his peers, it 
is nevertheless the case that the product and the player brought in to market it becomes 
associated with its user in distinct ways, and that the meaning of the product can only by 
metonymy be articulated with the endorsing player. Björn Borg briefs do not, for example, 
include an actual part of the former professional tennis player, but are associated with him 
merely by metaphor, and an active imagination on the part of the reader or consumer.
It is this gap in signification which facilitates different readings of the same utterance, 
making it impossible to arrive at a final suture of meaning, or an objective perspective, or 
truth, beyond subjective reading experiences. Polysemy also lays the ground for the political, 
in that it enables the possibility of at least two different meanings of every single word and 
concept, opening the way for a split in meaning, and ensuing attempts at hegemonising the 
meaning of words and concepts (see the discussion of discourse and articulation in chapter 3), 
most strikingly, perhaps, in the discussion over “democracy” in the international political 
the autonomous ego,” (“Agency” 171) productive of the notion of individual identity.
118 For a discussion of the apeiron or Absolute as constituting a limit to comprehension, see chapter 3.
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arena, or over justice in sports.
If nationalisms are considered as discourse formations, since they are composed of 
“gestative political structures”119, they are in themselves made up of webs of significations 
that are hegemonically related to each other.120 Nationalism’s engagements with other 
discourse formations, such as those of football and the field of class relations, receive their 
meanings by hegemonic processes that operate in and through the entanglements and 
interstices of these fields. Football as a form of social practice has a different meaning when 
articulated with nationalism from when it is hegemonised by large discourse operators of the 
economic field, such as major manufacturers of sports equipment,121 and these meanings are 
not intrinsic to either field or discourse, but produced by their mutual engagements. If football 
has a meaning that is wholly autonomous of nationalism and the economic field, such an 
independence of neighbouring discourses is ideal and almost impossible to imagine. Every 
football has a history of production and each participant puts in time, his body and a 
considerable libidinal investment in a game and its gestures in ways that connect it to 
discourses beyond the immediacy of football practice strictu sensu. A commercial for an 
alcoholic beverage can draw on the memory of playing or watching football, in an attempt to 
associate the movements of football, acquired through hours of tedious and pleasurable 
practice, with the beverage in order to increase sales and revenue for the company. The game 
may also be associated with the signifier of the nation, its flag or anthem through innumerable 
articulations on national television, or through endless reminders in official settings such as 
through the national physical education curriculum in schools. 
If the signified constitutes the site where unconscious elements float while awaiting 
119 This phrase is discussed within the context of discursive subject positions in chapter 3.
120 Discursive activities are practices invested with powers to control, select, organise and distribute 
subjects and objects, criteria for knowledge and methods, practitioners and various forms of capital.
121 See, e.g. the commercials featuring the logo of a major sports vendor and the word “football”.
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the partial fixing in a conscious moment, a prime football location such as the stadium offers 
itself as both a place in which elements of football are codified into scores, the movements of 
players interpreted and acted upon by their team mates, opponents, officials, spectators, 
vendors, and so on, but also as a space in which the preconscious ego defends itself. The 
stadium is the site in which the ego attempts to hegemonise the “I”, attempting to dislocate 
him or herself from others which are constituted as outside the self, alien to it, and serving as 
objects onto which the “I” can later project its wishes, desires, and failures. To Lacan the 
stadium is the site in which the fiction of the “I” is established as a fortress, producing a 
succession of fantasies that culminates in an image of a total and sutured body, and ushering 
in the entrance of the subject into the symbolic order (“Mirror stage” 4). The stadium hosts 
the intermediate stage in the formation of the “I”, after and beyond the hysterical repressions 
of a fragmented body, but also making possible the ego’s paranoiac alienation, and the 
possibility of its loss or transversal into the imaginary and an experience of “imaginary 
servitude” (“Mirror stage” 7).122 It is here the fantasies of the “I” are established, such as the 
constitutive other, the mythological trappings of an autonomous ego, and its corresponding 
values.
The most suitable analogy for football is a matter that should be thoroughly 
considered. Should football be signified as a drama set on the unconscious mirror stage and 
producing the fantasies required by a fictional “I”, including a limited number of set pieces or 
characters, narratives and firmly composed, and yet open-ended dramaturgy?123 Or should it 
be considered as a game, perhaps more in the vein of chequers or chess, defined by its rule 
122 “The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – 
and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of 
phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic – and, 
lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity” (Lacan “Mirror stage”: 4). Lacan's notion of the 
mirror stage is discussed further in chapter 7.
123  This is Gary Whannel’s view of the game, and was discussed in the context of an epic narrative 
framing the body of the sporting subject in chapter 5.
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book and chief obstacle for winning the game?124 Perhaps the activities that are referred to by 
the name of football should rather be grouped with the type of play we find among children, 
those game-like activities that are not yet as rule bound as chess or chequers, which would 
enable differentiation between actors’ accumulated recognition, or symbolic capital, in 
accounting for their acts and their outcomes on the field?
The latter approach would include Maradona’s infamous goal with his hand against 
England in the 1986 World Cup as a significant example of how an established, highly 
regarded and well-versed actor can turn a multitude of elements of a social practice into his 
benefit. It was not only his skills and recognition as one the world’s premier football players 
according to Suits’ definition that enabled the goal, but also his ability to carefully circumvent 
the constitutive rules without being caught, as well as his explication of the event as divine 
intervention after the game, by referring to it as “the hand of God”.
Maradona’s performance and signifying act stretches beyond the physical confines of a 
stadium and the constitutive rules of the game. The paradoxical inversion of his own agency – 
depriving himself of any intentionality in producing the goal – may be perceived as a 
justification of the goal in terms of the game’s constitutive rules, and a way to excuse himself 
from any guilt in transgressing these rules, but it also served to articulate the event as a kind 
of divine intervention manufactured in and through its very uttering, or performance in 
language. The act of God that Madonna referred to came about by his naming it as such in 
speech.125 Maradona scored by successfully circumventing of the rules of the game, and by 
cheating in a way that was not discovered until it was too late, and his explication of the goal 
124 Berhard Suits’s (8-15) analytical approach to sports was discussed in chapter 3.2.
125 This type of speech act, referred to as the performative, produces that which it names, the classic 
example being “I hereby name this ship 'Titanic'.” (Butler). Butler's version of the performative speech act is 
central to the discussions in chapter 3.2 on referees' subjective production, as they are producing in discourse 
their own role. It is also brought to bear on the performative production of gender and sex in sports in chapter 5 
and 8. To J.L. Austin performative utterances were those utterances that were not simply truth-evaluable. They 
were, instead, doing certain actions, such as baptising – giving name to – a ship (p. 5).
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signified it as a moment in which the everyday meaning of the game and its rules were 
undermined by contextualising the event as a moment in a divine and far more extensive 
game plan. By his utterance, Maradona indicated that the potential meanings of football 
stretch far beyond the needs of manufacturers of sports equipment, nationalist discourses, and 
the interests of a growing global football bureaucracy, and perhaps it is at a moment such as 
this, when football stands at its head – the “father” of football being knocked out of the World 
Cup after an unlawful goal signified as an act of God – that it most clearly becomes cognisant 
of itself and its limits, since it is through such acts that the circumference of the game can be 
re-established.126 Far from an act that undermined the game, Maradona’s goal and its 
contextualisation could be perceived as reinstalling the laws of the game by means of their 
transgression. Perhaps never more clearly has the ritualistic component of football been 
played out in the context of a sporting “patricide”.
Discipline, then, may be invoked in at least three senses in the context of football.127 
First, it may signify football as a form of sport practice distinct from handball or ski jumping, 
for example, defined by its constitutive rules. Football can be perceived as designating only 
those activities that are pursued in conformity with FIFA regulations, or some other analytical 
set of rules.128 In this sense, Maradona’s goal would fall outside the definition of football, and 
should not properly be an object of enquiry into the game. However, in a second sense, it is 
precisely through such acts that football establishes itself as a field of knowledge and practice. 
As academic disciplines order and disseminate knowledges, football appears differently to a 
sociologist than it does to an anthropologist, physiologist, or psychologist. In a sociological 
sense football includes not only the game’s constitutive rules, but also its players, spectators, 
126 To Georges Bataille it was precisely through such sacred acts that the profane world could discover and 
reassert itself (pp. 69-74). The question of transgression – the excessive – as constitutive of order in Bataille is 
discussed in chapter 6.
127 See also discussion of discipline in the introduction and chapter 3.
128 Suits pp. 8-15. See chapter 3.2.
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administrators, sponsors, representatives of the mass media, as well as rules, stadiums and 
other kinds of infrastructure, an esoteric history of records, a political philosophy.
As a social field of practice football offers specific forms of cultural capital that can be 
converted into political power or economic gains by trafficking with adjacent fields, such as 
nationalism or the field of class relations.129 Disciplines are systems in the control and 
production of discourse and as such are apparatuses of knowledge and forms of power. The 
engagement in football produces vastly different gains in social and cultural capital to, say, a 
sociologist or an amateur player. Cultural analysts of sport are located in a matrix of 
differently valued practices within their professional field, and these differences produce 
distinct symbolic and economic outcomes. Players and scholars produce different kinds of 
knowledges of the body, even if these knowledges are situated partly in the body.
If not wholly distinct from these two senses of the word, discipline may also signify 
the acquisition of practical mastery, and disciplined practices of football include those of 
sociologists, amateur players, administrators, and so on, as their engagements in the game are 
productive of dispositions that provide recognition as actors in the game and empowers them 
to participate in the selection and control of practitioners and their discursive activity. 
Disciplined action entails a silent exercise of power in the body of the performer. The 
movements and dispositions necessary to engage in football are recognised also by spectators, 
who may well imagine their participation in a game by miming body movements acted out on 
by players on the pitch, or by making judgements of the skill or competence of players. This 
kind of knowledge with the body, or a knowledge that is pre-verbal and situated in the body is 
produced by sports as practices in which skills, i.e. its languages and dialects of practice, are 
acquired through mimesis, or by imitating other and more accomplished practitioners. To be a 
129 The term cultural capital is discussed in the introduction and returns as central to the conceptual 
toolbox in chapter 3 and throughout the analyses in parts II and III as a response to questions such as how 
various sports signify class and gender, etc.
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disciplined football practitioner includes the ability to skilfully communicate in a language in 
which meaning to a large extent is exercised silently, or “body to body”.130
An understanding of football that only includes those practices that are performed by 
way of its constitutive rules fails to acknowledge the element of illusio that is necessary to get 
involved in the game and to attain a practical mastery of its rules. The player has to forget that 
it’s only a game, and that, as a game, it always contains the possibility of referring to 
something else, and contain an analogous relation to a different field of activity. The twin 
elements of a silent, mimetically acquired language and illusio makes football a premier site 
to disseminate officialising discourse. Football offers a global language with specific ways of 
ordering the body, producing durable dispositions to act, and soliciting from it – perhaps as an 
effect of the joy one may experience through practice – a consent which the mind might 
otherwise refuse. The kind of preconscious communication that takes place in football 
produces it as a means by which society may be symbolised, orchestrated, and, in effect, 
domesticated and somatised. These effects are discussed in chapter 2, where the body is 
considered as a site for silent and preconscious communication, and returns to inform the 
discussions in chapter 3, 3.2, and 6,
Nationalisms are among those officialising discourses that are embedded in football. 
As Gellner pointed out, national attributes are considered as naturally attached to human 
beings as are a nose and two ears131, and football as productive of dispositions to act, think 
and perceive disseminate nationalisms as embodied practices. Nationalisms as discourses 
promoting the objective or pre-discursive existence of specific nations are entrenched in the 
bodies of practitioners of football through school curricula and voluntary sports. The 
130 For a further discussion of mimesis and dispositions, see chapter 3.The notion of sports as sites for 
silent communication is central to the theoretical discussion in chapter 3 and 3.1 on the subject in Bourdieu, 
chapter 6 on the “authentic” body of sport and physical education, and chapter 7 on sports as vehicles for social 
orchestration and the production of a tacit consent.
131 Ernest Gellner's view of nationalism is discussed in chapter 4 and as part of sport's capacity to 
naturalise social relations in chapter 3.
197
articulations of national associations that organise the game hold hegemony over its code of 
practice, and negotiate with governments and actors in the field of class relations. 
Nationalisms are also major components in football as a form of media spectacles for the 
masses, such as the World Cup, when billions of citizens around the planet associate 
themselves with players competing on behalf of particular nations, and, aroused by the illusio  
that enables football to be perceived as something else and more real than a game, adapt and 
silently consent to values and significations that are loaded onto football as popular practice 
and mass spectacles.
Along with enterprises in the economic field and the official bodies of football, 
nationalisms struggle to define the meanings and values that are entrenched in the body 
through practice. If football emerged as a field of practice that overhauled and rationalised 
vulgar games into pass-times for the elite, it was modelled after a particular element of larger 
society, namely the army, and in accordance with the need of imperial Britain’s upper class to 
produce disciplined bodies imbued with a will to win – even if such a will would be 
circumscribed by a set of strict rules that served to remind its participants to maintain the rôle 
distance appropriate to an aristocratic disposition to sport – it returns as a form of mass 
spectacle and popular practice that in itself forms a model of an ideal state of affairs in society 
in toto. The element of illusio that is added on its return as a popular activity produces 
football as a vehicle to disseminate and domesticate values and meanings. Within the doxa, or 
hegemonic signification of football as a social practice, it provides a model of society as it is 
or should be, in the sense that it plays out a dominant perception of social practice as 
characterised by competitive activities that are bound by rules provided by governments and 
non-governmental organisations, determined by so-called market mechanisms (which, 
translated to the field of football, make scores and tournament results meaningful as abstract 
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or objective measures of the skills or qualities of each team), and acted out within a 
teleological and hierarchical narrative, so that each competition culminates in the naming of a 
single winner over and above a range of competitors that are assigned their rank hierarchically 
and in accordance with the numerical outcome of their total performance in the competition.132
With its immense popularity both as a popular practice and in the form of spectacle for 
the masses, football constitutes a prime arena for officialising discourses, or discourses which 
seek to transform private, particular interests into “collective, publicly avowable, legitimate 
interests”.133 In its popularisation phase football served to legitimate as official and preferred a 
body that was tailored to suit the interests of imperial Britain’s ruling class by producing a 
body that would acquire the dispositions necessary for soldiery and would be inclined to 
embrace the leisured classes’ approach to sport as disinterested amateurs, and the rôle distance 
required to consent to posit sport as an area of cultural production exempted from the rules 
that govern other parts of the economic field, and instead designating it as a field that should 
serve as a model to society as a whole. Interests which had been private and particular, such 
as the need to delineate certain sections of society from those inhabitants who are inscribed as 
outsiders or threats to the social order, become intrinsic to the game itself, serving to 
manufacture a game in which all of society must be protected from these social outsiders, 
hooligans, criminals, drug addicts, and so on.134 The official bodies of football lubricate the 
game with the values of the dominant fraction of the dominant class by adopting a morality of 
health associated with the new bourgeoisie and designating as official and legitimate a body 
that is “natural” and “pure” by excluding a whole set of practices that could improve 
performance. As a field of labour the official bodies’ insistence on the rôle distance associated 
132 See Fjeld. “Soccer Rites”, for a further discussion of sport as a model for society, rather than the 
historicist notion of a reverse relationship.
133 The term officialisation is discussed in chapter 5 as a way to explain how certain social relations are 
embodied and naturalised through sports. Officialising discourses returns as a topic in chapter 7 on social 
orchestration through spectacular sports.
134 Alterity is a topic of chapter 7, where sports are seen as tools to encapsulate the healthy and orderly.
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with the amateur past of football puts at a disadvantage those with an instrumental relation to 
their bodies and those who are disposed to take up a profession even if it may cause damage 
to their health.135 Finally, the official narrative of football manufactures a dimorphic body that 
is supplemented by a set of unofficial binary codes for gendered behaviour and appearance, 
and a heteronormative structure of desire.136
While the disciplined, mimetic character of communication in sport entails a dressage 
of the body, by manufacturing a body that concedes to the meanings and values of football 
even if the mind would have refused, it may also effect a particular kind of awakening of 
consciousness that takes place in and through the body. As a symbolic gymnastics football 
“always contains something ineffable, [...] something which communicates, so to speak, from 
body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words and concepts, and which pleases (or displeases) 
without concepts”,137 and it is this particular kind of understanding that may be raised to the 
level of consciousness and enable the performer to grasp the state and character of the 
sporting body and its context in a way that escapes symbolisation.138 While football serves as 
a powerful vehicle to order the body and its desire it may, perhaps ironically, produce a body 
with a heightened awareness of its own limits, needs, and desires, and with an expanded 
capacity for knowing the truth of desire.
The stadium may, then, serve as an ambiguous sign to the body of football. On the one 
hand it features as a site for the preconscious defence of the ego, where those fantasies are 
manufactured that bolster the ego. and seeks to produce an impermeable armour that will 
135 See chapter 5 for an outline of the official, national body that is produced through football. Chapter 7 
discusses how the gentlemanly code of “fair play” in effect privileges what Bourdieu refers to as the 
“macrobiotic cult of health.”
136 Chapter 5 and 7 discuss conditions under which the dominant order of sex, gender and desire may be 
destabilized.
137 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice 2. The pre-symbolic element of communication in sport is 
discussed further in chapter 3 and chapter 6.
138 Perhaps it is precisely this kind of understanding Lacan refers to when he notes that “I think where I 
am not, therefore I am when I do not think” (Lacan, “Agency”: 166).
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protect it from questions of its sutured and total character and will enable its entrance into the 
symbolic order. On the other hand, the stadium may be the site for liminal experiences, such 
as when a football player is sent off the pitch and barred from playing, or a performer suffers 
an injury ending her or his career, which could bring about the kind of “subjective destitution” 
effected by the loss of a fundamental fantasy and the type of “full speech” in which subjective 
truth reverberates.139 It is through such a loss and by the experience of a world that is shaken 
in its very basic structures that the subject may transverse the membrane or hymen140 that 
shields the symbolic order from the realm of the imaginary that precedes and envelops it.
It is this “actual experience of truth” (Lacan, “Agency” 151) that enables an acute 
awareness of the gap that divides the signifier from the signified and the symbolic from the 
realm of the imaginary, or that which has not yet been symbolised. While this bar enables the 
silent, pre-symbolic communication in sport, it also facilitates an experience of the ineffable, 
and a type of knowledge that only the body can hold. It is through this gap that the subject can 
never fully come to terms with their desire but must remain chasing it, like a football team 
that persists in pursuing experiences of community, accomplishment and overcoming.
139 Chapter 7 discusses how football, as spectacles for the masses, produce such fundamental fantasies and 
whether it may be possible for the spectator to experience the kind of loss or trauma by apprehending mediations 
of sport as mistaken objects of desire.
140 To Jacques Derrida the hymen represents a domain of undecidability, or a location in which it is 
possible to speak of difference and, hence, politics. The hymen is neither inside nor outside, and yet it doubles as 
both distinguishing between the two and performing a synthesis or fusion. “It is the difference between the two 
that is no longer functional. [...] What is lifted, then, is not difference but the different, the differends, the 
decidable exteriority of differing terms. Thanks to the confusion and continuity of the hymen, and not in spite of 
it, a (pure and impure) difference inscribes itself without any decidable poles, without any independent, 
irreversible terms” (Dissemination 209-10). The hymen comes to represent a term through which it may be 
possible to shift from a binary logic or space of positions to a realm of radical undecidability.
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Appendix: Key concepts and arguments
Relative cultural autonomy 
Both Bourdieu and discourse theory claim there is a relative autonomy of cultural practices. In 
this regard they variously oppose the economic determinism associated with Althusser’s 
notion that the economic base determines the social superstructure in the last instance. This 
reintroduces politics because articulations are no longer wholly reducible to the economic 
field. In the discourse theory of Laclau this is called hegemonic articulation, borrowing from 
Gramsci, indicating that there is no direct representation of an infrastructure (base or the 
realm of “signifieds”), but that its presentation in discourse is the result of contingent, non-
necessary articulation.
In Bourdieu classes are contested and constructed through struggle over “legitimate 
visions of the world” and not substantial entities given in reality.141 With Hall these views can 
be enlisted in a critique of the mirror theory of representation: the belief that mediations are 
simply mirrors of pre-discursive, external events. Since mediations are themselves events – 
and any event requires mediation to appear to us – there can be no final anchorage outside 
discourse. This is what Laclau refers to as the discursive being co-extensive with the social. 
Chapter 3 discusses the relations between discourse theory and Bourdieu’s notion of (the 
relative autonomy of) fields in greater detail. Practical applications of the tension between 
structure and autonomy in the context of the body is the topic of part II, while part III situates 
the tension within spectacular sports.
Kinds of knowledges 
The kinds of knowledges engendered through the disciplinarity we associate with scholastic 
141 Swartz 147. See the discussion on subjectivity in chapter 3.1 for a fuller discussion of substantialism.
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studies need to be supplemented by an understanding of actors’ modus operandi: how they 
respond in the face of “practical choices”. This is what Bourdieu refers to as overcoming the 
impasse between subjectivism and objectivism. After objectifying the structuring structures 
organising a cultural field, the structured propensities of actors – their dispositions to act in 
particular circumstances – are reintroduced. Sports serve as useful illustrations of how the 
practical knowledge of actors, such as referees, supplement knowledges acquired through 
scholastic objectification. Part III introduces a third kind of knowledge – a non-subjectivised 
type of truth – that is accessible in privileged moments. The attainment of this kind of 
knowledge offers the possibility of a “de-alienation” of the subject.
Embodied belief 
The type of silent communication engendered through the acquisition of skills in sport carries 
the implications of a whole system of belief that is automatised and maintained at the level 
prior to discursive articulation. The dressage entailed by the practical mastery of sports 
inculcates a form of belief in subjects: as such sports are practices where much 
communication takes place silently and never reaches the level of conscious awareness. The 
notion of a silent form of consent is discussed in conjunction with social somatisation and the 
subject in Bourdieu in chapter 3 and 3.1, in in the context of a new, “authentic” body in 
chapter 6.
Messianic time retained in nationalist narratives
Bourdieu generally associated nations with institutions and organised by states. In order to 
understand nations as discourses this study has turned to the writing of Benedict Anderson, 
who proposes that nations are constructed – imagined – social communities that respond to 
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particular social events, such as the distance between rulers and ruled in the colonies in the 
Americas and the mass dissemination of newspapers and books in the vernacular following 
from the emergence of print-capitalism. Nationalism as a historical period was a force to 
oppose and end imperial domination (chapter 4).
In Anderson’s view the advent of nationalism entailed a novel concept of time. In 
opposition to earlier dynastic and religious regimes – which were marked by “prefiguration 
and fulfilment” – nationalism enabled “simultaneity across time” or “transverse” time. This 
mean that events could happen simultaneously in, say, Buenos Aires and Madrid, and that 
events in the colonies no longer occurred as an effect of, and dependent upon, events in the 
imperial centre. This study shows how nationalist narratives make use of Messianic time – the 
time-conception marked by “prefiguration and fulfilment” – in an attempt to narrate a distinct 
break with the past. Such was the case with South Africa’s transmission of the 1998 Football 
World Cup on national television (chapter 4.1 and 5.1).
The body of nationalism framed as epic
As the body of nationalism disseminated through sports has been configured as an epic body, 
it is heternormative and naturalises the virtues and body-relations associated with the 
dominant fractions of the dominant class at the moment of its popularisation. As such it is a 
legitimating narrative for a society based on competition and values of individualism, as the 
case study of South Africa’s participation in the 1998 Football World Cup shows (chapter 2, 5 
and 5.1).
A new “authentic” body of globalised sports
As the cultural field of sports achieves greater autonomy it can place a further emphasis on 
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constitutive aspects of their practices that decreases the founding character of nations in the 
formation of the performer. Evidence from the Norwegian schools’ Physical Education 
curriculum and mass mediated sports indicate that a new globalised body may take the place 
of the epic body of nationalism. This is a body that values the “natural”, “organic” and 
“authentic”: it operates in the aftermath of what Bourdieu referred to as the “macrobiotic cult 
of health” (chapters 6 and 7).
Illusio and desire in spectacular sports 
In what Bourdieu calls the “popularisation phase” of sports, they take the form of mass 
mediated spectacles. The element of illusio disables viewers from apprehending the social 
orchestration inherent in such events, the effect of which can be further elaborated through the 
use of theories of the mimetic character of desire taken from the work of Jacques Lacan  and 
Slavoj Žižek. Mass mediated sports events can be seen as instances of desire engines designed 
to structure and trigger the desire of viewers. We ask if the subjective destitution associated 
with the loss of a fundamental fantasy may enable viewers to recognise what Bourdieu 
referred to as the illusio of social orchestration, and, in turn, the truth of desire. Illusio is 
defined and discussed in chapter 3 and brought to bear on sports as vehicles for social 
orchestration in chapter 6 and 7.
A passive spectator? 
Bourdieu generally assumed a passive recipient of mediated sports, and contended that such 
events could have a detrimental effect in that they rendered viewers increasingly passive. This 
has been referred to as Bourdieu’s theory of a subject rendered passive, or his “passification 
theory” of spectacular sports. However, the work of theorists such as Stuart Hall shows that 
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this is a simplified view of spectators and readers: we are actively producing meaning from 
the messages we receive, and this meaning-making activity is a necessary component in 
reception. His theory of an increasingly passive spectator overlooks Bourdieu’s own insight 
into the silent communication practised through sport: it is in this wordless realm of tacit 
understanding that an hitherto unarticulated realm of meaning may be uncovered (chapter 8).
